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Abstract
Why do some peace agreements last longer than others? The literature 
speaks of “spoilers”—parties excluded from the negotiations who turn to vio-
lence to  undermine the agreement—and identifies  the risk that  opposition 
groups excluded from negotiations will become spoilers. But the spoiler does 
not always fight for the opposition. The government party in these conflicts 
has erroneously been assumed to be unitary.  In fact,  pro-government mili-
tias—armed, organized groups that support the government but are not part 
of the regular armed forces—are important actors. This project questions the 
unitary government assumption that is common in the literature.
I propose to analyze these militias as if they were bureaucracies within 
the state: either they are delegated power, or they seize autonomy. These two 
models of bureaucratic behavior illuminate the relationships between militias 
and their government, and suggest how to manage militias in post-conflict 
situations.
My  project  proceeds  in  two  stages.  A statistical  regression  analysis 
finds that peace agreements fail more often when they are concluded while at 
least one militia was active. Importantly, militias that are closely tied to their 
governments, and militias that target noncombatants, are especially detrimen-
tal to the likelihood of peace. Case studies illuminate these findings. Two suc-
cessful peace agreements and one failed agreement illustrate how militias act 
as  spoilers  and  how negotiators  used  different  approaches  to  address  the 
spoilers. 
These findings advance theoretical and practical knowledge of militias 
and peace processes. There are of course further questions. When do peace 
agreements really produce a better state of affairs? When do “spoilers” have 
legitimate grievances? I express no judgments on these questions. I aim only 
to shed light on how peace might be achieved, on the assumption that some-
times it is worth bringing about.  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I. Introduction
In the Istanbul Archeological Museum sit the remnants of clay tablets, 
on which are inscribed the outlines of what is considered to be the first ever 
peace treaty. The Treaty of Kadesh, between the Egyptians and Hittites, was 
concluded in 1259 BCE. In the agreement, the parties agree to a mutual-as-
sistance pact; to keep away from the others’ territory; and to ask their gods to 
call for peace.1
In  the  intervening  3000  years,  myriad  peace  agreements  of  conse-
quence have been concluded; some have been more successful than others. 
The Treaty of Westphalia established the state system that persists today, but 
the Treaty of Versailles created only temporary peace before the horrors of 
World  War  II.  Peacemaking  methods  have  changed  since  Kadesh.  We  no 
longer ask the God of War to keep us at peace, but the goal remains the same: 
post-war peace agreements with maximum longevity. 
Peace  agreements—also  called  negotiated  settlements—represent  a 
moment of consensus in the conflict: a point in time in which the combatants 
are willing to settle their differences with diplomacy rather than violence.  2
These moments are worth seizing.
Despite  ample  theoretical  debate  and  plentiful  practical  experience, 
one estimate is that 79 percent of post-war peace agreements concluded be-
 Istanbul  Archaeological  Museums,  Treaty  of  Kadesh.  <http://bit.ly/1PTB6wK>.  Ac1 -
cessed 25 Jul 2015.
 A brief note on terminology: Here, I will use the term “peace agreement” to refer to “an 2
agreement between two or more primary warring parties in a conflict, which addresses 
the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a 
process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.” This is the def-
inition used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, from which I will ultimately derive 
my dependent variable. This definition is consistent with most of my source materials, 
though where authors make deliberate use of the nearly-equivalent phrase “negotiated 
settlement,” I have not altered their text.
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tween 1816 and 1992 failed to prevent a recurrence of conflict.  Why do some 3
peace agreements succeed while others fail? What factors contribute to their 
longevity? The literature seeking to answer these questions tends to use one 
of two methods: broad, quantitative approaches or more narrow, qualitative 
case studies. These case studies focus in-depth on a few agreements at a time 
and do not intend to generate broadly applicable theories. The quantitative 
literature, by contrast, attempts to form wider-ranging theories about general 
conditions that contribute to an agreement’s success or failure. For example, 
some authors have argued that an agreement is more likely to last if it is con-
cluded in a country with a relatively democratic regime.  Others argue that an 4
agreement is more likely to last if it includes third-party enforcement mea-
sures, like peacekeepers.5
For its part, the quantitative literature has tended to conceive of con-
flicts as occurring between two main actors: the government, and the opposi-
tion (usually called ‘rebels’). Some authors have begun to recognize the ar-
guably excessive parsimony in this formulation, and have moved to consider 
that each side in the conflict may comprise multiple, not unitary, actors. For 
example,  Nilsson  argues,  “Whereas  case  studies  within  the  literature  on 
durable peace emphasize that a refined view of the rebel side is needed, quan-
titative studies have, so far, mainly focused on two parties—the government 
and the opposition.”  But even as Nilsson (rightly) criticizes the quantitative 6
 Paul D. Senese & Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of 3
Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace,” The Journal of Politics 65.3 (2003): 710.
 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, & Donald Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace After 4
Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables,” International Organization 55.1 (2001): 
189.
 Virginia Page Fortna, “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after 5
Civil and Interstate Wars,” International Studies Review 5.4 (2003): 97-114.
 Desirée Nilsson, “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settle6 -
ments,” Journal of Peace Research 45.4 (2008): 480.
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literature for failing to disaggregate ‘the rebel side,’ she neglects to make the 
same conceptual move: in a civil war, the government side also should not be 
considered a unitary actor in all cases.
This  shortcoming  in  the  quantitative  literature  was  the  impetus  for 
Carey,  Mitchell,  and  Lowe  to  create  the  pro-government  militia  database 
(PGMD).  Pro-government militias are armed, organized groups that act with 7
the  backing  of  their  government,  but  are  not  a  part  of  the  state’s  regular 
armed forces. But “despite the effect that pro-government militias can have on 
the political, economic, and social stability and security of civilians…there are 
currently no systematic measures of these informal violent organizations that 
act on behalf of the government.”  As a result, the quantitative literature “lags 8
behind the case study literature in analyzing the impact of these groups.”9
The goal  of  this  thesis  is  to  bring this  insight—a focus on the  con-
stituent actors within the government party to a conflict—to the conflict-reso-
lution and peacebuilding literatures. Does the presence of a pro-government 
militia (PGM) affect the odds of success for a peace agreement? If so, are cer-
tain  types  of  groups more  detrimental  to  the  chances  of  peace  than other 
groups? If PGMs significantly affect the odds of success for a peace agree-
ment, these literatures should account for a non-unitary government.
This project will therefore attempt to examine the effect of this new in-
dependent variable—and with it, a newer way of thinking about parties to 
conflicts—upon our understanding of the factors that lead to the success or 
failure of post-civil war peace agreements. This will be a mixed-methods en-
deavor, first using a large-N quantitative analysis to examine the set of peace 
 Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, & Will Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the mo7 -
nopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias,” Journal of Peace Research 
50.2 (2013): 249-258.
 Ibid., 250.8
 Ibid.9
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agreements; and second, exploring in depth the role of specific conflict dy-
namics in three peace processes. 
I will first outline what is meant by ‘pro-government militia’ and ex-
plain how the data were compiled. Next, I will establish the academic founda-
tion for the research question, reviewing the literature on peace agreement 
success and civil  war recurrence.  I  will  focus particularly upon theories of 
‘spoilers’—excluded  or  disenchanted  parties  to  conflicts  who,  seeing  not 
enough benefit from the peace being proposed, deliberately undermine the 
settlement process. I will argue that PGMs must also be considered capable 
spoilers, and be accounted for in the peace process. 
I will turn to the literature on bureaucracies to explain the mechanism 
of how, precisely, a militia might spoil an agreement. I argue that the literature 
on bureaucratic management can explain militia behavior and offer insight 
into their management. By understanding when states delegate to bureaucra-
cies and when bureaucracies achieve autonomy, we can better understand the 
behavior of different types of militias. 
With this theoretical background, I will turn to the quantitative analy-
sis. I will present the evidence that exists for this undertaking, describe the 
data that I have used, and define the scope of my inquiry. I will also defend 
my underlying theoretical and methodological assumptions. I will explain the 
strengths and limitations of this sort of analysis.
Next,  I  will  explore  the  history  of  the  three  peace  processes:  two 
agreements in Indonesia—the 2002 Cessation of  Hostilities  Agreement and 
the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding—and the 1992 Chapultepec Accord 
in El Salvador. I will explain how the history of these cases aligns with the 
theoretical literature on peace agreements, but also how these cases offer new 
insights into the specific context of conflicts. Finally, I will offer some conclu-
!4
sions, and I will particularly seek to demonstrate how both the quantitative 
and qualitative research methods can benefit from insights discovered by us-
ing the complementary method. 
Ultimately,  I  find  that  the  data  indicate  that  agreements  concluded 
while at least one militia was active are, statistically, significantly more likely 
to fail than agreements concluded without active militias. This finding should 
have implications for how the quantitative literature conceives of ‘the gov-
ernment’ and considers which variables lead to lasting peace. The history of 
managing these groups in Indonesia and El Salvador sets forth an example for 
future peace processes. 
This empirical finding should push us to consider what drives a gov-
ernment to outsource its violence and repression, and how to more systemati-
cally settle the grievances that drive these conflicts. Developing a better un-
derstanding of each individual peace process is a necessary but not sufficient 
step, as it will only address the symptoms, and not the root of the illness of 
the current structure of the international system.  
!5
II. Pro-Government Militias
To  discuss  the  shortcomings  in  the  quantitative  literature  on  peace 
agreement durability and post-civil war peacebuilding, it is first necessary to 
properly define and understand what is meant here by ‘pro-government mili-
tia.’
In 2013, Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe introduced the the pro-government 
militia  database  (PGMD).  Pro-government  militias  are  organized  groups 10
that operate with some degree of support from their government, but are not 
a part of the state’s regular armed forces. The PGMD contains a set of 332 pro-
government militias (PGMs) that were active around the world between 1981 
and 2007.
Carey, et al. explained why they created the PGMD: “Despite the effect 
that pro-government militias can have on the political, economic, and social 
stability and security of civilians…there are currently no systematic measures 
of  these  informal  violent  organizations  that  act  on  behalf  of  the 
government.”  As a result, the quantitative literature “lags behind the case 11
study literature in analyzing the impact of these groups.”12
A PGM is defined by Carey, et al. to be a group that: 
“1. is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the 
government (national or sub-national); 
2. is identified as not being part of the regular security 
forces; 
3. is armed; and 
4. has some level of organization.”13
 Carey, Mitchell, & Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 10
249-258.
 Ibid., 250.11
 Ibid.12
 Ibid.13
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PGMs have one of two relationships to their government: either semi-official, 
or informal. Informal groups are defined as being:
pro-government, government militia, linked to the govern-
ment, government-backed, or government-allied. They may 
be armed or trained by the government. The key difference 
between informal and semi-official PGMs is that the link to 
informal PGMs is not officially or formally acknowledged. 
‘Death squads’, even when closely linked to the government, 
are normally informal and clandestine, and are categorized 
as informal PGMs.14
By contrast, semi-official groups are much more closely tied to their govern-
ments. Semi-official groups are defined as having:
a formally and/or legally acknowledged status, in contrast 
to  the  looser  affiliation  of  informal  PGMs.  A semi-official 
PGM  might  be  sub-ordinate  [sic]  to  the  regular  security 
forces, but is separate from the regular police and security 
forces. As such, the link between the PGM and the govern-
ment is more formal and institutionalized, for example by 
being  recognized  and  acknowledged  in  official  and  legal 
documents of the state. But the group is identified as a dis-
tinct organisation from the regular security forces…15
The PGMD also has information about other aspects of these groups: 
their means of support, their targets, and the constituencies from which they 
draw their membership. But despite ample variety on these dimensions, all 
PGMs have the same four primary characteristics defined above. 
Carey, et al. note that they do not use the terms ‘paramilitary’ or 'death 
squad’ as equivalent with PGMs. For other authors, the terms are largely in-
terchangeable. The terminology might reflect, as Campbell notes, that “There 
 Neil J. Mitchell & Sabine C. Carey, “Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD) Code14 -
book,” Version 1.1 (June 2013): 11. 
 Ibid., 12.15
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is  surprisingly  little  research  that  deals  specifically  with  death  squads.”  16
Mazzei agrees, arguing that this is an “analytical weak spot in the literature 
on  political  violence.”  Campbell  calls  these  groups  ‘death  squads’  while 17
Mazzei calls her groups ‘paramilitary groups’ and uses the acronym ‘PMG.’ 
Though  using  different  terminology,  Mazzei  and  Campbell  are  discussing 
PGMs because the groups they describe share the central features of PGMs: 
these groups are organized and armed; and these groups have the backing of 
at least some factions within the government.
Campbell defines death squads as being “clandestine and usually ir-
regular organizations, often paramilitary in nature, which carry out extrajudi-
cial executions and other violent acts.”  These groups have a very specific re18 -
lationship to their government. “Death squads operate with the overt sup-
port, complicity, or acquiescence of government, or at least some parts of it.”  19
Mazzei has a similar definition of the relationship between these groups and 
their government. 
Paramilitary groups are political,  armed organizations that 
are  by definition extramilitary,  extra-State,  noninstitutional 
entities, but which mobilize and operate with the assistance 
of important allies, including factions within the State. Thus 
while officially illegal,  PMGs enjoy some of  the resources, 
access,  and  status  generally  exclusive  to  the  State…This 
paradox is central to the nature of the paramilitary group.20
 Bruce B. Campbell, “Death Squads: Definition, Problems, and Historical Context” in 16
Death  Squads  in  Global  Perspective:  Murder  with  Deniability,  eds.  Bruce  B.  Campbell  & 
Arthur D. Brenner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 7.
 Julie Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 17
Carolina Press, 2009), 5.
 Campbell, “Death Squads,” 1.18
 Ibid., 2. 19
 Mazzei, Death Squads, 5.20
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The goal of this project is to apply this insight—a focus on the con-
stituent actors within the government party to a conflict—to the conflict reso-
lution and peacebuilding literatures. The PGMD was not compiled with atten-
tion to peace agreements; it merely catalogues and sorts the presence of these 
groups around the world. But Carey, et al. say they expect the data to be ap-
plied to study the effects of PGMs “on the security and stability of their host 
countries. The data will likely be useful to scholars working on state capacity 
and control, conflict and repression and collective action more broadly.”21
It is my project now to apply the PGMD to produce a more systematic 
examination of the factors that influence the success or failure of post-civil 
war peace agreements.  
 Carey, Mitchell, & Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 21
257.
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III. Literature Review
Much ink has been spilled about how to make post-war peace agree-
ments succeed and provide a permanent solution to the violence. Agreements 
fail when wars recur in the same territory; agreements succeed when the terri-
tory remains at peace. When war does recur despite the conclusion of a peace 
agreement, theories about civil war recurrence and peace agreement durabili-
ty both apply,  describing two sides of the same phenomenon. This project 
therefore draws from both the conflict  resolution and peacebuilding litera-
tures.
Why do some post-civil war peace agreements succeed in preventing 
further violence while others unravel? Authors examine a variety of factors, 
agreeing on the effects of some, and disagreeing vehemently about others. A 
brief summary of some of the relevant literature will follow. I will argue that 
considering the role of PGMs in the peace process will yield insights that can 
help increase the durability of peace agreements. Because I focus on the suc-
cess or failure of peace agreements, I am concerned specifically with civil war 
recurrence as distinct from onset. 
There are a few reasons to believe that the causes of civil war and the 
causes of its recurrence are different, at least in part, even if there is overlap. 
Call has found a statistically significant difference between the causes of civil 
war onset and recurrence. He finds that “civil war recurrence is worth study-
ing. Its causes seem to be different from those of onset. These differences are 
not simply a matter of degree.”  This suggests that a focused inquiry into the 22
causes of recurrence, as distinct from onset, is both justified and necessary. 
 Charles T. Call, Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence (Wash22 -
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 52.
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It is also important to study the recurrence of war in places that were 
thought to be at peace, even briefly. First, for strategic reasons: if a war is set-
tled by peace agreement but violence returns, it is either because the agree-
ment did not sufficiently address the original incompatibility, or because new 
incompatibilities emerged. But there was a period, however brief, of consen-
sus. “Peace agreements, whatever the pressures forming them, constitute at 
least a moment of agreement in a conflict. As such they embody a set of un-
derstandings between some of the protagonists to a conflict as to how to re-
solve or at least manage that conflict.”  Therefore, it is particularly important 23
to examine the violence that occurs after the conflict was thought to be settled.
Second, there is an important human perspective. Speaking of the re-
curring war in Liberia, Call writes that many of the casualties of the second 
war “were women and children who had developed cautious optimism with 
the end of the prior war, only to see their hopes dashed and their loved ones 
again threatened, conscripted, or brutally killed.”  The brief hope of peace 24
that is dashed by recurring conflict is hard to maintain; if war recurs with fre-
quency,  the  human  cost  may  make  lasting  peace  increasingly  difficult  to 
achieve. 
Third, successfully ending a conflict on the first attempt is simply a 
best practice. “Given the expanding investment of troops and international 
resources to stabilize places like Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Iraq, and 
Kosovo,  ensuring that  peace ‘sticks’  is  more important  than ever.”  There 25
should be lessons learned from previous attempts to construct agreements to 
prevent recurrence.
 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23
2000), 6.
 Call, Why Peace Fails, 1. 24
 Ibid., 1.25
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To better address why peace agreements fail, I will consider the litera-
ture, focusing first and primarily on the spoiler literature. These authors argue 
that peace fails when an actor undertakes (usually violent) actions to disrupt a 
peace process or negotiation. I argue that PGMs can act as spoilers to peace 
processes, but the literature has not developed a framework for considering 
their spoiler potential. As a result, in practice, these groups are more likely to 
be overlooked during negotiations. Understanding how, and why, PGMs act 
as spoilers to negotiations is a necessary step forward for the civil war recur-
rence and agreement durability literature.
 After discussing how PGMs fit into the spoiler framework, I will ex-
plore  other  variables  offered  by  the  literature  to  explain  peace  agreement 
durability.  In  the  literature  review that  follows,  I  will  use  Call’s  template, 
grouping variables with most-similar items for ease of discussion.26
Process, Inclusion, and Spoilers
Not all settlements to conflicts are created equal. The first issue a nego-
tiating team confronts is the process: how will the peace be won and who will 
be included in the negotiations? “Process issues range from preliminary issues 
of who should be at negotiations and the location and format of any talks, to 
implementation issues of timing, sequencing,  and mechanisms for enforce-
ment.”  In his study of peace agreement durability, Wallensteen focuses par27 -
ticularly on the process by which the agreement was concluded, because “the 
processes themselves can explain some of the agreements, but also are impor-
tant for assessing their durability.”  Process may be important because it is, in 28
 Ibid., 29.26
 Bell, Peace Agreements, 7. 27
 Peter  Wallensteen,  Understanding  Conflict  Resolution  (London:  SAGE  Publications, 28
2002), 7.
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a way, a proxy for the larger incompatibility. “Often issues that appear to be 
about process, or technical in nature, are inextricably intertwined with sub-
stantive issues going to the core of the conflict.”29
Perhaps the most basic process question is about which parties will be 
included in the negotiation.  Including every group with an interest  in the 
process is theoretically possible but, practically, quite difficult. Finding com-
mon ground in these “highly inclusive agreements” is challenging, and the 
difficulty in concluding these agreements may make them less durable.  But 30
excluded parties could possibly become “veto groups that will not surrender 
power for social change whose impact on them is uncertain.”31
This is the spoiler problem. Stedman first defined the phenomenon in 
1997. Spoilers are “parties who are excluded from a peace process…and use 
violence to attack the peace process.”  Since this seminal article, others have 32
advanced the theory with minor changes to this definition. Perlman defines 
spoilers in a slightly broader way: “Those who use violence or other means to 
undermine negotiations in the expectation that a settlement will threaten their 
power or interests.”33
The literature debates two main aspects of spoilers: which parties can 
be considered (potential) spoilers, and what outcome of spoiler behavior is of 
interest. I will outline these schools of thought, and then present some criti-
cism of the spoiler theory.
 Bell, Peace Agreements, 7.29
 Lisa Blaydes & Jennifer De Maio, “Spoiling the Peace? Peace Process Exclusivity and 30
Political Violence in North-Central Africa,” Civil Wars 12.1 (2010): 4.
 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” 31
The American Political Science Review 89.3 (1995): 685.
 Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 32
22.2 (1997): 6. 
 Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out:  Internal  Political  Contestation and the 33
Middle East Peace Process,” International Security 33.3 (2009-09): 79.
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What makes a spoiler?
By Stedman’s first definition, spoilers are “leaders and parties who be-
lieve that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, 
and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”  These 34
spoilers can be either included in the peace process but still unsatisfied (inside 
spoilers) or excluded from the process (outside spoilers). Stedman argues that 
there must be a peace to spoil for the concept to apply: either an agreement 
has been signed, or two or more parties have publicly committed themselves 
to seeking a peaceful settlement. Violence outside this context is part of the 
conflict itself, rather than spoiler behavior, according to Stedman.  35
Though Stedman’s arguments set the course of much of the future re-
search on spoiler behavior, his theories have been modified over the years. 
One critique is that, under his framework, spoilers could be identified only 
post hoc: that is, only after a party disrupted a peace process could it be la-
beled a spoiler. Greenhill and Major argue that, in order for the theory to be 
useful for practitioners, it needs to be possible to identify potential spoilers be-
fore they act, and not just apply a label after-the-fact.  One modification that 36
Stedman made in response is to acknowledge that any potential spoiler must 
possess not only the intent to spoil, but also the capacity to do so. “[T]oo much 
attention to spoiler motivation and intent detracts from the much more im-
portant considerations of capability and opportunity to spoil.”  Refining the 37
 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 5.34
 Ibid.,  6-8.35
Kelly M. Greenhill & Solomon Major, “The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and 36
the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” International Security 31.3 (2006-07): 10.
 Stephen John Stedman, “Introduction” in Ending Civil Wars, eds. Stephen John Sted37 -
man, Donald Rothchild,  & Elizabeth M. Cousens (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002), 14.
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theory this way acknowledges that some potential spoilers are a greater threat 
than others. 
Nilsson argues that Stedman fails to sufficiently distinguish between 
inside spoilers and outside spoilers. Applying bargaining theory, Nilsson ar-
gues that when parties to an agreement begin the negotiation process, they 
consider the likelihood of violence from a group that is not party to the nego-
tiations.  Therefore, agreements would not proceed as far or as fully if parties 38
suspected that there might be a spoiler. Nilsson argues that the literature con-
flates  violence between signatories  to  an agreement  and other  violence  in  the 
same location. Her data indicate that the presence of an excluded party does 
not make war between the signatories any more likely. But this is small conso-
lation to places that have been war-torn perhaps for years: whether between 
signatories or not, continued violence means peace has failed.
Other authors also argue for greater focus on actors beyond the central, 
conflicting parties. Blaydes and de Maio argue that “exclusivity in peace ne-
gotiations can breed political violence as outside spoilers seek representation 
at the bargaining table” and so argue for the broadest definition of inclusion, 
seeking the involvement of as many parties as possible.  Newman and Rich39 -
mond also argue for a broader definition of inclusiveness. They argue that ge-
ographically distant groups can be spoilers if they support the spoiler behav-
ior of groups closer to the conflict. These might include “ethnic or national di-
aspora groups, states, political allies, multinational corporations or any others 
who might benefit from violent conflict or holding-out.”40
 Nilsson, “Partial Peace.” 38
 Blaydes & De Maio, “Spoiling the Peace?,” 22.39
 Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond, “Peace building and spoilers,” Conflict, Security 40
and Development 6.1 (2006): 102.
!15
Stedman offers the narrowest frame, and Newman and Richmond the 
broadest; Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs offer a definition somewhere in be-
tween. They focus on the “former warring parties during the civil war, both 
state-related actors and nonstate actors, splinter factions from these groups, 
and new armed groups that may have emerged.”  This is the definition I will 41
apply here because it  is  most likely to be useful  in understanding how to 
structure peace agreements so that they last. If ‘spoiler’ can mean nearly any 
group with an interest in disrupting the peace, it will be difficult or impossi-
ble to include all the possible ‘spoilers’ in the process. On the other hand, as 
Stedman’s critics point out, his narrow definition of ‘spoiler’ cannot be ap-
plied ahead of time to potential spoilers so that they can be considered when 
structuring the process.42
What is the outcome of interest?
When studying spoilers, are we more interested in spoiler behavior for 
its own sake, or in how those actions affect the outcomes of peace processes? 
Stedman was concerned with managing spoiler behavior in order to produce 
better outcomes from peace processes.  But he, like many authors who fol43 -
lowed on his ideas, does not make a firm theoretical link between spoiler the-
ories and peace process outcomes.  For example, Blaydes and De Maio do 44
not  distinguish whether  spoiler  violence  explains  peace  process  failure,  or 
whether it is merely an indicator of its failure—or whether it can, or should, 
 Desirée Nilsson & Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Re41 -
view of  the  Debate  on  Spoilers  in  Peace  Processes,”  International  Studies  Review  13.4 
(2011): 610.
 Ibid., 61042
 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 6.43
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be both.  Other authors neglect  to discuss how, precisely,  spoiler  violence 45
undermines the peace process.46
Newman and Richmond offer one explanation that counters the seem-
ingly self-evident conclusion that violence by those who do not agree with a 
peace process succeeds when it disrupts that process. They argue that vio-
lence during a peace process is not necessarily meant to disrupt it but rather to 
shape  it: violence is their attempt to “influence the process in their favor.”  47
These groups see the peace process as “undermining their rights, privileges, 
or access to resources,” and so seek to alter its course with violence.  48
I  have chosen to  study the  effects  of  spoiler  behavior  on the  peace 
process to better manage spoiler behavior, specifically, the spoiler potential of 
PGMs. The theoretical link I make here is to consider PGMs as bureaucracies 
within the state and then to apply theories of principal-agent behavior and 
bureaucratic autonomy to understand and manage PGM behavior. I will ex-
pand on these theories in a later section, but this link is not unprecedented in 
the literature. Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs hint at this when they argue that 
“actors do not engage in spoiling [only] because they can, but also because 
they want to. Importantly, they want different things.”  As I will explain, del49 -
egation and autonomy theories of bureaucracies take as their starting place 
that elements within the state may have diverging goals, as PGMs may have 
different goals from the state. And PGMs—as armed and organized groups—
also have the capacity to spoil. 
 Blaydes & De Maio, “Spoiling the Peace?,” 7;  Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, “Revisiting 45
an Elusive Concept,” 613.
 Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, “Revisiting an Elusive Concept,” 613.46
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 Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, “Revisiting an Elusive Concept,” 613.49
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Thus, my outcome of interest is on management of peace processes, 
and the results thereof. I will fill the theoretical and explanatory gap in the lit-
erature on spoilers by reference to the literature on bureaucratic delegation 
and autonomy. 
Criticism
There are two main critiques necessary of the spoiler literature.  The 
first is an argument I have already made above, but bears repeating. If, when 
devising  a  settlement  to  a  civil  war,  it  is  important  to  account  for  armed 
groups that may veto any settlement, it is surely important to consider that 
these veto groups might be fighting for the government. Stedman comes clos-
est to understanding this point when he says, “The first step toward success-
ful management of spoiler problems in civil wars is to recognize that parties 
in civil wars differ in their goals and commitment—dimensions that are cru-
cial for understanding why some parties undermine peace agreements.”  But 50
his theory and analysis still do not adequately deconstruct the government to 
thoroughly examine the constituent parts that may have competing interests.
When the government is present at a negotiation, third party observers 
may believe that it speaks for all affiliated groups. Indeed, this has been the 
literature’s assumption. But some PGMs are only loosely affiliated with, and 
controlled by, the government. In such an instance, the militia may not feel 
that the government adequately represents its interests and may still have an 
incentive to spoil the agreement. Moreover, if  the militia has not been dis-
armed, it may also maintain the capability to spoil.
Despite the extensive literature on spoilers, the unitary government as-
sumption remains dominant and there has not been a systematic treatment of 
 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems,” 10. 50
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spoiling behavior by actors within the state.  While Conversi  explores why 
ETA  spoiled  peace  processes  between  the  Spanish  government  and  the 
Basque separatists, this is not precisely the same question as PGM violence 
because ETA does not fit the PGMD definition.  51
Höglund and Zartman’s discussion of spoiling by the state is a better 
treatment of these questions. They define the ‘state spoiler’ as “the destructive 
use of  violence by the state actor or  elements associated with the state.”  52
They note  several  important  factors  of  state-sponsored violence that  make 
these sorts of spoilers particularly important to account for. First, the state is 
generally assumed to be in a position of greater cohesion and control.  This 53
makes state-side spoiling both more rare and more interesting. Second, be-
cause the state maintains a hold on the legitimate use of coercive violence, 
state-side actors cannot be disarmed completely.  This complicates ‘textbook’ 54
spoiler-management techniques. 
State actors may choose to keep ‘the conflict track’ open as a policy op-
tion for  many reasons.  Elements within the state  may perceive peace as  a 
threat, perhaps because they are running a protection-racket that profits on 
violence.  Militias,  in  particular,  are  in  a  precarious  place  during  a  peace 
process because they have the “greatest degree of operational autonomy…
Their irregularity, assured under conflict, has no cover under peace.”  Mili55 -
tias are “the most likely to continue the conflict,” because of a rational calcula-
 Daniele  Conversi,  “Why do peace processes  collapse? The Basque conflict  and the 51
three-spoilers perspective,” in Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during conflict 
resolution, eds. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (New York: United Nations Uni-
versity Press, 2006).
 Kristine Höglund & I. William Zartman, “Violence by the State: Official Spoilers and 52
their Allies,” in Violence and Reconstruction, ed. John Darby (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2006), 13. 
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tion about what life after peace likely entails.  Militias are unlikely to be in56 -
cluded in an official way in the settlement process, and they are “notoriously 
difficult to control.”57
For all these reasons, a systematic look at the role of PGMs as spoilers 
in peace processes is necessary. Höglund and Zartman do consider several 
peace processes, but admit that, “because of the nature of the cases cited, the 
conclusions of this investigation are merely supported hypotheses rather than 
firm findings.”  Beyond their arguments, a thorough consideration of the role 58
of PGMs is lacking.
Scholars in the Critical tradition challenge the root of our understand-
ing of spoilers, and of peace. Newman and Richmond argue that “spoiler” is a 
loaded, normative term. Saying that an actor seeks to ‘spoil’ the peace rests on 
an assumption that the peace process is a ‘good’ one, or that peace is worth 
working toward. “At least in the West,” they argue, there is a “pervasive un-
derstanding…about what a peace process should ‘look like.’”  Those who 59
disrupt the liberal  peace,  the consensus,  are demeaned as spoilers.  In fact, 
these actors may have a legitimate grievance with a structure that is being 
imposed upon them by outside actors—a structure that is not value-neutral 
but instead carries with it ideas about ‘good governance,’ open markets, and 
human rights.  Understood in its context,  ‘spoiling’ may be a legitimate re-
sponse.  Pugh,  similarly,  asserts  that  modern  peacekeeping  constitutes 60
 Ibid., 16.56
 Ibid., 17.57
 Ibid., 28.58
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“crowd control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the 
liberal peace.”  Mac Ginty argues that peace is not a “normative good.”61 62
This is correct, and I do not pretend here to be value-neutral. I take the 
normative  position  that,  despite  the  problems  with  the  liberal  peace  par-
adigm, peace is at least sometimes worth seeking, and peace processes are 
worth understanding for that reason. Actions undertaken to disrupt the peace 
are thus spoiling the process. In defining this as an analytical category, I fol-
low the lead of Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, who argue that, “as long as 
this inherent normative bias is recognized and discussed, the spoiler concept 
can still prove meaningful as a descriptive device.”  63
But it remains true that there will be instances in which peace may not 
be the most important or most worthy objective. Conflict and the presence of 
spoilers may reflect that there are underlying grievances that should be ad-
dressed and may legitimately take priority over the peace process. Possibly 
these grievances concern the underlying problematic assumptions of the val-
ue of the liberal peace and the dominant world order. There is a risk that the 
favorable connotations of terms like ‘peace’ and the negative connotations of 
‘spoilers’ will obscure these points. But here my explicit assumption is that 
sometimes peace is a worthwhile objective, and that it is therefore important 
to understand more about the conditions in which it can be achieved. I will 
return to these issues in my last chapter.
 Michael Pugh, “Peacekeeping and critical theory,” International Peacekeeping 11.1 (2004): 61
41.
 Roger  Mac  Ginty,  International  Peacebuilding  and  Local  Resistance  (London:  Palgrave 62
MacMillan, 2011), 25.
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Conclusion
Stedman’s theory of spoilers has been modified over time, but the es-
sential meaning has remained the same: parties who take deliberate steps to 
unravel a peace process that does not align with their incentives. Generally, 
this term has been used to describe members of the opposition who are ex-
cluded from the settlement process.  But because these authors assume the 
government party to the conflict is a unitary actor, there may be a confound-
ing  variable  that  explains  agreement  failure.  Testing  for  the  presence  and 
character of PGMs during these settlement processes will further refine the 
spoiler  theory and increase its  explanatory power.  My outcome of  interest 
here is how to manage spoilers during the peace process because, even if ele-
ments of the liberal peace paradigm are problematic, it is still worth under-
standing how to keep these processes from unraveling. 
Other Factors
The spoiler literature argues that excluding certain important parties 
from negotiations can adversely affect the durability of a peace agreement. 
The  conflict  resolution literature  offers  further  explanations  for  why some 
agreements persist while others fail. I will here summarize the other factors 
that these authors say affect the success of peace agreements. My statistical 
study will control for these variables. 
Political Factors
The  political  dynamics  within  a  country  can  affect  the  odds  that  a 
peace agreement succeeds. There is, however, disagreement about the optimal 
design of a political system. Call, for example, finds that “political exclusion, 
rather than economic or social factors, plays the decisive role in most cases of 
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civil war recurrence: political exclusion acts as a trigger for renewed armed 
conflict.”  Call defines political exclusion as being “the perceived or actual 64
deprivation of an expected opportunity for former warring parties, or the so-
cial groups associated with them, to participate in state administration.”  Im65 -
portantly, political exclusion is about “processes rather than substantive poli-
cy outcomes” and refers to “participation in political or policy processes.”  66
This is a separate concept from inclusion or exclusion in the negotiation or 
settlement process, though the two may be related.
The converse of exclusion is political inclusion, which might be accom-
plished through a power-sharing arrangement. Many authors argue that some 
variety of power-sharing can help prevent civil war recurrence. The idea is 
that power-sharing institutions “promote moderate and cooperative behavior 
among contending groups by fostering a positive-sum perception of political 
interactions…Power-sharing serves as the mechanism that offers this protec-
tion by guaranteeing all groups a share of state power.”  Hartzell and Hoddie 67
study thirty-eight agreements and find that “the most effective means of ad-
dressing these common security concerns is for parties to agree to create mul-
tifaceted power-sharing arrangements.”  68
DeRouen et al. also argue that power-sharing can reduce the odds of 
recurrence,  but  that  not  all  power-sharing  measures  are  equally  effective. 
“Power-sharing provisions that are costlier to government and more difficult 
 Call, Why Peace Fails, 4; emphasis in the original.64
 Ibid.65
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to implement will decrease the life span of the peace agreement.”  Converse69 -
ly, there is some indication that less-costly measures might increase the odds 
of peace. Agreements that are costly to the government increase the govern-
ment’s incentive to renegotiate. Knowing this, the opposition has an incentive 
to preemptively engage in violence before the government does, or may resort 
to violence out of frustration at the delay in implementing difficult provisions. 
Bekoe agrees, but formulates the prescription differently. She argues that new 
political and military provisions need to be distributed such that both sides 
make—or  are  perceived  to  make—equal  sacrifices.  “[T]he  implementation 
process will advance only when the faction leaders do not feel unequally vul-
nerable.”70
Whereas these authors question power-sharing but ultimately argue it 
can  have  utility  in  some  cases,  other  authors  find  no  merit  in  the  idea. 
Rothchild and Roeder argue that, in cases of ethnic conflict, “power-sharing 
may get ethnic leaders to leave the battlefield, but then after a short lull trans-
forms the bargaining room into a new battlefield.”  Roeder instead argues for 71
‘power dividing,’  which decentralizes,  checks,  and balances state power in 
favor of individual rights. “Power dividing institutions provide more credible 
commitments to the rights of all minorities—whether based on ethnicity or 
other identities—by balancing and checking a majority in one governmental 
organ against several majorities in other organs.”  The advantage of power 72
 Karl deRouen, Jr, Jenna Lea, & Peter Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace 69
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dividing policies is that, in multiethnic societies, these policies “take seriously 
the constructivists’  evidence that  for  individual  identities,  including ethnic 
identities, tend to be multiple, situation-specific, and fluid over time.”  Pow73 -
er-dividing policies therefore seek to avoid solidifying into institutions the di-
visions that may have caused the war in the first place.
Of course, political settlements do not occur in a vacuum. Hartzell et 
al. hypothesize that agreements concluded after the Cold War ended are more 
likely to last, which is an argument about political dynamics in the broadest 
sense.  Mukherjee thinks more narrowly, arguing that power-sharing agree74 -
ments tend to last longer when they follow the clear military defeat of one 
side by the other,  and tend to fail  more often when they follow “military 
stalemate.”  This may be because a stalemate leaves both sides with a linger75 -
ing hope of victory and the incentive persists to break the agreement and re-
turn to war.
Though  there  is  no  consensus  on  precisely  the  sort  of  political 
arrangement that is most likely to prevent civil war recurrence, the prepon-
derance of these authors argue that political considerations are necessary but 
not sufficient.
Conflict Dynamics
Wallensteen  argues  that  conflict  dynamics  are  the  crucial  factor  in 
peace agreement durability. “Agreements…are particularly dependent on the 
central issues of contention, the incompatibilities.”  Conflict dynamics affect 76
 Roeder, “Power Dividing,” 61.73
 Hartzell et al, “Stabilizing the Peace,” 189. 74
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the durability of peace agreements in three ways: credible commitment con-
cerns, the salience of identity, and the intensity of conflict. 
Credible commitment concerns grow out of the security dilemma. This 
is an acute issue in the context of a civil war. “Ending a civil war calls for the 
reconstruction of central authority and the exercise of that authority by the 
state…The state…must now be vested with a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force, must reconstitute political power and enforce rules for the manage-
ment of conflict.”  But when that very same government was, just a short 77
time before, engaging in a brutal war against the citizens it is now supposed 
to protect, commitment issues can emerge. “In the hostile environment of pro-
tracted social conflicts, antagonisms run deep. There is no socially cohesive 
society within the borders of the state, but rather a multiplicity of different 
communal groupings each struggling for power.”  78
Hartzell argues that the most important elements of peace agreements 
are those that “address the security concerns of the contending parties as they 
move from the situation of anarchy and self-help that characterizes the end of 
civil war.”  Similarly, Walter argues that “designing credible guarantees on 79
the terms of the agreement” is the most important task in a post-conflict situa-
tion.  “The greatest challenge is to design a treaty that convinces the combat80 -
ants  to  shed their  partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even 
though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to 
enforce the treaty’s other terms.”  Agreements that do not address the main 81
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incompatibility may still succeed, Walter argues, as long as these security con-
cerns are addressed. 
Another way to address these security concerns is by alleviating the 
problem  of  information  asymmetry.  Mattes  and  Savun  argue  that,  “peace 
agreements that contain provisions to reveal information regarding the bel-
ligerents’  military  capabilities  increase  the  likelihood  that  peace  will 
endure.”  They  propose  two  precise  mechanisms:  third-party  guarantees 82
(addressed in the section on coercive/military factors) and institutionalization/
power-sharing techniques (political factors). 
It is logical that the credible commitment problem faced by the gov-
ernment—in this literature, taken to be unitary—would be even more acute if 
PGMs were considered. The opposition may consider the government inca-
pable of enforcing an agreement if, in their perception, the government was 
not even capable of controlling all the partisans on its side in the conflict. In 
cases where an agreement is concluded against the wishes of a PGM, these 
concerns are well-founded because militias have added incentive to spoil the 
agreement. The credible commitment problem must therefore be re-examined 
in the cases of non-unitary governments. 
The second relevant conflict dynamic is the salience of identity. Though 
its accuracy is contested, especially by constructivist and Critical scholars who 
argue that ‘identity’ is only ever a social construction, there remains a broad 
literature arguing that identity wars—those along the lines of ethnicity, or re-
ligion—are a category unto themselves. Much of this literature 
sees [identity] wars as more difficult to resolve than violence 
motivated  by  political-economic  issues  because  they  pro-
voke deeper levels of commitment, are more intense, and are 
 Michaela Mattes & Burcu Savun, “Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability 82
of Civil War Settlements,” American Journal of Political Science 54.2 (2010): 511.
!27
therefore harder to resolve by compromise—more broadly, 
because behavior can be changed more easily than identity.  83
This ‘common wisdom’ is not uncontested, however, even within the quanti-
tative (positivist) literature: Fearon and Laitin find that ethnic and religious 
differences are not the “main factors determining…the variation in civil vio-
lence.”  For purposes of my inquiry, the question is whether, in conflicts in84 -
volving a PGM organized around an ethnic or religious affiliation, a peace 
agreement is, other things equal, more likely to fail.
The third relevant conflict dynamic is the intensity of the conflict. The 
literature  is  genuinely  divided  on  this  question.  Hartzell  et  al.  argue  that 
peace agreements should be more likely to last if the war they conclude was 
longer in duration, and if the agreement “conclude[s] a civil war of high in-
tensity.”  They argue this is because “as wars become longer and opponents 85
can do no better than fight each other to a standstill, they are increasingly like-
ly to come to believe that they cannot prevail.”  But Doyle and Sambanis  86 87
are hesitant to argue that there is a broadly applicable relationship between 
the length of the conflict and the success of the agreement, and Walter finds 
no relationship between the number of battle deaths and agreement success.88
But beyond the disagreement about the political effects of a particular-
ly brutal conflict, the literature also notes a practical concern: it is very diffi-
cult to establish, with a high degree of accuracy, the precise number of war 
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dead. “Accurate measurement of the intensity of human rights abuses in most 
countries has eluded the social science community so far.”  This is a distinct 89
problem when the government’s tactic of choice has been death squads or 
other forces that operate in the shadows. “Events data are based on significant 
incidents reported in the press and therefore tend to undercount the most se-
vere episodes and fail to reflect clandestine forms of state violence. States gen-
erally attempt to conceal mass murder by…using such mechanisms as ‘death 
squads’ whose connections to the state are kept secret…”  Thus in the case of 90
civil war, where a government has particular incentive to conceal the true ex-
tent of the damage caused by its security forces, battle deaths and casualty 
numbers may be unreliable. 
Coercive/Military Factors and Capacity Factors
Finally, the literature suggests that a series of military-based, or other-
wise coercive, policies might reduce the chances of recurrence and increase 
the chance of agreement success. The first of these is a system of third-party 
guarantees (broadly),  or the deployment of peacekeepers (specifically).  The 
argument is that these guarantees can help mitigate the commitment problem 
(outlined in conflict dynamics). Fortna finds that the deployment of peacekeep-
ers increases the odds that peace will hold.  Taking that argument even fur91 -
ther, some authors propose that international military capacity is necessary to 
support negotiated settlements.  92
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Another policy is one of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion (DDR). Collier et al. argue that DDR programs can have a positive effect 
on the odds that a peace agreement succeeds.  Lyons agrees, arguing that re93 -
forming militias by transforming them into political parties can help strength-
en a peace agreement.94
The literature also indicates that the capacity of the state can affect the 
success of a peace agreement. Some authors argue that the size and strength 
of the militaries involved in the conflict can affect the duration of peace. Fort-
na finds that the larger the military, the less likely peace is to hold,  but Hegre 95
and Sambanis find no significant relationship between the size of the state’s 
military and the odds of peace.  ‘State capacity’ can also be understood in po96 -
litical  economy terms,  including GDP,  infant  mortality  rate,  and economic 
growth.  One way in which these political economy indicators affect the odds 97
of recurrence is through motivation and mobilization. Walter argues that be-
cause opposition groups do not always have a standing armed group upon 
which to  call  (unlike  the state,  which tends to  have standing army at  the 
ready), the incentives must be sufficiently strong for people to abandon their 
ways of life to take up arms in opposition. These factors align when quality-
of-life indicators are sufficiently low. “Enlistment is likely to become attractive 
[in] a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s cur-
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rent situation.”  The lack of state capacity to mitigate the dissatisfaction of its 98
citizens through economic or political means is therefore a risk factor for war 
recurrence, she argues.
Finally, some authors argue that recurrence is less likely when the gov-
ernment party to the conflict is more democratic. Hartzell et al. find that “civil 
war settlements agreed to by actors in countries whose previous regime was 
democratic or semi-democratic are more likely to prove stable than those con-
structed  by  actors  in  countries  whose  regime  was  authoritarian.”  This 99
echoes Call’s argument about the salience of political inclusion and exclusion. 
Conclusion
There is a broad literature on the factors believed to affect the longevity 
of post-war peace agreements. I argue that the government party to these civil 
wars has for too long been considered a unitary entity. Systematic considera-
tion of the effect of PGMs on the odds of peace will result in a deeper and 
more accurate understanding of how to best make peace agreements last. 
In the chapters that follow, I will examine the effects of PGMs upon a 
set of peace agreements, and analyze, in depth, their role in three peace pro-
cesses since the end of the Cold War.  
 Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?,” 374. 98
 Hartzell et al, “Stabilizing the Peace,” 189.99
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IV. Theoretical Contributions
My argument  is  that  the  quantitative  literature  on peace  agreement 
durability has tended to lack a systematic focus on the role of intra-state fac-
tions—PGMs—as spoilers of a peace process. I will here offer a theoretical ex-
planation of the mechanism by which PGMs may spoil peace agreements. I 
argue that PGMs can be understood as acting like a bureaucracy within the 
state, and that by turning to theories of bureaucratic delegation and autono-
my, we can better understand and manage spoiling behavior by PGMs.
Understanding and explaining PGM behavior requires an examination 
of the role of PGMs within a state’s structure. Just like the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or the Department of Education, PGMs occupy a niche role within the 
state: they have an internal organization; they have expertise over their juris-
diction; and they compete with other agencies within the state for resources 
and power.  The  bureaucratic  model  “explore[s]  ways  in  which  violence 100
against supposed enemies of the state can serve as a tool for competing fac-
tions or agencies within the state.”101
This is not an unprecedented application. Stanley makes a similar ar-
gument: “To understand state violence in most settings, we need to treat insti-
tutions of the state as actors with at least some degree of autonomy of interest 
and action.”  The link I am making here is to use the literature on bureau102 -
cracies to understand, explain, and manage PGM behavior. This will allow a 
systematic consideration of PGMs informed by an already-developed litera-
ture on spoilers in peace processes.
 These are some of the characteristics Weber lays out as essential to bureaucracies. See 100
e.g., Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills (London: Routledge, 2009). 
 Ibid., 13.101
 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 8.102
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Each of the two theoretical models of bureaucratic behavior—delega-
tion and autonomy—applies to one of the two types of PGMs. The PGMD 
uses the categories ‘semi-official’ and ‘informal’ to describe how PGMs are 
related to the government. Semi-official groups are more often openly associ-
ated with the government, and are likely to be better organized and armed. 
Informal groups have more clandestine links with the government. I will ar-
gue that theories of delegation explain well how semi-official PGMs operate 
within the state: these are agencies that act with explicit or implicit permission 
of the state. Theories of autonomy explain the behavior of informal PGMs, 
which act with less regard for the state’s decisions about the amount of power 
they should have. 
Delegation
A state may delegate power or responsibilities to a PGM. Delegation 
here is “a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that em-
powers the latter to act on behalf of the former.”  This principal-agent rela103 -
tionship best describes the relationship of a semi-official PGM and its gov-
ernment, for three reasons. First, in a principal-agent relationship, the state 
retains  considerable  control  over  the  bureaucracy.  The  relationship  is  ac-
knowledged freely because that bureaucracy is often a vital part of the gov-
ernment. And finally, the principal-agent relationship requires an understand-
ing that there is some form of agreement or contract—often an implicit one—
 Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, & Michael J. Tierney, “Delega103 -
tion under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory,” in 
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, eds.  Darren G. Hawkins, David A. 
Lake,  Daniel  L.  Nielson,  and  Michael  J.  Tierney  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 2008), 7; emphasis in the original.
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between the parties.  These three conditions are consistent with the PGMD 104
definition of a semi-official PGM.
In a principal-agent relationship, agents get authority from the princi-
pal, but they do not always do precisely what the principal wants. Principals 
have the power both to initiate and to terminate the relationship. Theoretical-
ly, misbehavior by the agent is bounded—because, beyond a certain point, it 
will  be terminated as the agent.  A chief assumption  of principal-agent 105 106
theories is that the agents act in their own interests, within the bounds set 
forth by the principal: they are “self-interest seeking with guile.”  This can 107
result in ‘agency loss,’ where the goals of an agent and its principal do not 
align perfectly.
A state may choose to delegate to a bureaucracy (here, a PGM) to bene-
fit from specialization and externalities. “Rather than performing an act itself, 
the principal delegates authority to a specialized agent with the expertise, time, 
political ability, or resources to perform a task.”  The principal gains from 108
this delegation because it does not have to expend on learning and perform-
ing this task. The principal gains most delegating a task that is repeated fre-
quently, or that requires specific skills or training.
The principal is also likely to delegate when there are policy externali-
ties. “An externality is said to exist wherever the utility of one or more indi-
viduals is dependent upon, among other things, one or more activities which 
 Ibid., 7.104
 Ibid., 7, 8.105
 Ibid., 24.106
 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 107
Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985): 30; cited in Hawkins et al., “Delegation under 
anarchy,” 24.
 Hawkins, et al., 13; emphasis in the original.108
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are under the control of someone else.”  A classic example of an externality 109
is  pollution. Businesses may pollute water or air resources as part of their 
production process, but it is the public at-large, not solely that business, that is 
affected by the pollution. 
In the context of militias,  PGM behavior affects not just the group’s 
outcomes but also the state’s outcomes. A specific subset of externalities is 
even more relevant for our understanding of PGM behavior. A “Pareto-rele-
vant externality” can be understood as one that makes the “externally affected 
party better off without making the acting party worse off.”  This would 110
mean that the state specifically benefits from PGM behavior—behavior that 
does not adversely affect the PGM itself.
In practical terms, externality-driven delegation to a PGM might the 
following form: under pressure from international organizations and donors 
to  behave  ‘respectably,’  states  engage  in  ‘subcontracting,’  outsourcing  the 
worst of their repressive behavior to these groups. States delegate to PGMs to 
“perpetuate violence against State enemies in order to appear ‘clean’ to in-
ternational sources of development and military aid money.”  This subcon111 -
tracting can have an international audience, but also serves a domestic pur-
pose: “Delegating violence to militias minimizes the potential political cost to 
the government in the form of losing domestic support.”  If a state does not 112
support a particular peace process but must be seen to be acting respectably, it 
may delegate the role of ‘spoiler’ to a PGM. This scenario is a “jointly benefi-
cial violation where the government refuses rather than loses control of the 
 Alan Randall, “Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice,” Amer109 -
ican Journal of Agricultural Economics 54.2 (1972): 175.
 James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, “Externality,” Economica 29 (1962): 110
374; quoted in Randall, “Market Solutions,” 175.
 Mazzei, Death Squads, 8.111
 Sabine Carey,  Michael  Colaresi,  & Neil  Mitchell,  “Governments’  Informal Links to 112
Militias,” (Working Paper, 2014): 12.
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agent.”  When PGMs spoil  a peace process,  externalities accrue:  the state 113
benefits from the spoiling and from keeping its hands clean; [and?] the PGM 
benefits from the spoiling as well. 
State delegation of violence to PGMs is a puzzle worth exploring more 
fully. The commonly accepted “essentially distinguishing feature of states” is 
the one articulated by Weber: the state is the actor with a monopoly on the le-
gitimate  use  of  violence.  “[S]tate  organized  terror  cannot  be  considered 114
simply a manifestation of the state’s essential nature. It is also a pathology 
and a perversion of the state.”  This is the paradox of PGMs. “In tolerating 115
or using death squads, states inevitably compromise their defining monopoly, 
often putting their very legitimacy into question.”  Understanding why a 116
state might willingly allow such groups to degrade their essential character is 
part of the puzzle of understanding political violence and state capacity more 
broadly.
Principal-agent relationships are not without problems. First, there is 
agency problem—essentially an agent gone rogue—which occurs when “the 
desires of the principal and agent conflict and…it is difficult or expensive for 
the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is 
that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately.”  117
The agency problem can manifest as shirking (when the agent is expending 
minimal effort to accomplish the principal’s tasks) or as slippage (where the 
 Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C. Carey, & Christopher K. Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Gov113 -
ernment Militias on Human Rights Violations,” International Interactions 40.5 (2014): 820.
 P. Timothy Bushnell, Vladimir Shlapentokh, Christopher K. Vanderpool, & Jeyaratnam 114
Sundram, “State Organized Terror: Tragedy of the Modern State,” in State Organized Ter-
ror: The Case of Violent Internal Repression, eds. P. Timothy Bushnell, et al (Oxford: West-
view Press, 1991), 6.
 Ibid., 6.115
 Campbell, “Death Squads,” 5.116
 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” The Academy 117
of Management Review 14.1 (1989): 58.
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agent’s actions may slip away from the principal’s preferences and toward its 
own).  The second problem with a principal-agent relationship, related to 118
slippage, is that the two parties may have different levels of acceptable risk. 
The problem of risk sharing occurs when the principal and the agent would 
“prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.”  119
Principal-agent  dynamics—theories  of  delegation—thus  explain  par-
ticularly well the relationship between a semi-official PGM and its govern-
ment. Either as a result of specialization or externalities, states may make the 
rational calculation to delegate spoiling behavior to PGMs. A peace agreement 
may be more likely to succeed if its architects can account for the state’s incen-
tives in these situations.
Autonomy
We can also understand PGM spoiling behavior by considering PGMs 
as an autonomous bureaucracy within the state. This theory describes well the 
relationship between an informal PGM and its government. Because informal 
PGMs are less likely to be acknowledged publicly by the state, they are more 
likely to act autonomously. With a specific focus on the role of the militias in 
El Salvador, Stanley describes one way in which a PGM might operate au-
tonomously: “[W]here agencies have the autonomous ability to use violence 
against regime opponents, this power can be used to secure the support of so-
cial elites and to scuttle reformist initiatives by other factions and agencies of 
the state.”120
 Hawkins et al., “Delegation under anarchy,” 8.118
 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory,” 58.119
 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 13.120
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Autonomy, loosely defined, is “the ability to operate in a manner that is 
insulated  from the  influence  of  other  political  actors—especially  states.”  121
Barnett and Finnemore argue that international organizations have autonomy 
when they have independence from the influence of states.  Dahl similarly 122
says that “to be autonomous in a political sense is to be not under the control 
of another.”  As discussed above, describing spoiling behavior by a PGM is 123
necessarily a political  project,  so PGM autonomy cannot be understood as 
‘apolitical.’ But it is possible to understand PGM autonomy as behavior exhib-
ited relatively  free  from the  constraints  of  state  preferences—regardless  of 
whether this is a normative good or not. 
Carpenter develops a framework for recognizing when an autonomous 
bureaucracy  emerges.  An  autonomous  bureaucracy  must  fulfill  three  re-
quirements. First, bureaucracies must be “politically differentiated,” with dis-
tinct preferences from those “who would seek to control them.”  Second, bu124 -
reaucracies must have expertise, with the ability to administer their policies 
and to act upon their preferences.  Third, bureaucracies must have legitima125 -
cy and support amongst their base, which may be independent from that of 
their state.126
Carpenter specifically addresses the political effects of an autonomous 
bureaucracy.  He  argues  that  autonomous  bureaucracies  are  able  to  “make 
program innovations  that  elected  officials  did  not  direct  them to  take.  At 
 Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, “The Independence of International Organi121 -
zations: Concept and Applications,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50.2 (2006): 256.
 Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World (Ithaca: Cornell University 122
Press, 2004). 
 Robert  Dahl,  Dilemmas  of  Pluralist  Democracy  (New Haven:  Yale  University  Press, 123
1982), 16.
 Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton Universi124 -
ty Press, 2001), 14.
 Ibid.125
 Ibid.126
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times, they can even make sustained policy choices that flout the preferences 
of elected officials or organized interests.”  His language is that of the Amer127 -
ican domestic system, but it is clear that Carpenter is describing precisely the 
‘spoiler’ phenomenon: when an agency within the state has enough power 
that it is able to produce outcomes counter to those preferred by the govern-
ment.
Autonomy  does  not  simply  describe  an  exceptionally  independent 
agent  that  can nonetheless  be understood as  operating within a  principal-
agent  relationship.  “Bureaucratic  autonomy…is  external  to  a  contract  and 
cannot be captured in a principal-agent relationship.”  This is also why the 128
autonomous model may best capture the relationship of informal PGMs to 
their  government.  Unlike  agents  who  remain  under  the  control,  however 
modest, of their principal, autonomous agencies “can change the terms of del-
egation.  They can even alter  the  electoral  strategies  of  their  principals.”  129
Again, Carpenter uses a particular language, but he is describing the phe-
nomenon by which an autonomous agency, operating beyond the control of 
its principal, changes that principal’s calculations—for example, with respect 
to concluding a peace agreement. 
Autonomous  bureaucracies  exhibit  goal  divergence  from  their  gov-
ernment. In the case of PGMs, the more independent the militias, the more 
likely  their  specific  goals  are  separate  from  the  goals  of  the  government. 
Therefore when a PGM spoils an agreement its government may be support-
ing, this behavior can be understood as a result of goal divergence. Whereas 
states may strategically delegate to PGMs to spoil agreements they do not fa-
vor, autonomous PGMs spoil agreements in direct contradiction to the state’s 
 Ibid., 15.127
 Ibid., 17.128
 Ibid.129
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goals. The “strategically useful violence” by “informal armed groups” is “at-
tributable to goal variance resulting from the militia members’ private mo-
tives rather than to the government itself.”  130
Thus the particular mechanism by which an informal PGM may spoil a 
peace agreement is by acting as an autonomous bureaucracy within the state 
with its own set of interests and incentives. Those wishing to improve the 
chances that an agreement will succeed will need to account for the interests 
of the PGM.
Hypotheses
Why do some peace agreements succeed while others fail? I have ex-
plained the background for the research questions of this project and the liter-
ature  to  which I  hope to  contribute.  Theories  on civil  war  recurrence and 
peace agreement durability offer some answers to this question, but I hypoth-
esize that a theoretically and empirically interesting answer can be found by 
questioning the unitary government assumption that pervades the literature. 
Using the literature on bureaucratic delegation and autonomy, I devel-
op three hypotheses to test the precise effect of PGMs on the outcomes of 
peace agreements. 
The first step is to discover whether an active PGM during a settlement 
process affects the odds of peace. Does the presence of a PGM affect the prob-
ability that a peace agreement will succeed? Principal-agent theories suggest 
that states that are unenthusiastic about ending a conflict might use PGMs to 
deliberately spoil peace. Theories of bureaucratic autonomy also suggest that 
PGMs may reduce the likelihood of peace because even if the government fa-
 Mitchell, Carey, & Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 819.130
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vors a settlement, it may be unable to control the militia. These theories sug-
gest a first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Peace agreements are more likely to fail if concluded while at least one 
pro-government militia is active.
Hypothesis 1 treats as equivalent spoiling behavior as a result of either 
delegation  or  autonomy.  But  this  assumption  is  worth  examining  closely. 
Does the type of link between the PGM and the government affect the proba-
bility that a peace agreement will succeed? The literature suggests that PGMs 
that are more wholly controlled by their government will be more responsive 
to the government’s wishes: agents are more easily controlled by their princi-
pals than are autonomous bureaucracies. I hypothesize that autonomous bu-
reaucracies—that  is,  informal  PGMs—are  more  likely  to  spoil  agreements 
their government favors. This may be because they have been excluded delib-
erately. It may also be that their relative autonomy means that even while the 
government favors peace,  the militia’s incentives are in favor of continued 
conflict. This suggests another hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Peace agreements are more likely to fail if concluded while at least one 
informal PGM is active.
Finally, we must consider the character of the conflict. The literature 
indicates that certain wars may be more difficult to settle peacefully than oth-
ers. Examples of such conflicts might include wars where the main incompat-
ibility is a question of identity; or wars where there is systematic and wide-
spread targeting of civilians and other non-combatants. Targeting third par-
ties such as aid workers and peacekeepers is another example. The literature 
indicates that identity conflicts and conflicts with significant third-party casu-
alties will be more difficult to resolve peacefully. The membership, target, and 
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support of PGMs offer another way to understand the incompatibilities, dead-
liness, and conflict dynamics of particular wars. This suggests a final hypoth-
esis.
Hypothesis 3:  Peace agreements are more likely to fail  if  concluded while groups 
whose characteristics indicate that the war is particularly brutal or intractable are ac-
tive.
Each of these hypotheses will be tested in turn. Achieving statistically 
significant results would be important because they would either refute or 
support the theories advanced by the literature. But even results that are not 
statistically significant are important, and could expand our understanding of 
the factors that contribute to an agreement’s success or failure. If militias are 
not a significant factor affecting peace processes, these results could offer al-
ternative explanations about which of the variables tested in the literature re-
tain their significance when the government is no longer assumed to be uni-
tary.  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V. Research Design
Research Question
Why do some peace agreements succeed while others fail? Seeking to 
contribute  to  the  literatures  on  civil  war  recurrence  and  peace  agreement 
durability, I have proposed deconstructing the government; recognizing that 
in certain cases, it may be a non-unitary actor; and examining the effects of 
PGMs upon the success of peace processes.
In this chapter, I will elaborate on the methods used in both my quanti-
tative and qualitative analyses, and I will detail the methodological founda-
tions of the approach I am taking.
Synthetic, Comparative Approach
I  have  taken  a  mixed-methods  approach,  employing  both  larger-N 
quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies. In particular, I draw on Ra-
gin’s development of the “synthetic” approach, which “selectively unites cer-
tain features” of both quantitative and qualitative analysis,  seeking to take 
advantage of the strengths of each. The synthetic approach is characterized by 
seeking a parsimonious explanation, but it also deliberately seeks out alterna-
tive explanations for the phenomena it investigates.131
Case studies in isolation tend to be “very sensitive to human agency 
and to social processes in general.”  But the qualitative approach, by its very 132
nature, is not suited to dealing with large numbers of cases. Therefore, it can-
not easily demonstrate regularities among cases and is less likely to identify 
“structural” explanations—explanations that emerge when behavior is exam-
 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 131
Strategies, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 83-84.
 Ibid., 70.132
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ined in the aggregate but that cannot be attributed to the actions of discrete 
individuals.  By  contrast,  the  quantitative  approach  is  “biased  in  favor  of 
structural  explanations”  but  tends  to  “obscure”  the  role  of  individual 
agency.  133
The synthetic approach unites these strengths. From the quantitative 
approach, it draws the ability to examine a larger number of cases; from the 
qualitative approach, it “allows assessment of complex patterns of multiple 
and conjunctural [sic] causation.”  This approach allows the study of struc134 -
tural explanations without compromising the “chronological particularities of 
cases and human agency.”135
The quantitative and qualitative analyses are iterative. No case study, 
no matter how fine-grained, can examine literally every aspect of an event; 
necessarily,  there  is  some  selection  involved  in  deciding,  often  implicitly, 
which aspects should be described. A quantitative analysis can help make that 
selection more explicit and can justify the aspects of the events that the re-
searcher considers significant. That is, the quantitative approach enables the 
researcher  to  “narrow  the  range  of  hypotheses  deserving  more-detailed 
analysis  by  suggesting  that  some  hypotheses…have  little  empirical 
support.”  By the same token, no quantitative analysis can consider every 136
possible  hypothesis.  Unavoidably,  only  certain  hypotheses  are  selected for 
testing, and a researcher might overlook, or be blind to, important possible 
explanations. Qualitative analysis can help address this problem: case studies 
inform the quantitative analysis when they are used “as a means of stimulat-
ing the imagination in order to discern important new general problems, iden-
 Ibid.133
 Ibid., 71.134
 Ibid.135
 Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, (Prince136 -
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 92.
!44
tify possible theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable re-
lations that were not previously apparent.”137
The goal is to use this synthetic approach for a deeper and broader un-
derstanding than would be possible using only one method at a time: to com-
pare “wholes as configurations of parts.”138
Quantitative Analysis
I  will  use  a  logistic  regression  to  analyze  the  probability  of  peace 
agreement success. My dependent variable will  be ‘success of peace agree-
ment,’ measured in a binary fashion: either the agreement succeeded, or it did 
not. My independent variables are drawn from the PGMD. First, I will focus 
on whether a PGM was present while the agreement was concluded. Second, I 
will look at whether those PGMs were ‘informally’ or ‘semi-officially’ related 
to their government. Third, I will look at the membership, support, and tar-
gets of the PGM to consider more thoroughly the precise character of the con-
flict. 
I  will  control for the variables suggested by the literature, including 
how democratic the regime was, the state’s capacity to enforce the agreement, 
and what types of settlement measures were included in the agreement, in-
cluding but not limited to: military factors, political factors, peacekeepers, and 
whether all ‘conflict dyads’ were included in the negotiations.
A more detailed discussion of how I gathered and coded these data is 
in the chapter on the quantitative analysis.
 Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Struc137 -
tured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, 
ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 51; emphasis in the original.
 Ragin, The Comparative Method, 84.138
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Case Studies
I will focus on a set of three peace agreements: 1992 El Salvador, 2002 
Indonesia, and 2005 Indonesia. I chose these for a number of reasons. PGMs 
were active at the time of all three agreements. All were concluded after the 
Cold War (and subsequent reorganization of international politics), meaning 
any lessons learned from these agreements can still be applied to present-day 
negotiations. The two successful agreements (2005 Indonesia and El Salvador) 
have held for ten and twenty-three years, respectively, as of this writing. The 
2002 Indonesia agreement presents a valuable contrast because it lasted only 
about one year.
A further strength of this set of agreements is the within-case design 
presented by the first failure in Indonesia. Only a very few factors changed 
between  the  initial,  failed  2002  agreement  and  the  subsequent,  successful 
agreement in 2005. The two Indonesian cases therefore represent a most-simi-
lar design. Studying these agreements side-by-side allows maximum compar-
ison to examine the factors that separate the successful agreement from the 
earlier failed process.  Lessons from the Indonesian cases can be then com-
pared with lessons from the Salvadoran case, which is something of a most-
different case: across the world, with a different set of combatants, incompati-
bilities, political arrangements, and external actors. 
I selected these cases on the basis of the scholarly bibliography that ex-
ists detailing the violence and the peace processes. As a result of the time, 
space, and resource constraints of this project, and the resulting inability to 
conduct my own field work, I was limited to the (English-language) writings 
and studies of others. Because research on post-conflict zones is often difficult 
to conduct, and access to victims of systemic violence can be limited at best, 
many of the conflicts in my dataset are under-studied. Selecting on the bibli-
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ography might introduce a few different sources of  bias.  Conflicts  may be 
more likely to be studied if they were settled with a substantial amount of in-
ternational involvement. Greater attention might also be paid to conflicts that 
were exceptionally violent.  Agreements that have lasted a long time might 
also attract scholarly notice. Any of these three factors could affect the odds of 
peace: in this way, it is possible that the relationship between bibliography 
and success of peace agreement is a source of some bias.
However, it is important to emphasize that of my three cases, one is a 
failure. The 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Indonesia lasted less 
than one year. This mitigates in part some of the criticism that selecting on the 
bibliography  biases  my  study  in  favor  of  successes  or  agreements  with 
longevity. Moreover, this project can still serve at least as the start of a broader 
investigation of some factors of importance in conflicts with PGMs. Future 
studies with fewer limitations can expand on the theoretical arguments made 
here to discover whether these conclusions still hold with respect to cases that 
are, currently, under-researched. 
Lieberman offers a template for “nested analysis,” where cases are se-
lected from within the broader, large-N analysis. Nesting “allows the scholar 
to identify the particular information that he or she wants to glean from the 
in-depth analysis of almost any case, and then to assess the potential added 
value of such analysis relative to a larger body of theory and data.”  139
This is the goal of my case selection. These are agreements that are rela-
tively well documented, but which have not been examined with particular 
attention to the role of militias. Their study will indicate the degree to which 
this is a fruitful thread of analysis to begin. This is also the underlying idea of 
 Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed Method Strategy for Comparative 139
Research,” American Political Science Review 99.3 (2005): 448.
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the synthetic approach: the case study selection was guided by the quantita-
tive analysis, and the lessons from the cases can inform future such analyses.
I will explain the particular characteristics of each agreement and how 
each serves to illustrate my broader theoretical arguments in the chapters on 
the cases.
Methodology
“Like all academic works, this one is based on a series of assumptions, 
some explicit, some implicit.”  In this section, I will outline the assumptions 140
I already know I am making, and the efforts I made to avoid the pitfalls of 
failing to interrogate my assumptions. 
I will broadly be using an approach that “applies scientific method to 
human affairs.”  My research aligns with King, Keohane, and Verba’s tem141 -
plate of scientific inquiry: “The goal is inference, the procedures are public, 
the conclusions are uncertain, and the content is the method.”  This is be142 -
cause I believe there is value in both the larger-picture search for patterns and 
in  the  smaller-picture  in-depth  discovery  of  nuance.  This  approach  stems 
from “an interest in both the exploration of general relationships and explana-
tions and the specific explanations of individual cases and groups of cases.”  143
I have chosen this approach for a few reasons. First, and necessarily 
fundamentally, I believe that certain phenomena can be better understood if 
we are able to discern patterns from analyzing a large-N sample of these phe-
nomena. This is the largest assumption on which my quantitative chapters 
 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, 3.140
 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Ox141 -
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will rest. I acknowledge here that I am making this assumption and that the 
analysis will follow from this foundation. But this does not extend to all phe-
nomena. King, Keohane, and Verba emphasize the importance of “maximiz-
ing the validity of measurements.”  “Validity refers to measuring what we 144
think we are measuring. The unemployment rate may be a good indicator of 
the state of the economy, but the two are not synonymous.”  One ought to 145
be  very  careful  when  attempting  to  quantify  ‘democracy’ for  example,  or 
when using gross domestic product as a proxy for ‘quality of life.’ I will do 
my best to explain how I chose to approximate and quantify my variables and 
to  defend my choices,  but  I  acknowledge that  any attempt  at  quantifying 
these human elements of the world will be approximate. 
Second, I am taking this approach because I believe there is value in a 
broader, semi-generalizable study. I seek to uncover any broad correlations 
and probabilities that may exist: ‘when we have tended to see X, we have also 
historically tended to see Y.’ I will be conscious of the effects of confounding 
variables, and uncertainty introduced into my models by the mere fact that I 
am studying human activity. I am hoping only to discover patterns, not make 
binding rules. 
Finally, I seek to remain conscious of the critical peacebuilding litera-
ture—for example, Mac Ginty’s criticism of ‘orthodox’ studies of peace pro-
cesses,  which  are,  he  says,  “overly  reductive,  elitist,  and ethnocentric  and 
have a bias towards formal forms of political and economic environment.”  I 146
will address these concerns in a more general way in my conclusion, but in at 
least one respect, I believe this study is consistent with, and in fact helps de-
velop, Mac Ginty’s claim. I  am questioning a problematic assumption that 
 King, Keohane, & Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 25.144
 Ibid., 25.145
 Mac Ginty, “International Peacebuilding,” 10.146
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pervades the literature. Neglecting the role of  PGMs and artificially consider-
ing the government to be unitary is one example of the reductionist, overly-
simplified scholarship that Mac Ginty criticizes. By reintroducing some of the 
lost nuance, I  am taking a step toward approaching the conflicts and their 
remedies with an appropriate level of complexity.
But in other ways, the difference between my approach and Mac Gin-
ty’s is simply the fundamental division within international relations scholar-
ship today: between those who would see value in larger, categorical, data-
driven enquiry and those who would dismiss this work as being overly sim-
plified and reductionist at best, and dangerous and imperialist at worst. With-
in limits, both perspectives have merit. To the extent that there is disagree-
ment about the utility of a data-focused inquiry, I hope to illustrate the utility 
of my particular use of a mixed-methods approach that is informed both by 
social science methods and by a respect for the critical tradition. In the end, 
my only claims are about the value of this particular study and any contribu-
tion it may make to our understanding, and not about the issues raised in the 
more fundamental debate. 
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VI. The Quantitative Methods
Scope
This thesis is concerned with the success or failure of peace agreements 
signed in the aftermath of a civil war. I do not examine whether peace agree-
ments should be used to settle civil wars: the universe of cases is only those 
where a peace agreement already exists. That is, my question is the probabili-
ty of peace conditional on an agreement. I also do not investigate whether civil 
wars settled by peace agreement remain peaceful longer than those without 
an agreement. Rather, I will examine which variables might affect the chances 
for peace, and for how long, when there is an agreement.
I have focused on peace agreements that follow civil wars for a few 
reasons. The literature argues that civil wars are particularly difficult to re-
solve, and therefore, their resolution is a more interesting and important ques-
tion. As Licklider argues,
Interstate opponents will  presumably eventually retreat 
to their own territories…but in civil wars the members of 
the two sides must live side by side and work together in 
a common government after the killing stops. Compro-
mise is particularly difficult because the stake is control 
of  this  new  government  and  is  thus,  literally,  life  and 
death for the combatants.  147
Moreover,  interstate  wars  have declined dramatically  since  the  end of  the 
Cold  War,  while  intrastate  conflicts  are  on  the  rise.  Quinn,  Mason,  and 148
Gurges note that the number of civil wars in the post-Cold War period ex-
ceeds the number of states that have experienced civil war—that is, these con-
 Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements,” 681.147
 Lotta  Harbom,  Stina  Högbladh  &  Peter  Wallensteen,  “Armed  Conflict  and  Peace 148
Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 43.5 (2006): 617-19.
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flicts are recurring in the same set of states.  Finally, and most simply, the 149
PGMD consists of PGMs that operate within their own borders.  To keep the 150
data on militias consistent with the data on agreements, I focus only on post-
civil war agreements.
The Dependent Variable
To explore the success rate of peace agreements following civil war, I 
am  using  data  from  the  Uppsala  Conflict  Data  Program  (UCDP)  Peace 
Agreement  Dataset.  My  dependent  variable  is  Ended,  a  variable  in  the 151
UCDP. Ended is a binary variable: either the agreement ended, or it did not. 
Agreements that end are coded as 1; else, 0. Colloquially, I also refer to these 
agreements as ‘failing’ or ‘succeeding,’ respectively. 
UCDP defines the variable Ended: 
Did the peace agreement end, i.e. did the implementation 
fail? The peace agreement is no longer considered fully 
implemented if the validity of the agreement is contested 
by  one  or  more  of  the  warring  parties  that  signed.  A 
peace  agreement  cannot,  from  the  UCDP  perspective, 
survive if the primary parties are no longer party to it. If 
a party officially withdraws from a peace agreement, it is 
considered to have ended.152
For UCDP, agreements end when one or more parties withdraw from it, or if 
the conflict restarts. UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two 
 Michael J. Quinn, T. David Mason, & Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Deter149 -
minants of Civil War Recurrence,” International Interactions 33.2 (2007): 167.
 Carey, Mitchell, & Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 150
251.
 Harbom et al, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements.”151
 Stina Högbladh, “Peace Agreements 1975-2011—Updating the UCDP Peace Agree152 -
ment Dataset” in States in Armed Conflict 2011, eds. Pettersson Therése & Lotta Themnér 
(Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report, 2011): 5.
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parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths.”153
To maintain consistency, I did not change the UCDP data by changing 
the time limit on Ended. If an agreement failed before the dataset was pub-
lished in 2011, I considered it to have ended; if an agreement failed after the 
dataset was published, it is not considered to have ended. Future studies can 
use the next iteration of UCDP data. 
The unit of analysis is the peace agreement, and I have narrowed the 
UCDP data to fit my scope and definitional constraints. First, because I am 
considering only post-civil war agreements, I  eliminated agreements in the 
UCDP concluding interstate wars. UCDP listed 173 armed conflicts, of which 
only  23  were  interstate  conflicts,  accounting  for  20  of  216  agreements 
signed.  Excluding interstate conflicts still leaves a large number of cases for 154
analysis. Second, because the PGMD codes militias active between 1981 and 
2007, I include only peace agreements that were concluded in that time. I used 
the resulting set of 166 agreements for statistical analysis, and as the universe 
from which I selected my case studies.
The Independent Variable
I will explore three questions surrounding how PGMs may affect the 
probability that a post-civil war peace agreement succeeds.
The first question is whether the simple presence of a PGM affects the 
probability that an agreement holds. The variable here is PGM. PGM is a bina-
ry  variable:  if  at  least  one  PGM was  active  in  the  year  in  which  a  peace 
agreement was concluded, it was coded as 1; else, 0. The agreements com-
piled differ in the number of PGMs present, from zero to eleven. But number 
 Ibid., 3.153
 Ibid., 43.154
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of groups is not necessarily an indication of their strength or ability because 
these groups also differ, for example, in the number of members and the type 
of  weapons  to  which  they  have  access.  Therefore,  in  order  to  reduce  the 
amount of speculation introduced, I have kept PGM a binary variable. 
But PGMs do vary on many dimensions, and we know from the litera-
ture that their relationship to the government may affect their behavior and 
therefore may affect the probability that they can spoil an agreement. There-
fore, the second question is how the relationship a PGM has with its govern-
ment affects the rate at which peace fails. The PGMD divides PGMs into two 
categories  of  ‘government-relation’:  Informal  and  Semi-Official.  Coding  on 
these variables was also done in a binary fashion. If at least one group with 
that relationship was present, it was coded as 1; else, 0. Every PGM is either 
Informal or Semi-Official—never both—but multiple groups sometimes operat-
ed, and so both types may be active for some agreements. 
The third question is whether specific characteristics of the PGMs, be-
yond their relationship to the government, significantly affect the odds that 
they spoil a peace agreement. Again, the PGMD offers myriad categories to 
describe the membership, target, and support of PGMs. But not all of these 
data are theoretically relevant here (for example, groups of adolescents). I se-
lected categories that,  based on the literature,  seemed more likely to affect 
peace agreement success. The remaining variables are all coded in a binary 
fashion: if at least one active PGM had that characteristic in the year in which 
an agreement was concluded, it was coded as 1; else, 0. These variables are as 
follows.
First, I considered the membership of PGMs. Drawing from the litera-
ture, there is reason to examine the hypothesis that identity wars may be par-
ticularly intractable. For example, PGM membership based on ethnicity or re-
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ligion clearly qualifies as identity-based. These are the PGMD’s variables Eth-
nic  and Religious.  I  combined these into the variable Membership.Identity  to 
measure the net effect of ‘identity’ conflicts and to reduce the degree to which 
judgements about whether a trait is ethnic or religious affects my results. I 
also coded for groups based on ideology or whose members are party ac-
tivists, because the literature indicates that the overlap between ideology and 
identity is often significant and can sometimes be difficult to distinguish with 
precision. These are the variables Party Activists and Ideology. I have combined 
these to form the variable Membership.Ideology. These combinations give the 
PGMD data a broader, more inclusive scope to better measure the hypotheses 
that ideology and identity conflicts are of a particular (intractable) sort. 
Second, I considered the targets of PGMs. Even if a group is not orga-
nized around identity-based principles, a conflict can be still be identity-based 
if  the group’s targets are identity-based. I  have therefore coded for groups 
whose targets are ethnic or religious. These are the PGMDs variables Ethnic 
Group and Religious Group; I combined these into form Target.Identity. The lit-
erature also hypothesizes that peacekeepers and third-party guarantees can 
help ensure the stability of peace; logically, peace is threatened if third-party 
guarantors are not themselves safe. I therefore coded for groups whose targets 
include peacekeepers and aid workers.  These are the PGMD variables Aid 
Workers  and International  Peacekeeping  Force;  I  combined these  to  form Tar-
get.PKO. And finally, because local support is crucial to the success of a rebel-
lion against a government, I coded for groups that target what I am calling 
‘noncombatants.’ There are three PGMD variables that capture this sort of tar-
get: Civilians, Journalists, and Unarmed Political Opposition, Government Critics. I 
combined these into Target.Noncombat.
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Finally, I considered the support of PGMs. The literature argues that a 
relevant factor in an agreement’s longevity is whether all parties to the con-
flict were included in the negotiation. I therefore coded for groups supported 
by entities that are less likely to be included in the negotiations and therefore 
retain  their  incentive  to  spoil.  These  variables  are  Support.Foreign  (support 
from Foreign Governments,  the  PGMD variable)  and Support.Illegal  (support 
from Crime and Drugs, two variables from the PGMD). I also coded for sup-
port by a domestic government or the military, as the degree of support re-
ceived from these constituencies is, logically, directly related to the group’s 
prestige and capability as a PGM. I combined the PGMD variables Domestic 
Government and Military to form Support.Domestic. 
The Control Variables
The literature outlined above also offers a series of independent vari-
ables, separate from PGMs, that are theorized to affect the odds of agreement 
success. It is important to also test these variables to determine whether they 
maintain statistical significance after accounting for the activity of PGMs—
that is, whether they are still explanatory even when the government is not 
assumed to be unitary. These control variables are: the presence of military 
provisions, political provisions, peacekeepers, inclusive negotiations, a mea-
sure of GDP per capita, military spending, state capacity, democratic regime, 
and battle deaths. 
The data on military and political provisions; on inclusive negotiations; 
and on peacekeepers are from the UCDP. The other data are from a variety of 
sources. I will briefly outline how I obtained and coded these data.
The variable Military notes whether at least one military provision was 
included in the peace agreement,  or  whether the agreement included zero 
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military provisions. Examples of military provisions include a ceasefire, DDR 
programs, integration of the opposition into the army, and the withdrawal of 
foreign  forces.  The  UCDP codes  this  in  a  binary  fashion,  coding  1  where 
present, and 0 otherwise.
The variable Political is also coded as 1 where present, and 0 otherwise. 
Examples  of  political  provisions  include  the  transformation  of  opposition 
groups into political parties; integration into the civil service; power-sharing 
provisions; and negotiations about the new, or interim, government.
The  UCDP  also  has  data  on  Inclusive  and  PKO.  Inclusive  indicates 
whether all ‘conflict dyads’—that is, every opposition group in conflict with 
the government—were included in the negotiation. PKO  indicates whether 
the agreement provided for the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Both are 
coded in keeping with the UCDP standard, with a 1 indicating its presence 
and a 0 indicating its absence.
The other variables from the literature are not part of the UCDP but are 
available elsewhere. In each case, the data point is accurate for the year in 
which the agreement was concluded. GDP per capita data was retrieved from 
the World Bank.  I have taken the log10 of these data in order to better blend 155
with the scale of the other (binary) data. Further, measuring GDP logarithmi-
cally better captures the intent of the theory: generally, increases in GDP indi-
cate increases in capacity; the relationship is not thought to be linear. 
State capacity,  in the literature, is meant to refer broadly to a state’s 
ability to enforce a peace agreement. Therefore, I have chosen the Composite 
Index of National Capacity (CINC) data from the Correlates of War project. 
The variable CINC is an aggregate of six factors of a state’s capacity into a sin-
gle score: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron 
 The World Bank. “GDP (Current US$).” Web. Accessed 6 Nov 2014. <http://bit.ly/155
1c9UjCx>
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and steel production, urban population, and total population. (Note that be-
cause CINC includes military spending, I have not included this as a separate 
variable). These data seem to be an appropriate proxy to measure the question 
from the literature: is the state robust enough to enforce an agreement? Fur-
ther, use of the CINC data allows me to maintain consistency with the litera-
ture, where many authors use the CINC data and whose theories I am testing.
Quantifying Democracy requires judgment. I have chosen the data from 
FreedomHouse.  FreedomHouse measures democracy in two categories: po156 -
litical rights (which includes electoral process, political pluralism and partici-
pation, functioning of government) and civil liberties (freedom of expression, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, individual rights). The lit-
erature’s concern is with political inclusion, and the inability or disinclination 
of a government to renege on its agreement or to crack down brutally on the 
opposition. The two categories from FreedomHouse are thus a fair measure. I 
averaged the two FreedomHouse scores for the year in which the agreement 
was concluded.
A more common choice amongst the quantitative literature is to use the 
Polity data rather than the FreedomHouse indicators. However, I have delib-
erately chosen to use data from FreedomHouse over Polity in this instance, 
though I use the Polity data in my robustness check to follow. This is because 
the coding used by Polity would confound my analysis. Polity codes whether 
elections take place under conditions of violence. Concept 7 of the Polity data 
is  “transitional or restricted elections,” and includes coding about whether 
“the election takes place in an unstable political environment in which repres-
 FreedomHouse, Freedom in the World 2015 Methodology, <http://bit.ly/1WjJWEr> (ac156 -
cessed 9 Feb 2015).
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sion and violence affect a significant portion of the population.”  The au157 -
thors  continue,  “If  elections are held under conditions of  widespread civil 
war…it is coded here.”  This methodology would bias nearly every score in 158
my data set because I have selected only cases of civil war. To avoid this con-
founding, I have selected the FreedomHouse data instead.  
Finally, I collected data on battle deaths (Deaths).  As discussed in the 159
literature review, battle deaths is a variable about which the literature is gen-
uinely conflicted:  some authors theorize that  more deaths should entrench 
hostilities and so make a conflict more difficult to resolve peacefully, while 
others argue that more deaths increase war weariness and thus increases the 
odds of peaceful settlement.  Still other authors strike a more practical note, 160
noting the difficulties of precisely counting the dead. These difficulties are 
particularly acute in conflicts where the government has an incentive to hide 
its atrocities or its failure to provide security, or where irregular methods of 
warfare were used.  161
PRIO’s Battle Deaths Dataset was developed to be compatible with the 
UCDP dataset. I coded the number of deaths in the year in which the agree-
ment was concluded. This was the best practice given many practical limita-
tions. First, though the theory speaks of total deaths in a conflict, the PRIO set 
does not include deaths for every year of every conflict.  I  chose final-year 
deaths on the theory of anchoring: proximate phenomena are weighted more 
highly in a person’s consciousness and thus can be reasonably expected to 
 Monty G. Marshall,  Ted Gurr,  & Keith Jaggers,  “Polity IV Project:  Data Set Users’ 157
Manual,” Polity IV Project (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2012): 51.
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have an out-sized effect upon the negotiations.  Second, the PRIO data are 162
raw numbers, but to achieve comparison across cases, the deaths as a propor-
tion of population would be preferable. Finally, in addition to the  many miss-
ing observations, there is the necessary caveat about the difficulty of obtain-
ing precise numbers. 
These shortcomings should affect every measurement equally—that is, 
they should not skew the results in any particular direction—and so I include 
the Deaths data with these caveats. Nonetheless, I run every regression twice: 
once without the variable Deaths, and once with it. As with GDP, there is no 
reason to expect that the relationship between increased deaths and difficulty 
of settlement is linear; therefore, I again use the log10 of these data.
Analysis
I  used a  regression analysis  to  examine the relationship of  my pro-
posed variable of PGMs and the control variables drawn from the literature.
With a dichotomous dependent variable, my model of choice was the 
logistic regression. This function indicates the probability of any particular 
distribution of the dependent variable given a set of independent variables. 
The logistic regression has a range of 0 to 1 because it presents outcomes as a 
probability, and is thus well suited to answer my questions about the proba-
bility of peace agreement success and failure.  163
My final data set contained 166 peace agreements. Occasionally, data I 
collected from outside sources suffered from missing observations, but I will 
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 162
Biases,” Science 185.4157 (1974): 1124-1131.
 All models were run in R (version 2.15.3) using the package Zelig (Imai, King & Lau). 163
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note this where it applies. I tested each hypothesis in turn; the first set of re-
gressions excludes the variable Deaths.164
Hypothesis 1: Peace agreements are more likely to fail if concluded while at least one 
pro-government militia is active.
To test this, I ran the regression with PGM as the independent variable. 
I find support for Hypothesis 1: the results indicate that agreements are signif-
icantly more likely to fail if they are concluded while at least one militia is ac-
tive.  This offers support for the argument that accounting for PGMs, which 165
may disrupt the peace process, improves understanding of agreement success 
and failure. 
In addition, these results suggest that agreements that include the de-
ployment of peacekeepers are statistically more likely to succeed, which sup-
ports the literature’s theories about third-party guarantees. This hypothesis 
about peacekeeping should be tested further. The correlation may be the other 
way around:  the  international  community  may be more willing to  deploy 
peacekeepers if it believes the peace process may succeed and their monitors 
will not be put in danger. 
This regression has 158 observations, and suffers the least from miss-
ing-data concerns.
Hypothesis 2: Peace agreements are more likely to fail if concluded while at least one 
informal PGM is active.
To test this, I ran the regression as above, replacing PGM with the two 
measures of relationship: Informal and Semi-Official. The results do not offer 
support  for  Hypothesis  2.  Only semi-official  groups are,  statistically,  more 
 Results for the first set of regressions can be found in Table 1. 164
 ‘Statistical significance’ here indicates the variable reached at least p<0.05. The tables 165
indicate the precise level of significance for each variable, where applicable.
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likely to be associated with an agreement’s failure; informal groups are not. 
While my hypothesis was that groups that are more independent may wreak 
greater havoc on the peace process, the statistics indicate the opposite. This 
may be because semi-official groups are more likely to be better funded and 
better organized, and thus more capable spoilers.
When PGM is replaced with these two measures, PKO is no longer a 
statistically significant explanation of agreement failure. Perhaps this is be-
cause, if a government strategically employs a semi-official group to spoil the 
agreement, no counterbalancing by a peacekeeping force can make a differ-
ence.  Or,  as above,  perhaps the causal  mechanism is reversed,  and the in-
ternational community supported these are the processes less because they 
are seen as more likely to fail.
Hypothesis 3:  Peace agreements are more likely to fail  if  concluded while groups 
whose characteristics indicate that the war is particularly brutal or intractable are ac-
tive.
Broadly, I tested whether the literature’s theories about brutal and in-
tractable wars, identity-based wars, and inclusion in negotiations had statisti-
cal support. I find only partial support for Hypothesis 3. Accounting for char-
acteristics of the militias, agreements are statistically more likely to fail when 
concluded in the presence of a group that targets what I have termed ‘non-
combatants.’ This supports arguments in the literature that conflicts that are 
especially deadly for noncombatants are particularly intractable. This may be 
because this sort of systematic targeting makes third-parties reluctant to offer 
support for these agreements.
Curiously,  inclusive negotiations—those including all  the opposition 
groups—are more likely to fail in this test. This may be because the govern-
ment’s  targeting of  noncombatants  embeds hostility  within the population 
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and erodes the constituency for peace. It may also show that the difficulty of 
reaching an agreement increases as the number of parties present increases. 
Other characteristics—including the source of a group’s support; its targets 
besides non-combatants and peacekeepers; and the membership of the group
—are not statistically significant. 
Battle Deaths
 When these three regressions are re-run to include the variable Deaths, 
with all its caveats, the results are very different.  It is important to note here 166
that these regressions were based only on 92 observations—down from 166—
and suffer more systematically from missing-variable concerns. Still, these re-
gressions were run in an effort to present a first step—but only that—toward 
an analysis of the effect of battle deaths upon conflict resolution when PGMs 
are accounted for.
When accounting for Deaths, the first regression (PGM) reveals no vari-
ables of significance. In the second regression, testing the groups’ relation-
ships, Semi-Official and Deaths both reach significance. Semi-Official thus main-
tains the significance it had when the regression was run without Deaths. It is 
interesting to think about the interaction of these variables.  Perhaps, when 
government  violence is  sufficiently  state-sponsored and deadly,  these  phe-
nomena combine to be especially detrimental to the likelihood of peace. These 
would be the instances of particularly well-organized, well-equipped militias 
that operate with high levels of state support.
Finally, the third regression produces more new results. In this iteration 
Support.Illegal,  Support.Domestic,  Membership.Identity,  Target.Noncombat,  and 
CINC are all significant, but Deaths is not. (When the regression was run with-
 The results from these regressions can be found in Table 2.166
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out Deaths, only Target.Noncombat was significant). These findings may indi-
cate two things. First, they indicate that peace is hard to maintain in the con-
text of widespread targeting of civilians. Second, they indicate that a more 
systematic consideration of these variables, with better data on battle deaths, 
is necessary. The idea that highly deadly, intensely identity-based conflicts are 
more difficult  to  settle  peacefully  is  intuitive—and would be important  to 
confirm—but requires better data to investigate fully.
Expected Values
The regression indicates which variables weigh more heavily upon an 
agreement’s success or failure, and the proportion of agreements we expect to 
succeed or fail given a certain characteristic. It is also possible to calculate an 
expected  value  for  agreement  success.  This  is  a  simulation  of  concluding 
100,000  agreements  with  precisely  these  characteristics  to  approximate  the 
probability of success.167
Over 100,000 simulations, agreements concluded with at least one ac-
tive PGM are predicted to succeed 19 percent of the time, compared to a 45 
percent success rate in the absence of PGMs. Semi-official groups are associat-
ed  with  a  12  percent  success  rate  (36  percent  without  such  groups)  and 
agreements succeed 24 percent of the time when a militia makes a practice of 
targeting noncombatants (45 percent without such a target). Other results are 
more encouraging: agreements succeed 52 percent of the time when peace-
keepers are deployed.
 These results can be found in Figure 1.167
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Checking Robustness
A robustness check is performed to ensure that the statistical signifi-
cance is related to an empirical phenomenon and not simply a result of the 
particular methods of measurement. Therefore, alternate measures for vari-
ables requiring judgment—democracy and state capacity—were used to re-
run the regression.  168
The initial regression used FreedomHouse scores for democracy; the 
robustness  regression  used  the  Polity  measurement,  again  for  the  year  in 
which the agreement was concluded. The initial regression used CINC scores 
for state capacity; the robustness regression approximated state capacity as 
military spending. This is the measure used by some authors cited in the liter-
ature review, and reflects the perspective that state capacity to enforce a peace 
agreement is related to its military strength. These data are from SIPRI’s Mili-
tary Expenditure Database, and are per capita measures of spending for the 
year in which the agreement was concluded, in $US. As with GDP, I have tak-
en the log10 of these data.
In order to examine the precise effect that variable choice has on the 
outcome of the regression, I have replaced these variables one at a time. 
Polity
The first robustness check includes Polity as a replacement for Democra-
cy. The first regression (PGM) confirms almost exactly the original regression. 
Hypothesis 1 is  again supported:  agreements concluded while at  least  one 
PGM was active are, statistically, significantly more likely to fail.  Similarly, 
PKO is again significant. In this iteration, Polity is also significant, indicating 
that some of this variation may be a result of data choice. Recall, however, 
 The results of the robustness checks can be found in Tables 3-6.168
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that the Polity data may be confounded in this context, which is why they 
were not chosen for the main regression.
The  second  robustness  check  only  partly  replicates  earlier  findings. 
Hypothesis 2 is again not supported, with Semi-Official militias significantly 
affecting the odds of success. While this increases the evidence against this 
particular hypothesis, it also lends support for the broader theory: that PGMs 
have a significant effect on agreement durability and deserve systematic at-
tention.  Political  and Polity  also achieve significance.  These results  indicate 
that agreements including political measures are more likely to fail—but only 
when ‘democracy’ is measured as the Polity data are, with a particular focus 
on election proceedings. As above, this coding is problematic because I am 
working in the post-civil war context. This may explain the divergent results 
for this regression.
The third regression produces further disparate findings.  Here,  Sup-
port.Foreign,  PKO,  and  Inclusive  achieve  significance.  Inclusive  carries  over 
from the initial test with Democracy, but the other two variables are new. This 
lends support to the idea that all conflict dyads ought to be included in set-
tlement negotiations. It also indicates the need to continue to refine measures 
of 'democracy' to examine more accurately the effects of particular structures 
of government on the odds of peace.
Spending
The second robustness check includes Spending  as a replacement for 
CINC, as a measure of state capacity to enforce an agreement. Due to some 
missing data, this regression has only 118 observations. The first regression 
produces no variables of significance, which means only that we must fail to 
reject  Hypothesis  1.  The  second regression again  indicates  significance  for 
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Semi-Official  and  further  undermines  Hypothesis  2  in  favor  of  the  bigger 
project, of attention to PGMs. The third regression results in significance for 
three variables: Target.Noncombat, Target.PKO, and Inclusive. Target.Noncombat 
and Inclusive were both significant in the original regression, lending support 
to the original hypothesis, and strengthening the claim beyond the specific 
choice of measurement; that the same variables emerge as significant beyond 
the particular choice of data is compelling evidence in the hypothesis’ favor.
Robustness with Battle Deaths
As with the original regression, an additional set of analyses were per-
formed with the inclusion of the Deaths variable: first, Polity replaced Democ-
racy  and was run in  a  regression that  included Deaths  as  a  variable;  next, 
Spending  replaced CINC.  The robustness results here neither supported nor 
undermined the  hypotheses.  No new variables  were  significant,  but  some 
variables that had previously been significant (e.g. Political when paired with 
Polity) failed to reach significance. Further, these regressions are approaching 
problematic,  as the number of  observations has continued to drop:  Polity/
Deaths has 92 observations of the original 166, and Spending/Deaths has just 
73, of the original 166.
There was not, however, a clear shift in the data toward one variable, 
or one category of measurement. Including Deaths affected the results almost 
the same regardless of whether Polity or Democracy was measured; the same is 
true of CINC vs Spending. This indicates that the alternate measures are not 
the source of these results and that there is instead be an underlying pattern 
that would emerge despite the particular source of proxies. 
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Alternative Explanations
It is worth discussing the factors that may exist as confounding vari-
ables or circumstances. 
One  argument  about  confounding  might  concern  the  locations  in 
which PGMs have been observed. This is a concern about endogeneity: PGMs 
may be more likely to exist in places where the central government is weaker 
than average. In this formulation, PGM presence and agreement failure are 
correlated, but not as I hypothesize: instead, both are related to a general state 
incapacity.
The empirical evidence, and the preponderance of the literature, argues 
otherwise, however. Campbell argues, “the thesis that death squads may exist 
because a given state is simply too weak to prevent powerful social interests 
from engaging in murder can be rejected in all  but a handful of  cases.”  169
Robinson argues that state power does not correlate with the probability of 
PGM emergence, but rather with the type of PGM. “What the evidence…does 
suggest, however, is that different configurations of state power may facilitate 
the emergence of different kinds of militia formation.”170
But my argument does not actually depend on the empirical record on 
this point. My main argument is that questioning the unitary government as-
sumption will lead to a better understanding of agreement durability. Thus, 
that there needs to be an accounting for PGM incentives—indeed, even their 
existence. This should lead to a more comprehensive and nuanced agreement 
that will have greater explanatory power. Even if PGM presence and weak 
state capacity are in fact related, this suggests that agreements should be con-
structed to account for both, not that the theory is confounded beyond use.
 Campbell, “Death Squads,” 12.169
 Geoffrey Robinson, “People’s War: Militias in East Timor and Indonesia,” South East 170
Asia Research 9.3 (2001), 286.
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Another argument might be that there is too much variation between 
cases to produce such a broad theory. For example, Staniland argues that in-
surgent groups differ with respect to their degree of organization and central-
ization.  He identifies four types of groups, arguing that a dedicated and 171
appropriate response is needed for each; one-size-fits-all approaches to these 
different groups is not appropriate. Therefore, in this argument, peace agree-
ments may fail  because they are recycled from the previous conflict rather 
than built for the present circumstances. This is Mac Ginty’s argument about 
“peacebuilding  from  IKEA,  whereby  the  vision  of  peace  is  made  off-site, 
shipped to a foreign location, and reconstructed according to a pre-arranged 
plan.”  172
These are arguments about classification and categorization, and in the 
literature they come in two forms: those who contest the act of categorization, 
and those who contest the particular way in which the categorization is ac-
complished. Staniland argues that the classification may be improperly done, 
while Mac Ginty tends instead to generally disapprove of the practice of cate-
gorization. In the chapters that will  follow, I  seek to be highly transparent 
about the way in which I have drawn my categories, to answer the criticism of 
Staniland and others.
By contrast, the argument against classification is, in my view, over-
stated. Almost every social science study involves some sort of comparison, 
and comparisons are impossible  unless  we use general  categories  in some 
way; otherwise we can identify neither similarities nor differences. This re-
lates to Sartori's lament about what he called “conceptual stretching.”  He 173
 Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Lon171 -
don: Cornell University Press, 2014).
 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, 39.172
 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” The American Polit173 -
ical Science Review 64.4 (1970): 1034.
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wrote  that,  in  a  “deliberate  attempt  to  make our  conceptualizations  value 
free,” we have stretched so many concepts that the terms have come to lack 
significant meaning and therefore do not contribute to our understanding.  174
While it is always worth questioning which assumptions underlie our defini-
tions and categories, we cannot shy from all categorization. “We do need, ul-
timately, ‘universal categories,’—concepts which are applicable to any time 
and place.”  If categories are drawn in such a way that they “point to differ175 -
ences in degree, then our difficulties can be solved by measurement, and the 
real problem is precisely how to measure.”  I will address this ‘how’ ques176 -
tion in the chapters that follow.
Conclusion
The quantitative literature on peace agreement durability has a consis-
tent shortcoming: failing to disaggregate the government party to a civil war 
and to consider that various constituent parts of the government may have 
the incentive to spoil an agreement. By using data from the PGMD, the analy-
sis above has found that peace agreements fail at a rate that is statistically sig-
nificantly higher when concluded while at least one militia was active. The 
effect of the militia on agreement failure is even more significant when the 
militia is semi-official—that is,  more closely affiliated with its government. 
Militias that target non-combatants are also significantly related to agreement 
failure. Though the variables suggested by the literature—such as political or 
military reforms, or the degree to which the government is democratic—are 
still important to consider in any practical setting, these results indicate that 
 Ibid.174
 Ibid., 1035.175
 Ibid., 1034; emphasis in the original.176
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they may not be sufficient to create peace. Rather, the presence of a militia 
with the intent and capacity to spoil an agreement will trump these more fa-
miliar approaches.
Of course, militias operate differently in every context. These findings 
are not deterministic: agreements concluded while militias are active are not 
guaranteed to fail. But this finding indicates that the literature should engage 
in a serious way with the proposition that the government may not always be 
a  unitary actor,  and to  begin to  account  for  the behavior  of  these  various 
PGMs. By re-thinking power distributions within the state and the incentives 
of sub-state groups, a more powerful explanation of peace process outcomes 
emerges.  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VII. The Cases
The analysis above indicates that, statistically, peace agreements con-
cluded while at least one PGM was active are more likely to fail. As noted ear-
lier, the outcome of interest here is precisely how spoilers can cause an agree-
ment to unravel. Here I will consider three processes in depth to examine how 
the potential spoilers were—or weren’t—managed and what effect those tac-
tics had on the agreement’s durability. This is, as I explained in Chapter V, an 
effort to use the practical and theoretical approaches to inform each other in 
an iterative way.
The first two agreements considered here were both concluded in In-
donesia. Aceh, the province on the northern end of the island of Sumatra, has 
its own history and traditions, from the Sultanates who had ruled since the 
1500s.  After Indonesia won its  independence from the Dutch in the 1940s, 
Aceh thought it  would be granted independence from Jakarta—or at  least 
some autonomy—but this was not forthcoming. After struggling to push In-
donesia toward a federal system without success, the Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; GAM) organized to agitate for Aceh’s independence. 
Indonesia  presents  a  natural  experiment,  a  most-similar  design  for 
study, because of the two peace processes that took place in quick succession. 
The first agreement, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), conclud-
ed in 2002, unraveled shortly thereafter. But the second agreement, the Mem-
orandum of Understanding (MoU), concluded in 2005, has held since it was 
signed.
In part, GAM spoiled the CoHA because it did not grant Aceh inde-
pendence. In addition, though, PGMs associated with the Indonesian military 
(Tentara  Nasional  Indonesia;  TNI)  and TNI itself  were convinced they could 
achieve a military victory and breached the CoHA with precisely this goal. By 
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2004,  however,  conditions  on  the  ground  had  changed,  and  negotiations 
restarted.  In  August  2005,  the  MoU  was  concluded,  and  it  addressed  the 
CoHA’s shortcomings. GAM gave up on its goal of independence and accept-
ed autonomy; TNI was placed under increased civilian control; and the mili-
tias were reined in to prevent spoiling.
The militias in Indonesia dated from colonial  times but came under 
government control when the Suharto regime began centralizing power in the 
1960s. After Suharto fell, the militias did not disappear; rather, they persisted, 
with officially documented ties to Army subdivisions. The government and its 
militias  believed  they  could  still  achieve  a  military  victory  after  the  2002 
CoHA and deliberately spoiled the agreement. Understanding how the 2005 
MoU successfully neutralized these groups is vital to the story of how peace 
has held in Indonesia for more than a decade.
The third case, the 1992 Chapultepec Accords, ended El Salvador’s civil 
war. El Salvador’s process is a most-different peace process from the agree-
ments in Indonesia: it was concluded across the world, in a different era of 
politics, with a different set of combatants and incompatibilities.
When El Salvador gained independence from Spain, fourteen families 
owned the vast majority of the country’s wealth. El Salvador’s perma-com-
modity is its fertile soil; those who owned the land owned the wealth. It was 
easy for this oligarchy to exclude the lower classes simply by refusing any 
agriculture reform or land transfers. In the late 1800s, these oligarchs orga-
nized their own private militias to defend their land, their interests, and this 
status quo.
The civil war began in earnest in El Salvador in 1980. Several leftist 
guerrilla  groups  that  had  been  fighting  the  government  united  into  the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). A series of PGMs, oli-
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garch-funded death squads, fought for the government to repress the FMLN; 
the national police, treasury police, and intelligence arms of the government 
also had death squad elements. 
Through the 1980s,  neither  side was able  to  achieve victory despite 
much bloodshed and staggering atrocities. By 1989, conflict dynamics shifted: 
the FMLN launched an offensive; the death squads murdered six Jesuit priests 
in cold blood, causing international outrage; and the Cold War ended. Against 
this backdrop, negotiations began;  this UN-mediated process is  considered 
one of the most successful.
The specifics of these three agreements illustrate a variety of variables 
theorized by the literature to be relevant to the peace prospects. While Aceh 
has natural resources and thus economic differences from Javanese Indonesia, 
the main incompatibility was GAM’s independence struggle, rooted in what 
GAM perceived as historical and fundamental differences. By contrast, while 
the economic classes in El Salvador did often divide along ethnic lines, the 
FMLN was not waging an ethnic war nor an independence campaign. Rather, 
the FMLN was seeking the complete overhaul of the government and econo-
my.
Both states struggled with the legacy of colonialism. The islands of In-
donesia were a conglomerate of previously-independent peoples, united by a 
foreign power. El Salvador’s oligarchy was created from the remnants of the 
Spanish ruling class. Both of these colonial arrangements were important ac-
celerants of the conflicts. Both  conflicts were also affected by the Cold War, in 
different ways. The United States supported the Suharto regime in the 1970s 
and 1980s, so GAM was unable to gain support from the United States for its 
independence. El Salvador, meanwhile, was a proxy conflict between the US-
backed government and associated forces, and the USSR-backed FMLN.
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Finally, the militias played different roles in each conflict. In Indonesia, 
the PGMs had strong government ties, although the army denied their pres-
ence and use. In El Salvador, the death squads were more independent from 
the government; they were an outgrowth of private militias and continued to 
be funded by the oligarchs, giving them split loyalties. All of these conflict 
dynamics became relevant during negotiations and peaceful settlement.
The next  two chapters will  explore these cases in greater detail,  ex-
plaining how the history of the conflicts and the specific mediation processes 
helped two of these processes succeed.  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Indonesia
The conflict in Indonesia was the result of an independence struggle by 
the province of Aceh, seeking to secede from the rest of Indonesia. To under-
stand the final iteration of the conflict, it is necessary to understand Aceh’s 
long history and deeply rooted mythology. The story begins with Aceh’s push 
for independence, which began in earnest in the modern era at the end of 
World War II. 
The legacy of Dutch rule is also the backdrop for the PGMs that would 
operate  essentially  with  impunity  to  resist  Aceh’s  secessionism.  Therefore, 
second, I will describe their emergence, ties to the government, and behavior 
through the independence struggle. I will then explore the conflict’s dynamics 
in greater depth, including how the GAM battled TNI for primacy in Aceh. 
With this background, I will describe the two peace processes: first, the 
failed 2002 CoHA and then the successful 2005 MoU. I will conclude by offer-
ing some lessons from peace building in practice, and explore how Indonesia 
conforms—or doesn’t—to our theoretical expectations of conflict resolution.
History of the Conflict
Aceh, a province on the northern coast of Indonesia, has struggled to 
assert its independent identity essentially from its beginning. “Though once 
an important power in the Malay archipelago, Aceh…[never] sat easily as part 
of the Netherlands East Indies, the foundation for the new postwar state of 
Indonesia.”  177
The modern history of Aceh’s struggle for independence begins with 
the end of World War II, and has its roots in the history of Dutch colonialism. 
 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern In177 -
donesia Project, 1995), 3.
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In the inter-war period, the production of pepper plummeted precipitously 
and reformist agitation began to grow. In 1939, the all-Aceh Ulama Association 
(PUSA) was established. The Dutch had struggled to keep the ulama (Islamic 
scholars or teachers) out of politics, but felt less threatened by PUSA as an 
Acehnese organization because Indonesian nationalists were a bigger concern 
at the time.178
PUSA welcomed  the  Japanese  invasion  in  1942,  which  it  thought 
would  help  them  overthrow  Dutch.  After  the  Japanese  surrender,  Aceh 179
joined the struggle for Indonesian independence. While the central govern-
ment of Indonesia (GOI) fought the Dutch, leaders in Aceh were consolidating 
their power and “operated with almost complete autonomy” for the rest of 
the 1940s.  180
But the leaders of Aceh and GOI were soon in conflict again, as they 
had been for centuries. Aceh was unhappy that Indonesia had not been estab-
lished as an Islamic state; as the central government grew in power, Acehnese 
leaders became increasingly concerned about again being governed by what 
they perceived to be an outside power. “From an Acehnese separatist perspec-
tive, aspirations to a high degree of autonomy or independence are driven by 
clumsy and often brutal responses by Jakarta…to claims for equity.”  Some 181
of Aceh’s grievances are more imagined than others, but the end result—hos-
tility to perceived repression from Jakarta—is the same. “The cycle of claim 
and  repression  has  rekindled  historical  memory  of  assertions  by  political 
 Ibid.,  8-9.178
 Richard Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in 179
Aceh (Bangkok, Thailand: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, 2000), 16.
 Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 10.180
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identity against outsiders, and the gaps in memory have been filled with (of-
ten shared) myth.”182
GOI soon moved to take power from PUSA and to limit the autonomy 
of Aceh. In the late 1940s, the Darul Islam movement, seeking the establish-
ment of a federal Islamic state of Indonesia, became prominent; in 1953, rebel-
lion in Aceh broke out and was quickly allied with Darul Islam.183
In 1959, Aceh was granted “special autonomy” status, which devolved 
to Aceh the power over customary law, religion, and education.  This was a 184
technical but not a practical victory for Aceh.  In the 1960s, a new elite began 185
to rise in Aceh as power shifted from the ulama to the more secular, highly 
educated sector of society, though the ulama would remain influential.  The 186
1950s  brought  a  “re-assertion  of  the  Acehnese  identity,  which  has  been 
claimed by GAM as constituting the base of the modern struggle for indepen-
dence.”187
GOI was also facing upheaval.  In 1965,  the government of  Sukarno 
(now called the Old Order) was overthrown by Suharto, who established the 
New Order. Suharto’s regime, backed by the armed forces, eliminated the In-
donesian communist party. As one of the most anti-communist regions, Aceh 
was initially pleased by the transition.  But it soon became clear that Suharto 188
had no intention of allowing Islam to flourish as a political force in Aceh. Fur-
ther, Suharto’s regime was characterized by a dramatic centralization of pow-
er, brutally enforced, and rendering moot Aceh’s special autonomy status.
 Kingsbury, “A Mechanism to End Conflict in Aceh,” 75.182
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Meanwhile,  Aceh’s  economic  status  quo  was  being  transformed.  In 
1971, Mobil Oil Indonesia announced the discovery of natural gas reserves off 
the North Aceh coast; by 1977, a refinery was in operation, making Aceh vital-
ly valuable for Indonesia. By the end of the 1980s, Aceh was responsible for 30 
percent of Indonesia’s oil and gas exports, and by the early 1990s, Aceh was 
providing 40 percent of the world’s liquid natural gas.  189
Aceh was not rewarded with the revenues from these exports. Aceh’s 
reserves and fertile soil make it the fourth or fifth wealthiest province on the 
island.  But while Indonesia exports “approximately $1.3 billion worth of oil 190
and gas from Aceh each year,”  the government of Indonesia signed a con191 -
tract  with  the  oil  and  gas  companies  that  “almost  completely  excluded 
Acehnese economic interests.”  The philosophy in Indonesia at the time was 192
that any resource in any province was the collective wealth of the whole ar-
chipelago.  This resulted in the profound irony that the wealthy but inde193 -
pendence-minded  Aceh  effectively  subsidized  the  rest  of  Indonesia,  and 
propped up a government from which it wished to secede.  Some reports 194
indicate that as little as one percent of the profits from oil and gas develop-
ment were returned to Aceh.  Further,  its  “special  autonomy” was rolled 195
back de facto as a result of Suharto’s extreme centralization of power. It is pre-
cisely  that  centralization of  power that  lends the most  insight  into under-
 Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 14.189
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standing the emergence and behavior of the PGMs active in Indonesia during 
this time.
The Pro-Government Militias
In Indonesia,  “terrorism by public  authority” came in two varieties: 
crime-preventative, and political-ideological.  Like Aceh’s secessionism, the 196
militias had their roots in colonial times. One predecessor is the jago, the “no-
torious rural criminal of late colonial Java.”  Just as its modern successors 197
would, “the late 19th century jago of Java occupied an odd marginal space in 
the shadow of a modernizing colonial bureaucracy…the jago was both a crim-
inal and an essential bulwark to the colonial system of law and order.”198
Another, the lasykar, were “homegrown bands of freedom fighters.”  199
The  lasykar  were  particularly  active  during  the  independence  campaign 
against the Dutch, and “occupied a position at the margins of political power 
and criminality.”  For the lasykar and jago, the “prime modus operani” was 200
terror.201
A third militia was the preman, the village-level enforcers of law and 
order. In this way, the preman  were “potentially both upholders of law and 
perpetrators of criminal activity.”  The preman were considered “street hood202 -
lums” and worked “as extortionists, debt-collectors, parking attendants, and 
 Justus van der Kroef, “Terrorism by Public Authority: The Case of the Death Squads of 196
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nightclub security—when not outright breaking the law.”  Over time, the 203
preman evolved into “gangs of youth recruited by political, and especially mil-
itary, authorities and economic élites to serve both criminal and political pur-
poses.”204
The relationship of these groups to the government varied as govern-
ment power waxed and waned: these groups were “a product of and insepa-
rable from state power.”  After gaining independence from the Dutch, the 205
government  tried  to  co-opt  the  militias  but  “control  was  always 
incomplete.”  Many militias ran protection racket schemes even as they did 206
the government’s bidding. 
 After  the  1965  coup  that  brought  the  New  Order  to  power,  the 
regime’s  centralization also brought the militias under government control. 
Now, “virtually all militia groups were drawn tightly under the army’s au-
thority.”  From this point on, no longer were the groups “at the margins of 207
state power but rather were directly mobilized and controlled by the state, 
and to which end they developed and used a common repertoire of unusual 
brutality.”208
One example  of  this  brutality  was when the  communist  revolt  was 
crushed in 1965. This marked the emergence of the Gestapu militia.  “Tens 209
and probably hundreds of thousands” of Indonesian communist party sym-
pathizers—and, likely,  many people not  associated with the communists—
 Loren Ryter, “Permuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order?” 203
Indonesia 66 (1998): 46-47.
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Movement, commemorating the date on which the communist revolt was attempted.
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were “massacred by usually military-supervised youth groups, often Muslim 
in  orientation,  by  village  guards,  and  other  vigilante  units.”  Gestapu 210
worked in a “highly politicized atmosphere” and perpetrated “fanatic, almost 
ritualistic slaughter.”211
In East Java in 1982, bodies began to appear, the work of a new militia: 
the Petrus squads, the “mysterious killers.”  Petrus was composed of “fairly 212
hastily assembled military police and national police personnel.”  Petrus’s 213
main targets were criminals and recidivists and reflected the government’s 
belief that the people perceived crime as a major driver of instability and eco-
nomic stagnation. The Petrus squads were blamed for 4,000 deaths in eight 
months in 1983 and though the exact number of dead is unknown, Petrus ac-
tivities “continued almost daily.”214
Both Gestapu and Petrus were “the product of the practices of gov-
ernment security agencies.”  In 1983, there was a “tacit admission that the 215
Petrus squads were government condoned, if not led.”  Police in some areas 216
of Indonesia were openly cooperating with Petrus squads, “compiling com-
plete lists of names, with photographs and other particulars, of ex-convicts or 
suspected criminal elements.”  The militias were supposedly spontaneously 217
forming, but there is evidence that they were instead “deliberately organized, 
trained,  and supplied  by  military  authorities.”  Military  statements  from 218
1990 speak of “a disorganized gang comprised of military deserters, who pos-
 Justus M. van der Kroef, “‘PETRUS’: Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia,” 210
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sessed  the  means  and techniques  of  violence  that  the  Indonesian  military 
should have monopolized.”219
There is substantial evidence that these groups were linked to the gov-
ernment. The emergence of new groups coincided with government-launched 
counterinsurgency campaigns against GAM, peaking in 1989. By 1991, tens of 
thousands of men were estimated to have joined these militias.  There are 220
further clues in the names and rhetoric of the militias. “The Acehnese militias 
bore names reflecting the ideological preoccupations of the armed forces, and 
were reminiscent of the lasykar units of the National Revolution.”221
After Petrus’s activities were publicized by an Indonesian newspaper 
and human rights organization, the United States and the Vatican both ex-
pressed  concern  over  the  government’s  use  of  death  squads.  Neither  was 
pleased by GOI’s response. First, GOI banned the newspaper that reported on 
the militias. Then, the speaker of parliament said that he had “personally ap-
proved of the summary killings,”  and that this “should be appreciated” be222 -
cause crime and poverty were a result of “too many people”  and Petrus 223
squads were mostly targeted criminals and other ne’er-do-wells.
The emergence and proliferation of these militias was likely a result of 
a few factors. The first was the aligned interests of a centralized, repressive 
government and its business elite—made rich by natural resources—in en-
forcing a stable status quo. Journalists in Indonesia noticed that “lower- and 
middle-ranking  military  men  of  middle  age  might  be  involved  in  ‘local 
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mafias’  in certain regions;  these mafias “also included local  civilian power 
brokers, businessmen, and an assortment of criminals.”224
Second,  international  pressures  and concern in  human rights  circles 
made the outsourcing of violence an attractive option for the government. As 
international  scrutiny  increased,  GOI  began  to  modify  earlier  statements, 
denying involvement with Petrus and other militias.  GOI calculated that 225
“in view of the growing…criticism of human rights abuses by the Indonesian 
armed forces,…the use of militias would…[provide] a useful cover…a basis 
for plausible deniability.”226
The militias did not disappear when Suharto fell in 1998, but instead, 
the record indicates that the militias continued to operate in the countryside. 
The tactics of the militias in 1999 “borrowed heavily from models and an-
tecedents deeply rooted” in history.  The preman, comprising “the politically 227
connected thugs whose influence became so pronounced in the late New Or-
der,” was never disbanded, perhaps in part because their roots were so deep 
in Indonesia’s militarized past. 
A leaked TNI memo detailed the number, arms, and strength of these 
groups. A negotiator who was present outlines the content of the memo in his 
account of the peace process. By March 2004, according to these documents, 
nine  militias  were  working  in  Aceh,  with  an  estimated  165,000  members. 
“These militia organizations were explicitly linked to local Army” subdivi-
sions.  These militias were armed with the standard TNI-issue M-16 rifle but 228
also  with  SS1  assault  rifles,  which  were  manufactured  by  a  TNI-owned 
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outfit.  The memos confirmed the reports elsewhere that the leaders of these 229
militias  were community elites:  “the leaders of  these organizations ranged 
from local businessmen and government employees to local administrators 
and local politicians.”230
Thus the extrajudicial sector of Indonesian society persisted from be-
fore independence through to the signing of the CoHA in 2002, where these 
groups became more relevant than ever. Understanding the precise role these 
groups played in the CoHA's unraveling requires first understanding their 
opposition: the Free Aceh Movement.
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
GAM was established in 1976 by Hasan di Tiro. di Tiro had been work-
ing at the Indonesian mission to the United Nations in New York City when 
he defected and declared Aceh to be an independent state. In the 1950s and 
60s, di Tiro argued for a federal system in Indonesia to accommodate the myr-
iad ethnic groups and to fairly distribute economic resources.  But as the 231
Suharto regime consolidated its power without any indication of “fundamen-
tal change” in Indonesia’s structure, di Tiro began to push for Acehnese inde-
pendence.232
di  Tiro  saw  Indonesia  as  an  accident  of  history—an  “unliquidated 
colonial empire with Javamen replacing Dutchmen as emperors.”  di Tiro 233
was seeking what, legally, should have happened after World War II: the divi-
 Ibid.229
 Ibid.230
 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story, 28.231
 Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 61. 232
 Ibid., 62.233
!85
sion of Indonesia into independent states.  di Tiro established GAM to pro234 -
tect Aceh’s “political,  social,  and cultural heritage,” which, he charged, the 
Javanese were destroying.  Unlike Darul Islam, GAM was more secular in 235
orientation: the Declaration of Independence “made no mention of religious 
issues.”  di Tiro returned from exile in 1976 and GAM began operations in 236
1977. But its largely secular focus made recruitment lackluster as the ulama 
were unmotivated to support GAM.237
GAM’s  relationship with  Islam evolved through the  decades  as  the 
struggle continued. “Islam as a religion and culture is inextricably intertwined 
with Acehnese identity and heritage. GAM as a popular movement cannot 
but reflect this.”  GAM’s attitude toward Islam was “ambiguous”: within 238
GAM, “Islam has served as a unifying element for the different suku [ethnic 
group] and as another way of differentiating devout Aceh from syncretistic 
Java.”239
di  Tiro’s  main  strategy  was  to  internationalize  GAM’s  struggle.  He 
knew, from his time at the United Nations, that statehood is a club where 
membership is granted by the preexisting members of that club. He therefore 
made “straightforward appeals for international backing.”  In his capacity 240
as “head of state,” di Tiro wrote to U.S. officials explaining the strategic im-
portance of  Aceh,  and thus of  its  independence.  Calling the United States 
“practically  my second country,”  he  emphasized that  he  would  “establish 
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close relations between Aceh and the United States.”  Not finding much 241
success, he would later write of his frustration with “the American frame of 
reference.”  During the Cold War, the United States could not be convinced 242
to support Acehnese independence at the expense of the American-friendly 
Suharto regime. 
di Tiro, by his own account, “having failed to get Western audience, … 
had to concentrate on the Islamic World.”  Only Libya provided assistance. 243
By the 1990s, GAM was receiving support from the Acehnese diaspora, espe-
cially in Malaysia, but it was unable to successfully internationalize the con-
flict. 
There  were  three  phases  of  GAM’s  insurgency.  From  1976  to  1979, 
GAM was a group of  seventy highly-educated,  heavily ideological  men.  244
“These  were  the  people  exposed to  intellectual  thought  and debate  rather 
than the state propaganda from Jakarta.”  Among other things, this iteration 245
of GAM targeted Western oil  and gas companies and their  installations.  246
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the centralized and powerful Suharto regime had lit-
tle difficulty dispatching this incarnation of GAM. By 1982, all its leaders were 
dead or in exile.247
Libya’s assistance arrived at a crucial moment for GAM. From exile in 
Sweden, di Tiro directed the reorganization, and foot soldiers were sent to 
Libya for training starting in 1986.  Upon their return to Aceh, GAM was 248
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now better equipped and better trained. This iteration of GAM attacked the 
police and army, civil authorities, and “suspected government informers.”  249
From 1986-89, GAM’s strategy was one of “geographic expansion.”250
But GOI still preferred to settle conflicts by military, rather than politi-
cal, means.  In 1989, the government declared Aceh a Daerah Operasi Militer, 251
a military operations area (DOM). DOM was “characterized by heavy-handed 
military reprisals against villages believed to provide logistical help or sanc-
tuary to the insurgents.”  Tactics included “arbitrary arrest and detention of 252
hundreds  of  people…the  systematic  burning  of  houses,  rape, 
‘disappearances,’ and the dumping of unidentified corpses at roadsides.”253
DOM was intended as a counterinsurgency strategy but was character-
ized by such brutality that the government lost the “hearts and minds” of 
many Acehnese.  The military used what it  called ‘shock therapy.’ Whole 254
villages of civilians were used to create a ‘fence of legs’ that would insulate 
the military from the counterinsurgency.  Because nearly the entire commu255 -
nity was affected by government atrocities, GAM became a “genuinely popu-
lar  movement.”  Recruiting  was  no  longer  a  problem.  Many  new  GAM 256
members were “merchants and farmers whose existence was economically 
threatened.”  But  GAM’s  primary constituency was  “the  ranks  of  unem257 -
ployed  young  men,  primarily  from  rural  areas,  with  limited  educational 
backgrounds.”258
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By the end of DOM, between 1200 and 2000 people had been killed, 
and  3,439  had  been  tortured.  Estimates  of  the  number  of  disappeared 259
ranged from 500 to 39,000. Other atrocities were also perpetrated in shocking 
numbers: an estimated 625 rapes of women and children; 16,375 children or-
phaned; 3,000 women widowed.260
Given these losses, by 1991, GAM persisted primarily as an organiza-
tion with a political goal (independence for Aceh) for three main reasons.  261
First, much of the leadership was safely in exile, running the insurgency from 
a distance. Second, much of the membership was also safe, having fled to Ma-
laysia to join the sizable Acehnese diaspora already there. And finally, DOM 
had provided such fertile  recruiting grounds.  The ‘shock therapy’  GOI in-
tended to  defeat  GAM had partially  backfired and even more  civilians  in 
Aceh were drawn to help GAM.  “On an Achenese level, the DOM experi262 -
ence of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, and rape overshadowed 
everything. The consequent focus of the Acehnese population on issues of jus-
tice was naturally taken up by GAM” and sought to draw international atten-
tion to the actions of the government.263
The Beginning of the End
Though GAM persisted in seeking independence and GOI would offi-
cially keep DOM in place through 1998, conflict dynamics were shifting. The 
first big shift was the fall of Suharto and the end of the New Order govern-
ment. This created a new political space and the potential to transform the 
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conflict in Aceh. The simultaneous Asian financial crisis brought an end to the 
costly policy of DOM.264
The New Order’s successor government publicly pledged to resolve 
the conflict in Aceh and declared itself open to negotiations. But GAM did not 
perceive the new government, in the transition period, to be attentive enough 
to the plight of Aceh.  Revelations about the extent of the human rights vio265 -
lations during DOM continued to provide GAM with supporters.  These fac266 -
tors combined to motivate GAM’s second wave of territorial expansion be-
ginning in 1999. 
The  other  shift  in  conflict  dynamics  was  the  end  of  the  Cold  War. 
GAM’s resurgence “coincided with a period when important players in the 
international  system were  more  willing  to  support  conflict  resolution  and 
democratic transitions in developing countries. It was the end of the decade of 
interventionism that followed the Cold War.”  Further, concerns about the 267
dangers posed by ‘failed states’—and then, after 2001, concerns about radical 
Islam’s festering in power vacuums—pushed the international community to 
greater attention and involvement in Aceh. In 1999, the “liberal minded” Ab-
durrahman Wahid became president of Indonesia and announced he wanted 
a negotiated settlement.  This prompted American, European, and Japanese 
leaders to seek to support a peace process. 
GAM still sought to internationalize the conflict. International journal-
ists began to visit in increasing numbers—taking advantage of the political 
opening in the wake of the fall of the New Order—allowing GAM to ramp up 
their media operations. “[GAM] became sophisticated at handling the media, 
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smuggling conspicuous foreigners behind enemy lines, stage managing pho-
togenic events, and ensuring that civilians were always on hand to tell stories 
of military brutality. They also made more urgent appeals for foreign inter-
vention.”  GAM also adjusted its rhetoric to appeal to a broader section of 268
the international audience, dropping the most anti-capitalist stances of its ear-
lier incarnations—perhaps rightly sensing that such stances were increasingly 
lacking a constituency in the post-Cold War world.269
The final important shift was within GAM. di Tiro suffered a debilitat-
ing stroke in 1997, leaving the second tier of GAM leaders (also in exile) in 
charge. In some ways, this may have been the most important development. 
As Aspinall argues, “it is hard to imagine him acceding to the compromise 
that was eventually reached.”270
Spoiled Process
These shifts led to the first peace process, which began in 1999 when 
two GAM leaders “indicated interest in negotiating with the Indonesian gov-
ernment.”  In January 2000, a small, Geneva-based NGO called the Henry 271
Dunant Center (HDC; named for the founder of the Red Cross, it would later 
be renamed the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) contacted GOI and of-
fered itself as a mediator.  272
The HDC-led process first produced a Humanitarian Pause in 2000 and 
culminated in the CoHA. The CoHA required both sides to cease all violence, 
not redeploy their forces, and acknowledge the right of the HDC to facilitate 
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the agreement.  An extended pause would allow the insertion of third-par273 -
ties and mediators. Perhaps most indicative of the trajectory of the conflict, 
the CoHA also called on both sides to “take joint action against third parties 
violating the agreement.”  This  clause was aimed at  government militias 274
“acting outside of central control.”275
Though the CoHA seemed to reduce the violence in places, the situa-
tion on the ground felt  tenuous.  The main problem was the particulars of 
GAM’s disarmament. GOI wanted GAM fully disarmed, but GAM intended 
only to put its weapons in the care of the HDC.  Three months after the 276
CoHA was concluded, a mob attacked monitors in Central Aceh and burned 
HDC vehicles. The state news agency reported this violence was the work of 
GAM, but this  was apparently deliberate misinformation.  Rather,  “the fact 
that Central Aceh had been a training centre for pro-Indonesian militia for the 
last two years, and that the attack had come at a time when the HDC was 
pressuring the military to withdraw to their barracks was not lost on any ob-
servers.”  The government, for its part, had plausible deniability because of 277
the relative autonomy of the militias.  These autonomous militias were do278 -
ing their best to spoil the agreement, and it worked. “From early May 2003 
onwards, there was no longer any doubt that the province would soon be at 
war again.”  The CoHA broke down in 2003 and violence resumed.279
Some of the trouble was that GAM was not negotiating in good faith. 
“From the beginning GAM’s participation in the dialogue was motivated less 
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by what GAM could receive from Indonesia than by what it  could receive 
from the international  community.  GAM displayed little  interest  in the In-
donesian  delegation  and  its  position.”  Seeking  international  recognition 280
was an end, not a means, for GAM. Bragging that the negotiations were a first 
step toward independence, GAM did not approach the talks with intent to 
cede anything.281
This  strategy quickly  ran up against  reality.  International  diplomats 
were put off by GAM’s revolutionary rhetoric and its persistent references to 
historical wrongs. When meeting with the international representatives to the 
negotiations,  “it  was  their  habit…to  convey  their  standard  beliefs  about 
Aceh’s past glories, the illegality of Indonesian sovereignty, the perfidy of the 
Dutch,  and the artificiality of  Indonesia,  finishing with the need to restore 
Aceh’s independence as successor to the sultanate.”  The mediators were 282
not impressed, and made their position plain.  “A U.S.  official  dismissively 
told [GAM] that he and his government were not interested in such ‘old histo-
ry’ but rather in the current situation under which U.S. recognition of Indone-
sian suzerainty over Aceh would not be reviewed.”283
Despite the resumption of the violence, the HDC process was impor-
tant for several reasons. GAM saw this as the beginning of appropriate in-
ternational attention to its struggle. The HDC formed a commission of “wise 
men” including U.S.  General  Anthony Zinni.  Their  presence and attention 
signaled, to GAM, international support for the peace process.  This, in turn, 284
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allowed GAM to consolidate its support among the Acehnese. Aspinall ar-
gues, “here at last was evidence that the world took them seriously.”285
On the other side, the militias were spoilers, too. Analyses of why the 
CoHA failed emphasizes the actions of  those “who undermined the peace 
process either deliberately or through the unintended consequences of their 
actions in the field.”  In retrospect, it is clear that TNI and its militias were 286
none too eager to see the agreement succeed, still believing they could achieve 
a military victory.  Some militias were tied to TNI, while others had politi287 -
cal-party  benefactors—some of  which objected to  the  peace  process— and 
these groups grew in prominence in the run up to the 2002 CoHA.  The hope 288
of military success deeply affected TNI and militia behavior.
In May 2003, when it became eminently clear that the CoHA was un-
raveling, GOI mobilized. Military leaders announced a campaign to finally 
defeat GAM by “isolat[ing] the insurgency from its rural base.”  They had a 289
four-point  plan,  one  of  which  was  “the  establishment  of  civilian  militias, 
whose tasks it was to provide intelligence on GAM movements, guard vil-
lages at night, and otherwise support the military’s counterinsurgency opera-
tions.”  Ultimately, GOI and its allies were successful: “it had…been the un290 -
dermining of the CoHA in 2003 by TNI and militias that led directly to its col-
lapse.”  The strategic use of militias allowed GOI to say it was obeying the 291
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terms of the CoHA while actively working to spoil it: “they just got someone 
else to do the killing for them.”292
This campaign achieved one quick success—the collapse of the CoHA
—and looked set to achieve another: finally defeating GAM. TNI had “aban-
don[ed] the hesitancy that had characterized much past behavior…and pur-
sued the guerrillas for weeks at  a time, leading to what one former GAM 
commander  described  as  endless  games  of  ‘cat  and  mouse’  deep  in  the 
jungle.”  This strategy indicated that the military still believed in “the pri293 -
macy  of  the  military  solution.”  GAM  sustained  unprecedented  losses, 294
which had ripple effects on the group’s morale. By this point in the conflict, 
GAM had such a wide recruiting base that most fighters “were not battle-
hardened veterans.”295
Though GAM suffered these losses, it was not “disabused of…earlier 
beliefs  that  either  military  victory  or  independence  through  negotiation 
would be possible.”  TNI’s latest offensive had made it clear that indepen296 -
dence was no longer a realistic goal. But despite TNI’s relative success, it still 
had not soundly defeated GAM past any return. “The existing strategies ap-
plied by both parties had caused a costly stalemate.”297
How the Peace Was Won
This stalemate is the backdrop against which the peace would finally 
be won. Accounts of the final MoU concluded in 2005 invariably mention the 
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importance  of  the  tsunami  that  hit  Indonesia—and  Aceh  particularly—on 
Boxing Day 2004. Upon first glance, this connection is accurate: “almost im-
mediately” after the tsunami, GAM leaders announced a ceasefire.298
But the story is more complicated than a single “freakishly disruptive 
natural disaster.”  A few days before the tsunami hit, GAM leaders had ten299 -
tatively agreed to renewed negotiations.  GAM was not eager for these talks, 300
so the tsunami was certainly “an accelerant” to the discussions, but it remains 
the stalemate, not the weather, that was primarily responsible.301
The tsunami brought international attention to Indonesia and Aceh, the 
kind of attention GAM “had previously only dreamed about.”  Indonesia 302
was soon crawling  with  relief  workers  and journalists.  The  tsunami  relief 
work provided a base for a new international push for a negotiated settle-
ment. Early in the process, the EU announced it would provide a stronger 
guarantee and monitoring presence than before. Maarti Ahtisaari,  a former 
president of Finland, was chosen as the mediator, bringing “a personal au-
thority to the negotiations that had previously been lacking.”  Finally, GAM 303
had the chance to internationalize its struggle.
The crucial moment early in the negotiations was when Ahtisaari re-
versed the HDC-led process status quo. Ahtisaari declared that “nothing is 
agreed  until  everything  is  agreed”  and  insisted  on  a  comprehensive 
solution.  The analysis was that both sides had used the earlier CoHA as a 304
chance to regroup and rearm without making any political concessions. By 
accepting  no  temporary  measures,  Ahtisaari  intended  to  force  movement 
 Ibid., 221.298
 Ibid.299
 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement, 19.300
 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, 232.301
 Ibid., 233.302
 Ibid.303
 Ibid.304
!96
from both sides toward a political agreement. In particular, Ahtisaari wanted 
to discover whether a promise of “special autonomy, or self-government, as 
GAM called it during the talks, offered enough for GAM to give up its claim 
of independence.”305
GAM now faced a choice was between continuing to insist on inde-
pendence and therefore likely scuttling the talks;  and moderating its  long-
held beliefs and accepting the offer of special autonomy instead. After two 
days of internal deliberations in Helsinki, GAM leaders accepted a guarantee 
of autonomy and agreed not to continue to ask for independence. This was 
not a discussion GAM had prior to Ahtisaari’s ultimatum; this decision was 
forced entirely by the circumstances at the negotiation.306
GAM’s leaders calculated that continuing to insist on independence—
and therefore essentially ensuring a return to armed struggle—was not a ra-
tional choice, in large part because of the stalemate that had immediately pre-
ceded the negotiations.  The tsunami also affected this calculation, because 307
GAM was able to present negotiations as a response to the new, post-disaster 
environment, as opposed to a reversal of a previous policy.  Having sought 308
international attention and recognition for literally decades, “the movement 
was now being offered much of what it had previously desired: praise and 
honor from foreign government and international agencies, a prolonged in-
ternational  presence  in  Aceh,  and  international  monitoring  of  the  peace 
process.”  Continuing to press the case for independence could result in the 309
withdrawal  of  this  international  attention  and  good  will.  GAM  chose  its 
means (internationalization) over its ends (independence).
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This was precisely how GAM sold the agreement to the rank-and-file. 
In the aftermath of the tsunami, leaders explained, continuing armed struggle 
would  cause  the  international  community  to  accuse  GAM  of  being 
terrorists.  GAM leaders could also count on the group’s self-image to assist 310
in this task. A former commander explained, “GAM was ‘exactly like a mili-
tary, whether you’re talking of the civilian or the military wings. They follow 
orders exactly like a military does.’”  GAM displayed “remarkable discipline 311
and cohesiveness as an organization, with strong central leadership,” which 
meant the exiled elite could count on the loyalty and obedience of the rank-
and-file.  These dynamics helped ensure GAM members would not spoil the 312
agreement,  which  was  considerably  more  comprehensive  than  the  failed 
CoHA. 
Political Provisions
The  central  provision  proposed  decentralizing  Jakarta’s  power  over 
Aceh.  GAM  leaders  called  it  “self-government”  and  Indonesian  officials 
called it “the broadest possible autonomy.” In reality, the provision was nearly 
identical to the 2001 Special Autonomy Law, but the MoU had one vital dif-
ference, laid out in a section called “political participation.” This section out-
lined local elections for Aceh. It also allowed local parties to run in national 
elections. Previously, only national parties had been permitted to compete at 
the national level. To run for national office, Acehnese politicians would have 
to join a national party, something they categorically refused to do. GAM felt 
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strongly enough about the regional and local elections and parties that nego-
tiations almost broke down over these provisions.313
Military Provisions
In addition to these political provisions, the MoU detailed provisions 
for “amnesty, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of GAM fight-
ers into society; robust mechanisms for international monitoring of the peace;
…and compensation for ‘all civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss 
due to the conflict.’”  The disarmament by GAM and the government forces 314
would  happen  concurrently,  at  a  rate  of  25  percent  per  month  for  four 
months.  At ten district offices, GAM members (estimated at 1,300 weapons 315
for 4,000 active members) would turn in their weapons for decommissioning. 
These weapons would be immediately destroyed, a “symbol of ending con-
flict and to ensure weapons are not re-used.”  316
Third Party Enforcement
The  MoU  had  a  more  robust  monitoring  mechanism  than  did  the 
CoHA. While CoHA had provided for twenty-five monitors sent by Thailand 
and the Philippines (the only two states acceptable to GOI)  the Aceh Moni317 -
toring  Mission  (AMM)  was  a  joint  project  of  the  EU  and  ASEAN.  This 
arrangement gave the monitors more enforcement capacity than, for example, 
an NGO might have, which was crucial to the success of the AMM.  This 318
was a  big  adjustment  from the CoHA. Recognizing that  facilitators  of  the 
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agreement would be subpar enforcers, the AMM was given the mandate for 
enforcement; this was acceptable because the EU and ASEAN were seen as 
independent in Aceh.  Under the MoU, the AMM would have free move319 -
ment in the country and would not be armed, and GOI would be responsible 
for the AMM’s safety. The AMM was designed to deploy without delay, to 
begin enforcing the agreement right away, and it was given “proactive moni-
toring” capabilities to “play more of a leadership role, which allowed [AMM] 
to address potential problems with the two parties before they escalated and 
became major issues that could derail the peace process320
The MoU specifically outlined the mandate of the AMM, authorizing it 
to monitor the demobilization, reintegration, and amnesty of GAM; monitor 
the human rights situation and legislation; and “establish and maintain liai-
son and good cooperation with the parties.”  The AMM was also in constant 321
contact with civil society representatives, to help build local stakeholders for 
peace.  Perhaps  most  important,  it  was  clear  that  AMM personnel  were 322
“part of a mission that was not under the control or authority” of the gov-
ernment of Indonesia.323
Spoiler Management
The agreement also provided for the disarming of TNI-sponsored mili-
tias. The government continued to deny their presence, and so these groups 
were  called “illegal  parties”  in  the  MoU at  the  government’s  insistence.  324
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There were no representatives of the militias at the talks because the govern-
ment denied their existence.  Facing this resistance, it was a victory for the 325
meditators and GAM to have the militias addressed in the agreement at all. 
Ahtisaari insisted that TNI be limited to “external defense and be under civil-
ian authority.”  The last days of the negotiations focused specifically on the 326
language dealing with these militias, where mediators pressed hard to limit 
the number and power of these groups.  In the weeks following the signing, 327
while there remained some reports of TNI proxy militias, the government was 
working to bring TNI under “civilian control and hence [limit] its capacity or 
intent to wreck the agreement.”328
Implementation
The MoU was signed on 15 August 2005,  and was implemented by 
both sides with “few serious violent incidents.”  GAM members demobi329 -
lized and disarmed, and the Indonesian parliament passed the Law for the 
Government of Aceh, which implemented the political agreement from the 
MoU. Certain members of parliament who objected to the negotiations altered 
the law to allow national legislation affecting Aceh to be passed even without 
Aceh’s simultaneous approval. 
GAM  criticized  this  change,  but  was  unable  to  abandon  the  peace 
process, in large part because it had already disarmed. What is more impor-
tant, GAM leaders were also busy preparing for local Aceh elections, sched-
uled for December 2006. Never having actually governed, GAM had to devel-
op comprehensive and coherent  policies,  and “to offer  tangible  benefits to 
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voters and persuade them that they had the administrative skills and capacity 
to deliver.”  Assuming this responsibility changed GAM’s rhetoric and ap330 -
proach. “Without ever having a sophisticated social or economic program of 
their own, former GAM leaders simply borrowed whole-scale from the in-
ternational  development  agencies  that  now  clustered  around  the  peace 
process…and [GAM] promised to clean up government administration, in-
troduce transparency and effectiveness in government service delivery, and 
attract foreign investment.”331
Demobilization left unoccupied many GAM members with no skills, 
means, or occupations. The MoU provided for land transfers as a way of inte-
grating former combatants into the productive economy, which had the unin-
tended effect of creating patronage networks in Aceh.  “The entry of a large 332
number of GAM members into bureaucracy, following the incredible winning 
of Aceh party in the provincial election [created] a new circle of power and 
lucrative  patronage  networks  in  Aceh,  thereby  deconstructing  the  existing 
constellation of political power in the province.”  Previously, GAM had been 333
a protection racket: among other practices, it was fond of kidnapping for ran-
som, trafficking in arms, and other illicit deals.  But now it needed to evolve 334
into a government that raised funds only legally, and a general sense of law-
fulness needed to be (re)created. The transformation of GAM from opposition 
to government happened in this context. “The transition from war to peace 
provided new economic and political resources for the Acehnese people and, 
in the process, generated a new structure of conflict.”335
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Another minor wrinkle was of GAM’s own creation. Unwilling to ad-
mit  to—and thus  surrender—all  their  weapons,  GAM declared  only  3,000 
fighters.  Reintegration provisions thus accounted for 3,000 combatants.  But 
the actual number of GAM fighters was considerably higher, causing trouble 
with the distribution of government-provided reintegration funds.  336
Despite these shortcomings, the emphasis on democracy in the MoU—
and GAM’s  subsequent  embrace  of  the  process—helped the  MoU become 
self-reinforcing. “Making elections the centerpiece of the deal thus allowed 
[GOI] to accept a solution whereby Aceh remained part of Indonesia while 
claiming that they remained bound by their commitment to the Acehnese na-
tion.”  This was a crucial understanding of the incompatibility and its solu337 -
tion.
Lessons from Aceh
After  centuries  of  struggling  for  independence,  Acehnese  leaders 
dropped this central goal under pressure and settled for special autonomy 
status instead. Though the HDC-led process in 2002 failed, it also established 
the  framework  by  which  the  eventual  MoU  would  succeed.  Today,  the 
Finnish-mediated process is considered “one of the most successful interna-
tionally mediated peace accords in the world.”  338
GAM accepted DDR measures in exchange for compensation from the 
government and transformed itself from an opposition group to a legitimate 
political—and governing—party. GOI allowed regional parties like GAM to 
compete in national elections, and agreed to keep TNI’s footprint in Aceh be-
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low a certain, internationally-monitored level. The role of PGMs in the conflict 
was specifically addressed. The MoU called for the disbanding and disarming 
of ‘illegal parties,’ and these militias were de facto addressed by limiting TNI’s 
footprint.
Though turbulence remains—the patronage networks, for example, are 
a troubling source of conflict—it is worth examining what elements of the set-
tlement worked well to bring this lasting peace, and how the 2005 agreement 
improved on the 2002 version. Some of these lessons can be applied to further 
our understanding of how peace agreements, generally, succeed and fail, but 
other lessons only illustrate the unique quirks of the Indonesian case and tell 
only the story of this particular success.
It is important to emphasize that these lessons are drawn from empiri-
cal observations of the peace process in Indonesia, and are not all intended to 
be policy prescriptions. In some cases, the human cost is simply too high. In 
these instances, efforts should be made to approximate the scenario that made 
space for peace.
Process, Inclusion, and Spoilers
In Helsinki, every party to the conflict was included. GAM was made 
to disarm, but in exchange was granted amnesty and the right to organize as a 
legitimate political party. Land transfers were meant to allow a path back to 
economic self-sufficiency. TNI reduced its footprint in Aceh to the bare essen-
tials and was made to restrict itself to external defense only. 
The spoiler potential of the PGMs in Indonesia was directly addressed 
by provisions in the MoU that clarified the expectations for TNI and GOI with 
regard to reining in the militias. Ahtisaari emphasized the need for TNI to be 
responsive to civilian control. And the militias and their spoiling of the CoHA 
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were also addressed, if not as robustly as GAM may have originally hoped. 
The party that was perhaps the most silent in the conflict—the international 
community—was also present and bought into the process and its outcome.
It is not fair or accurate to blame the CoHA’s failure entirely on the 
jumpy TNI. GAM also acted strategically and was not negotiating in good 
faith. If a party is going to use negotiations strategically in this way, there may 
be  no  solution  but  Ahtisaari’s:  that  nothing  is  agreed  until  everything  is 
agreed. The only real antidote to unequal gains in the process is to ensure that 
the process has no constituent parts but rather is accepted as a package deal. 
The process by which all sides were accounted for is just as important 
as the actual concessions won. Bekoe emphasizes that both sides need to feel 
that the other is conceding at least as much—if not more—in order to be satis-
fied with an agreement.  Ahtisaari’s maxim kept the two sides from sizing 339
up the deal during a mid-negotiation ceasefire, deciding the other side was 
getting the advantage, and reneging. Requiring both sides to agree to every 
detail  before  anything could be  finalized meant  that  the  concessions  were 
clear in real-time and both sides had a sense of victory in the process.
Political Exclusion
Addressing the political exclusion of GAM from Indonesian national 
politics was at the centre of the final agreement. Political grievances in Aceh 
had two forms.  First,  most  saliently,  Aceh wanted to  be  independent.  But 
some of that desire for independence was fueled by a perceived difference, 
and exclusion, from Javanese politics and government. This was exacerbated 
by the unwillingness of GOI to reform and decentralize. Granting Aceh in-
 Bekoe, Implementing Peace Agreements, 2.339
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creased autonomy was a partial solution because it reduced the sense within 
Aceh that it was governed by an outside power. 
More fundamental political reforms were also essential. GAM was al-
lowed to reconstitute itself as a political party and run for local government in 
Aceh. Most crucially, Jakarta allowed regional political parties like GAM to 
compete  in  national  elections.  These  concessions  mitigated  the  degree  to 
which GAM and Aceh were excluded politically.
The political provisions of the MoU were self-reinforcing. To stay in 
power,  GAM—now  a  legitimate  political  party—needed  to  deliver  on  its 
promises.  As  the  standard  of  living  and  the  political  system in  Aceh  im-
proved, GAM saw return on its involvement. This dynamic helps ensure the 
longevity of the agreement.
In this case, all these reforms were implemented into the existing polit-
ical system. There were no agreement-imposed power-sharing or power-di-
viding measures, and the Indonesian government was not subject to an ethnic 
or religious quota system. While Indonesia is not precisely the sort of democ-
racy imagined by the theoretical literature which argues that democratic tradi-
tions  increase  the  odds that  an agreement  succeeds,  the  manner  in  which 
these reforms were implemented here shows one path forward even in per-
haps less ‘textbook’ democracies.
Third Party Enforcement
In the case of Indonesia, third-party enforcement measures were clear-
ly part of the agreement’s success. Third-party enforcers are not created equal
—the failure of the CoHA indicates this acutely. But the AMM had a “clear 
timeframe and mandate” and was independent of the mediating team—both 
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factors contributed to its success as an enforcer.  After such egregious extra-340
legal behavior by TNI and its associated forces, general adherence to the rule 
of law needed to be reintroduced. Further, GAM trust in the government was 
at its nadir. The AMM was one sign of international support and neutral en-
forcement of the agreement that helped facilitate its success from its earliest 
days.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Along with granting amnesty for  GAM fighters,  the DDR measures 
were a central part of the agreement. Some of the success came because every 
detail was painstakingly spelled out in the agreement. The CoHA had been 
considerably more vague  and mediators seem to have learned from that ef341 -
fort. The disarmament and demobilization numbers and rates were written 
into the MoU,  and these efforts were successful even if GAM was not en342 -
tirely honest going into the disarmament process. When the legislation passed 
by  the  Indonesian  parliament  failed  to  meet  expectations,  being  disarmed 
kept GAM from responding with violence. 
One policy that the MoU might teach future processes is tying reinte-
gration funds to disarmament numbers. GAM declared fewer weapons and 
fighters than actually existed so it would not have to fully disarm, but this 
meant  there  were  fewer  funds  than  needed  for  reintegration.  Any  future 
group that strategically admits fewer combatants for disarmament purposes 
will be similarly affected on the reintegration process. Regardless of the par-
ticular mechanism, reintegration procedures that allow former combatants a 
method to rejoin the legitimate economy will  be crucial  to an agreement’s 
 Rajasingham-Senanyake, “Transnational Peace Building and Conflict,” 219.340
 Shie, Disarming for Peace in Aceh. 341
 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement, 44-45.342
!107
success, in part by reducing the appeal of joining protection rackets, which 
may be where a group’s expertise lies.
The disarmament process in Indonesia might be distinctive. For exam-
ple, Indonesia does not historically have a gun culture, and weapons do not 
carry with them local connotations of ‘machismo.’  A conflict with such fac343 -
tors might make disarmament more difficult—or, in any event, such factors 
would require mediators to understand the dynamic and work to find agree-
ment even despite their presence. 
Proximate Goals
The ideal-type mediation discovers solutions that are acceptable to all 
sides because no party achieves all they seek at the expense of another. In the 
case of incompatibilities that are particularly all-or-nothing—for example, in-
dependence claims—finding this middle ground requires a talented mediator. 
Credit goes to Ahtisaari for finding a path forward even amidst two sides 
with great resolve not to concede, but also for recognizing and exploiting both 
sides’ proximate goals. GAM was seeking international respect and legitima-
cy and was willing to trade that for autonomy, conceding its goal of indepen-
dence. GOI had the self-image of being open and democratic, and could not 
maintain this image if it continued to refuse to allow GAM to organize politi-
cally and run for office.344
Thus neither side got everything but neither side got nothing—and in 
the case of an incompatibility as intractable as independence, this is a particu-
lar victory. One path to peace may therefore be through recognizing and ex-
ploiting each group’s proximate—as opposed to central—goals.
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Military Stalemate
The backdrop to all these provisions is that, at least temporarily, a re-
turn to armed hostilities was not a rational option for any party. TNI’s coun-
terinsurgency was unable to soundly defeat GAM after the CoHA; GAM, in 
turn, was so worn down that its calculations were beginning to change. This 
may have been the most important facilitating factor to the agreement: the 
barriers to restarting the campaigns of violence were high for both sides and 
so the incentive to keep negotiating remained higher perhaps than usual.
This is not a factor to weigh lightly. The human cost of a stalemate is 
tremendous, and it is difficult to offer ‘military stalemate’ as a facilitating fac-
tor for peace when it comes only at such a cost. But perhaps the silver lining 
of such a finding is that when and if a conflict does organically reach such a 
turning point, the chances for peace are likely never higher.
Because waiting for stalemates to occur naturally is a tremendous cost, 
it  may be  possible  for  third  parties  intervening  in  a  conflict  or  the  peace 
process to artificially simulate a stalemate. One policy sometimes considered 
in  these  scenarios  is  an  arms embargo.  But  as  conflicts  in  the  former  Yu-
goslavia, for example, demonstrated, embargoes often disproportionately af-
fect the opposition without significantly hindering the government, which is 
more likely to have stocks of arms and to be able to circumvent the embargo 
on the black market. Nonetheless, a way to artificially simulate a stalemate—
that equally affects both sides, else it will not be a proper stalemate—may be a 
facilitating factor for peace processes. As their resources disappear, belliger-
ents may be coaxed to the negotiating table without as much loss of life as 
would accompany a hard-fought stalemate. 
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Distinctive Factors
Some aspects of the successful Indonesia accord are unlikely to occur 
again—certainly not in the same combination. This remains a story of nuances 
that are too important to be elided. International attention to, and appetite for, 
interventionism in the  years  following the Cold War no doubt  galvanized 
GAM. Similarly, a new global focus on the Islamic extremism and the per-
ceived dangers of  failed states brought Indonesia into the spotlight.  These 
were both facilitating factors on a global scale.
But nothing is so distinctive about this story as the tsunami. Social sci-
entists have published widely about the political aftermath of natural disas-
ters.  But such disasters cannot simply be conjured at crucial moments in a 345
settlement process. The tsunami was an important accelerant of peace in Aceh 
and cannot be overlooked, even while it cannot be counted upon to fulfill the 
same role in future processes.  
 See e.g., Drury & Olson; Pelling & Dill.345
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El Salvador
The scale of the violence in El Salvador cannot be overstated. During 
the civil war, El Salvador “became virtually synonymous with human rights 
abuse and political terror.”  In a region and an era wracked by violence, the 346
scale of the atrocities in El Salvador was still remarkable. Per capita, the terror 
wreaked by the state was the most severe in the hemisphere.  In the most 347
violent regions in the most violent years, “as many as 34 people per week 
were found beheaded.”348
The Chapultepec Accords are all the more remarkable for the scale of 
violence and destruction that the accords were written to solve. Called “a ne-
gotiated revolution,” the Accords established a ceasefire that has never been 
broken; reformed the military and removed from it the duty of keeping order 
domestically; established a new, civilian-controlled police force; reintegrated 
former combatants; and addressed the chief incompatibility of inequality by 
mandating land transfers. 
Part of the peace process was a UN-run Truth Commission, which had 
a mandate to investigate human rights violations since 1980. Its report was 
released in 1993 with “tremendous impact.”  The report recommended that 349
those named as abusers be prohibited from holding public office for ten years: 
this was something of a work-around to achieve justice and closure in a sys-
tem the authors did not expect to be robust enough to prosecute the offenders. 
Though the government tried to offer blanket amnesty to anyone named, the 
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report was still important and it remains “the most important public instru-
ment of truth, accountability, and an end to impunity ever to emerge in El 
Salvador.”350
In  El  Salvador’s  story,  themes recur.  Class  divisions  were cemented 
during colonial times, and wealth remained concentrated in the hands of the 
oligarchy until the accords in 1992. During the civil war, El Salvador was ex-
ceptionally penetrated by outside interests, when the USSR funded the oppo-
sition while the United States supported the government. 
El Salvador’s civil war also featured a proliferation of PGMs that ter-
rorized the rural countryside. Originally established by the oligarchy as pri-
vate militias to defend their economic interests, these groups were not abol-
ished when the government created the armed forces: instead, they became 
the roots of the modern death squads. During the civil  war, they colluded 
with  the  government  to  suppress  the  opposition  and support  the  regime. 
Changing the calculus of these groups and their financial and logistical sup-
porters was essential to secure the peace in El Salvador.
“The setting for paramilitary emergence is a political environment tra-
ditionally  ruled  by  an  oligarchy  whose  monopoly  over  the  country’s  re-
sources and wealth has depended on an exclusive right of political participa-
tion.”  This held true in El Salvador, where the alliance with the elites made 351
the death squads status quo actors, and their violence was intended to enforce 
that status quo against reform efforts. This alliance would prove particularly 
deadly in El Salvador.
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The Death Squads
The death squads are an essential part of the story of El Salvador’s civil 
war. Even in a notably bloody civil war, “perhaps nothing so epitomized the 
violence in the eyes of the public as the actions of the death squads.”  The 352
UN-sponsored Truth Commission found that ninety-five percent of “extraju-
dicial executions, disappearances, and torture were attributable to ‘agents of 
the State, paramilitary groups allied to them, and the death squads.’”353
Death squads were active in El Salvador from the beginning of the un-
rest in 1932. These death squads were “made up of regular police and military 
personnel, often operating in plain clothes but under the orders of superior 
officers.”  The death squads seemed to operate with impunity. “The style 354
and brazenness of operation suggested either state complicity or, at a mini-
mum, because of the frequency of killings and the squads’ freedom of opera-
tion, state acquiescence.”  The death squads aimed to terrorize. They “elimi355 -
nated opponents” and “disfigured” the bodies.356
The conflict in El Salvador had its roots in the class structure estab-
lished by Spanish colonizers. The oligarchs who dominated society came to 
also dominate politics, creating and using institutions for their benefit. “The 
military and elite had been building a sort of dysfunctional codependent rela-
tionship for decades, and out of that grew the ‘official’ political party focused 
on preserving and furthering that relationship.”  The military had operated 357
as a ‘protection racket’ [earning] the concession to govern the country (and 
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pillage the state) in exchange for its willingness to use violence against class 
enemies of the country’s relatively small but powerful economic elite.”  An 358
oligarch explained the relationship like this: “We have traditionally bought 
the military’s guns, and have paid them to pull the trigger.”  Through the 359
civil  war,  therefore,  the death squads were allied with the anti-reform ele-
ments within the government but were also loyal to, and funded by, the oli-
garchs. 
As a result of extensive U.S. (i.e., CIA) involvement in El Salvador dur-
ing the conflict,  and then during the UN-supervised peace process,  a cata-
logue of the death squads and those accused of running these groups exists.  360
In 1981, the CIA described Roberto D’Aubuisson, then a major in the Salvado-
ran National Guard (GN) and assistant chief of the intelligence agency, as “the 
principal henchman for wealthy landowners and a coordinator of the right-
wing death squads that have murdered several thousand suspected leftists 
and leftist sympathizers.”  Journalists on the ground describe D’Aubuisson 361
as  being  “publicly  recognized  as  the  principal  promoter  of  the  death 
squads.”  362
D’Aubuisson  was  a  “political  entrepreneur”  who  organized  several 
groups to target the left.  While serving as assistant chief of the intelligence 363
agency, D’Aubuisson founded the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), 
a far-right political party intended to protect the interests of the oligarchy af-
ter the 1979 coup. ARENA did accomplish one major goal: the “restoration of 
the traditional Salvadorean regime—the reestablishment of the order of “the 
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Fourteen Families.”  “The forces whose interests ARENA defends politically 364
not only were principally responsible for the historical situation of injustice 
that caused the conflict, but over the years they were also the crucial actors in 
the development of the war.”365
Generally,  D’Aubuisson’s organizations served as a structure for the 
oligarchy,  which  could  funnel  its  “financial  and  logistical  support  for 
D’Aubuisson’s death squads.”  ARENA became the “central vehicle for vio366 -
lence” and “part of a multifaceted, overlapping network of terrorists based in 
and out of the security forces and financed by wealthy civilians.”  The death 367
squads that were active in the rural areas were based out of the national secu-
rity services and cobbled together by D’Aubuisson.
One  of  these  groups  was  the  (GN),  which  was  organized  out  of 
D’Aubuisson’s former section in the intelligence agency. The GN death squad 
was financed by right-wing civilians who also supplied weapons.  While the 368
GN actively sought the limelight, the National Police (PN) worked in a more 
shadowy way. The PN drew its members from three sections of the police: the 
Criminal Investigation section, the Special Political Investigation section, and 
the  Narcotics  Control  section  but  maintained  ties  with  ARENA  and 
D’Aubuisson.369
The  uniformed  divisions  of  Treasury  Police  (PH)  “were  among  the 
most brutal of El Salvador’s established security forces” but there is much less 
information about the behavior of their death squads. The record indicates 
that PH director, Colonel Nicolás Carranza, may have been a CIA informant: 
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“That the CIA’s landmark 1983 report on death squads contains not a word on 
the involvement of the Treasury Police suggests that Carranza himself may 
have been a principal source.”  The PH differed from the other death squads 370
because it appears to have had a rivalry with ARENA and D’Aubisson—a ri-
valry  that  included kidnappings  and executions  of  each  others’  members, 
though the record also indicates they perceived a shared enemy from leftist 
forces, and that  seems to have motivated most of the violence.371
Finally,  right-wing elements  within the  Armed Forces  had a  role  in 
death squad activities. These forces operated out of military headquarters and 
were led by senior  officers  who had been classmates  of  D’Aubuisson and 
shared his political sentiments.372
With their roots in El Salvador’s earliest days as an independent coun-
try, these death squads are an integral part of the civil war and its resolution. 
Their activities are in the background of the violence; a history of that conflict 
follows.
The Roots of the Problem 
Conquered by Spain in 1541, El Salvador would not become indepen-
dent until 1821. The roots of El Salvador’s future conflicts were established in 
the years immediately after independence from Spain. Deep inequality had 
persisted for centuries, laying the foundation for future class-based struggles.
In El Salvador, “land is the traditional source of wealth and the founda-
tion of the country’s oligarchy.”  The oligarchs worked together to oppress 373
the peasantry. The economic divisions became more important than other di-
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visions in society: “Despite the hostility between ethnic oppressor (those of 
Spanish descent) and ethnic oppressed (indigenous groups), the conflict over 
land became a unifying force among campesinos [peasants] regardless of eth-
nicity.”374
The  vast  majority  of  El  Salvador’s  wealth  was  concentrated  in  the 
hands of only a few families. “El Salvadorans today still refer to ‘Los Catorce,’ 
the fourteen families who were the elite of the elite.”  The top ten percent of 375
landowners  owned  78  percent  of  the  land,  while  the  bottom  ten  percent 
owned only 0.4 percent.  Those not in Los Catorce were desperately poor. 376
Sixty percent of rural families did not earn enough money to feed themselves 
sufficiently, and ninety-six percent did not earn enough to meet basic needs.
El  Salvador  had a  predictable  agricultural  and economic  boom and 
bust cycle.  El Salvador’s land was notably fertile, and new and profitable 377
crops were often discovered. After the development of the crop, El Salvador 
would benefit from its subsequent export, but economic stagnation or depres-
sion would lead to a desperate search for that crop’s replacement. The down-
ward cycle would end only with the discovery of a new crop, and a new up-
ward cycle would begin.
It was perhaps inevitable, with such wealth in the hands of landown-
ers, that they would emerge as the defenders of the status quo. By the turn of 
the century, the oligarchy had begun to defend its interests with force. In 1895, 
the first police forces were created, but they did not completely replace their 
predecessors, the private militias the oligarchs employed.  In 1912, the GN 378
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was established, and the PH was established in 1936.  These would become 379
“the instruments of control” used by the wealthy to repress the peasantry. 
By 1903, the oligarchs had successfully consolidated their power. Be-
tween 1912 and 1927, the presidency was passed around a single family.  380
The elite flourished in this time as coffee, then the main export crop, tripled in 
value. “The growing cooperation between the State and the oligarchy institu-
tionalized the socioeconomic stratification and political distribution of power 
that had informally been evolving since independence.”381
The Rise of the Left; the Descent into Juntas
In 1931, then-President Bosque broke with tradition and held the first 
free and fair elections in El Salvador’s history.  Arturo Araujo, “a wealthy 382
renegade landowner” was elected in January 1931 with the support of the or-
ganized left, denying the elite the political victory to which they had grown 
accustomed.  Araujo “had become known as a friend of the working class 383
and peasantry.”  But Araujo underestimated the degree to which the elites 384
perceived his administration to be a threat to the status quo. As the left agitat-
ed for more reforms, the elite felt increasingly threatened. When Araujo an-
nounced that  the  next  local  elections  would  be  open to  all,  including  the 
Communist Party, it was the last straw for the oligarchs, who decided to take 
matters into their own hands. Ten months into his administration, Araujo was 
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ousted in  a  coup in  December  1931.  “Thus began the  longest  unbroken 385
record of military rule in Latin American history.”386
Angered by the ouster of a democratically elected president, the left 
tried to negotiate with the junta,  seeking recourse through nonviolent and 
democratic means, without success  “The peasants will win with their ma387 -
chetes the rights you are denying them,” the rebel leaders were said to have 
warned the administration, which was unmoved.388
One of the leaders of the organized left, Farabundo Martí, was arrested 
just days before the planned siege, but the “rebels did manage to pull off an 
uprising and had nearly twenty-four hours in some areas before any counter-
attack came. Half of the twelve municipalities captured by the opposition re-
mained occupied for four days.”  Martínez’s response was swift and brutal. 389
One of  the  worst  single  incidents  of  violence  is  known as  la  matanza:  the 
slaughter. An estimated 30,000 were killed, as civilians were targeted in rural 
areas, with specific focus on those carrying machetes or who were dressed in 
traditional indigenous garb. “La matanza marks the point at which an authori-
tarian alliance between the Salvadoran military and the landed elite turned to 
an almost exclusive reliance on coercion as a way of preempting further un-
rest in the countryside.”390
With Martínez’s junta, El Salvador would begin a series of political cy-
cles that would continue until  the country descended completely into civil 
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war in 1980.  A new government would sweep to power on the back of sys391 -
tematic repression. But growing agitation against this repression would give 
rise to progressive elements within the armed forces, which would seek to 
implement some reforms. The elites, threatened by these reforms, would sup-
port  the  conservative  factions  within  the  military,  which  would  return  to 
power on the back of systematic repression. 
Plus ça change
By 1960,  “the oligarchy and the Armed Forces  had institutionalized 
their relationship and solidified their respective places in El Salvador.”  The 392
1960s also saw the emergence of new actors who would come to play a crucial 
role in the civil war. Revolutionary movements and politics elsewhere in Latin 
and Central America meant that there were a variety of political groups and 
governments eager to see the leftist opposition succeed in El Salvador. The 
U.S. was also emerging as a major actor in Latin America, and in the 1960s, 
the United States “created the story line and wrote the draft for its future role” 
in the civil war.393
After the Cuban revolution, the United States was eager to avoid a sim-
ilar event in other states in the hemisphere.  Beginning in 1963, the United 
States worked in El Salvador to establish ORDEN.  ORDEN (Organización 394
Democrática Nacional; ‘order’ in Spanish), established with the goal of “fight-
ing communism” was the “paramilitary central nerve system.”  It had both 395
state-supported and informal elements, just as the death squads would. OR-
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DEN was “directly tied to the State security apparatus from the start, though 
it operated and evolved in more of a quasi-State fashion.”  As much as ten to 396
twenty percent of  ORDEN’s manpower came from members of  the armed 
forces, including the GN and PH.  In some rural areas, there were people 397
who joined ORDEN out of self-preservation: “to be a member of ORDEN was 
to be protected from the military because you were seen as one of them.”  By 398
March 1983, the regular army boasted 22,400 members, but was supported by 
11,000 members of the GN, PH, and PN—and 50,000 members of ORDEN.  399
ORDEN, as a union of state, economic elite, and military factions, epitomized 
Salvadoran politics between independence and the 1992 peace accords.
This was the pattern in El Salvador. Police and security units were cre-
ated through the 20th century. These units were supposed to replace the pri-
vate militias, but never did. During the civil war, the military had become an 
extrajudicial actor to the extent that it apparently lacked any civilian or insti-
tutional check on its power. What was left was “a national security structure 
focused nearly entirely on the protection of the country’s elite,” and, with the 
support of the oligarchs, the military and its PGMs defined “any threat to the 
elite and system of exclusion as a threat to the nation.”  These militias would 400
operate essentially unchecked through the rural countryside, terrorizing the 
lower classes and enforcing the elite’s status quo.
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Preludes to a Coup; the Beginning of the End
In 1979, the political cycle had spun and the reformists seized power. In 
October, progressive elements within the armed forces overthrew the junta 
and established a new regime. In an effort  to consolidate power,  the junta 
scaled up their repressive policies.
Nineteen-eighty  was  a  bloody  year.  The  Attorney  General,  Mario 
Zamora Rivas, was shot at his home. Zamora had been an outspoken critic of 
the  government’s  repression.  Archbishop Oscar  Romero was shot  in  the 401
back while saying Mass; bombs and gunfire killed civilians mourning at his 
funeral.  The “entire leadership of the nonguerilla left” was also assassinat402 -
ed.  The left  responded by organizing into a united front,  the Farabundo 403
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which launched an offensive. The 
civil war was underway. 
The next  years  would see “high intensity politics  and low intensity 
conflicts” as both war and elections dominated life in El Salvador.  But the 404
political system was not equipped to adequately address the grievances of 
those fighting in the war, however: the power dynamic within El Salvador 
was as stagnant as ever. While usually it is a “reasonable assumption” that the 
person “who holds the top office in the land also wields considerable political 
power,” this was not the reality in El Salvador: “in spite of elections, the locus 
of power—the army and the oligarchy—did not change.”  405
The FMLN and the army would trade offensives for the next several 
years. International actors saw the conflict as a proxy war and would nursed 
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one side or the other back to strength. By 1987, the human rights situation, 
never  good,  had deteriorated dramatically.  There were “reports  that  death 
squads were reactivating in response to perceived deterioration in the politi-
cal and security situation in the country.”  A U.S. Embassy report explained 406
the evidence: “For the first time in years blindfolded bodies are again begin-
ning to appear in San Salvador with their hands tied behind their backs.”  407
How the Peace Was Won
From  this  nadir,  conditions  shifted  significantly  to  make  space  for 
peace. A confluence of events led the FMLN and the government of El Sal-
vador to the negotiating table in 1989. These shifts—four in total—occurred in 
both global and local dynamics.
ARENA Shifts
In 1988, ARENA won the local elections and turned its attention to the 
upcoming 1989 Presidential elections. Alfredo Cristiani was chosen to lead the 
party. A “political neophyte,” Cristiani had the advantage of being unaffiliat-
ed with the military or the death squads.  But D’Aubuisson was often seen 408
at  Cristiani’s  side  and  “there  was  little  doubt  that  D’Aubuisson  ran  the 
party.”  Cristiani made it clear that reaching out to the FLMN in order to 409
bring peace to El Salvador was one of his primary goals. Two days after his 
election in June 1989, he “called for immediate peace talks” with the FLMN.  410
In his  inaugural  address,  Cristiani  “promised to get  the economy moving, 
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then unveiled a five-point plan for talks with the FLMN, something the oppo-
sition themselves had proposed the day before, and did not call for their sur-
render.”411
Cristiani’s election showed how ARENA’s calculations were changing. 
Representing the elite and the oligarchy, Cristiani was not a military man but 
a businessman, who had run on a promise to improve the economy. He and 
his supporters recognized that the continuing violence in El Salvador was bad 
for the economy and hindered involvement in the global economy. ARENA 
came to “accept the need for a negotiated settlement mostly out of pragmatic 
necessity.”  An observer at the time commented, “ARENA is largely busi412 -
ness oriented…They realize things can’t continue like this. They really want 
to get it over with.”  El Salvador’s economy was a shell of its former self af413 -
ter years of violence. “Investment dropped, capital fled the country, and the 
national economy became increasingly protected and isolated from the world 
economy.”  This motivated the elites to push ARENA and Cristiani to find a 414
solution to the violence.
Military and Strategic Shifts
As a result of Cristiani’s rise to power, the alliance of the military and 
the oligarchy became strained. The military was deeply wary of Cristiani’s 
overtures and remained convinced that a military victory over the FMLN was 
necessary  and  possible.  But  ARENA was  also  suspicious  of  the  military. 
“Many  in  the  private  sector,  worried  about  short-  and  long-term  conse-
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quences of a corrupt and overgrown military that considered itself above the 
law, were eager to strip the military of power.”  415
These divisions were exacerbated by the “November Offensive,” long-
planned  by  the  FMLN  and  launched  in  November  1989.  The  offensive 
demonstrated to the government and military of El Salvador that the FMLN 
had no serious weaknesses and that continued engagement would be deeply 
costly.416
The Offensive strained the military. The United States’ earlier demand 
that the government discontinue its use of death squads had, in the military’s 
view,  allowed the FMLN to regain its  strength.  The military believed that 
“U.S. human rights concerns had forced them to abandon the most successful 
tools for counterinsurgency: terror, and selective assassination of those who 
supported the left.”  Perhaps chafing at the U.S.’s restrictions, the govern417 -
ment overreacted in response to the offensive. On 15 November, the Atlacatl 
Battallion, an especially vicious death squad,  entered the University of Cen418 -
tral  America  and  murdered  six  Jesuit  priests,  their  housekeeper,  and  her 
daughter. “They then vandalized the priests’ residence, detonated grenades 
and an anti-tank weapon, and wrote graffiti on the walls suggesting that the 
FMLN had been responsible.”419
This was an overreaction “so irrational as to seem inexplicable.”  The 420
American  public  reacted  poorly  to  press  coverage  of  ‘the  Jesuit  murders.’ 
Shortly after the murders, military aid to El Salvador was up for a vote in the 
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U.S. Congress. Though Cristiani traveled to Washington to lobby for the bud-
get,  his  efforts  were not  successful  and funds were cut  by fifty percent.  421
Members  of  Congress  voting  against  the  funds  said  they  did  so  to  cause 
deeper divisions within the Armed Forces, seeking to make it easier for the 
government to negotiate.422
Global Shifts
During the Cold War, the U.S. had supported and funded the govern-
ment of El Salvador because it valued the stability the government provided 
against the communist opposition. In 1979, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua over-
threw the Somoza government, a U.S. ally and puppet, and the U.S. did not 
seek to reinstall Somoza.  The Salvadoran government read this as a sign 423
that the United States’s support was not unconditional. This may explain why 
the military was temporarily willing to limit its use of the death squads it saw 
as so effective. Later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. no longer 
perceived a need to fight the global threat of communism—or to support the 
regime against the opposition and could instead pressure the government to 
negotiate.424
The end of the Cold War also allowed a series of peacemakers to be-
come involved. Local Latin American governments pushed hard for peace be-
cause they could be involved in the peace process and not get caught up in a 
proxy war between superpowers. The governments of Mexico, Colombia, Ve-
nezuela, and Spain became known as “Friends of the Secretary-General” (also 
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known as the Four Friends) and were instrumental in keeping the belligerents 
at the negotiating table.  425
These Four Friends were the UN’s proxy in the region, in place of a re-
gional  organization  such  as  the  Organization  of  American  States.  These 
Friends held sway with one side or the other—Mexico, for example, had long 
hosted the FMLN High Command —and their  informational  relationship 426
with the UN was to serve as local sources of pressure, pushing the two sides 
to make crucial concessions. “During the last-minute negotiations, for exam-
ple, the four Friends’ diplomats ran back and forth from the parties’ hotels to 
the UN headquarters,” helping keep negotiations on track.427
The FMLN Shifts
The  FMLN  was  also  caught  up  in  global  dynamics.  Their  chief  fi-
nancier—the  Soviet  Union—was  collapsing  and  unable  to  provide  further 
support. Local calls for peace were also growing louder.  The FMLN saw the 428
“staggering economic toll of the contra war in Nicaragua” and knew that a 
revolutionary  government  would  be  met  with  hostility  from  the  United 
States.  In  this  way,  the  social  and  economic  pressures  increased  on  the 429
FMLN to negotiate despite their relatively strong military position.
The November Offensive did highlight some weaknesses of the FMLN. 
It was unable to successfully occupy the cities, so although it was not defeated 
by the military, the offensive also illustrated to the FMLN “that a military vic-
tory or  popular  insurrection to  overthrow the government  was not  in  the 
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cards.”  The November Offensive set up a military stalemate, where both 430
sides were too weak to win and too strong to lose.
But these are logistical reasons the FMLN changed its position, willing-
ly imposed a unilateral cease-fire, and agreed to negotiate. There was also a 
philosophical, ideological shift that is harder to explain. “In essence, this revo-
lutionary movement, which had embraced several varieties of a particularly 
Salvadorean brand of Marxism-Leninism since the early 1970s, chucked it all 
in favor of democratic socialism.”  In some ways, this is not as dramatic a 431
shift as it might have been in other contexts: the FMLN was never  against 
elections and never called for a “completely socialized economy.”432
But the magnitude and importance of this shift should not be underes-
timated.  because it  shows the FMLN’s shift  from ideology to pragmatism. 
Given the electoral  defeat  of  the Sandinistas,  the disintegration of  socialist 
economies  in  Eastern  Europe,  and the  promises  of  aid  and reconstruction 
from Latin America and the United States, the FMLN made a utility calcula-
tion.
The FMLN first sought wholesale revision to El Salvador’s economy 
and instead decided, between 1989 and 1991, to seek this through the political 
system. Though the peace accords would never entirely restructure El Sal-
vador, the FMLN’s decision to self-impose a ceasefire and to negotiate is a re-
versal of Clausewitz’s maxim: El Salvador after 1992 would have politics that 
were the continuation, by other means, of warfare.433
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“A Negotiated Revolution”
On 31 December 1991, the government and the FMLN agreed to a pre-
liminary peace agreement; the final agreement was signed on 16 January 1992 
in Chapultepec Castle. On 1 February 1992, a cease fire took effect, and it has 
never been broken.  The success of the peace process is in large part due to 434
the structure of the negotiations.
The Chapultepec Accords are often called “a negotiated revolution.”  435
This is not hyperbole. The accords marked an “important transformation in 
Salvadoran reality.”  The accords were written with the goal of addressing 436
the central incompatibility in the conflict, and the ceasefire has been “impec-
cably observed.”  So much of the violence in El Salvador was “pseudo-insti437 -
tutional”—that  is,  occurring  in  officially-sanctioned  state  institutions—that 
creating a new set of institutions for the post-violence reconstruction was vi-
tally important.438
The United Nations was deeply involved in the peace process and in 
the mediation of the immediate post-war environment. This was the first time 
that the UN had “attempted to broker the end of an internal conflict.”  The 439
most novel tactic of the UN Mission was to “facilitate the consolidation of 
peace by strengthening domestic structures that will prevent the recurrence of 
conflict” —a policy now known as ‘post-conflict peace-building.’440
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The conflict in El Salvador had two main dimensions: the extrajudicial 
and excessive use of the military and death squads in a domestic setting; and 
the  economic  and social  exclusion  of  large  sectors  of  society.  The  accords 
sought to address each of these concerns.
Military Reforms
El Salvador’s military reforms were pioneering. To return the rule of 
law to El Salvador, it was necessary to create a distinction between national 
defense—“which involves the organization and maintenance of force and in-
telligence to defeat potential enemies”—and internal security—“which is the 
task of protecting the rights of citizens as defined under the norms of liberal 
democracy.”441
The FMLN demanded that the military be abolished completely, but 
the government refused.  Still, “the police civilianization project…constitut442 -
ed the most radical attempt to date to put internal security firmly under civil-
ian  control.”  This  civilianization  was  necessary  to  break  the  protection 443
racket state that had previously existed. “Removal of the military from inter-
nal security functions, at least as a part of its normal duties, reduces its capaci-
ty to manipulate perceptions of domestic threat, or to provoke conflicts which 
then  serve  to  increase  elite  and  middle  class  demand  for  military 
protection.”444
El Salvador’s earlier military transition had been incomplete: the estab-
lishment of the armed forces did not entirely replace the private militias.  445
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But the FMLN put its capital into military reform, and the Chapultepec Ac-
cords were thorough.  The accords disbanded the “paramilitary patrol struc446 -
ture in the countryside” along with “the old public security forces” like the 
National  Guard  that  had  colluded  with,  or  even  sponsored,  the  death 
squads.  447
Further, the new civilian police “incorporated relatively few personnel 
from the military controlled security forces it replaced.”  The military was 448
restricted to external defense, which “almost completely eliminat[ed] their re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of public order.”  Organizations that were 449
“military-dominated” and worked domestically were abolished and replaced 
by “a single, nationwide corps that is strictly civilian in character, structure, 
management, and doctrine.”  In this way, the accords were able to replace 450
the old, political armed forces and establish a new, independent police force 
for domestic use.
The peace process was temporarily delayed because neither side was 
willing to  unilaterally  disarm.  The New York Accord,  one of  the template 
agreements  on  the  way  to  Chapultepec,  was  the  breakthrough.  In  it,  the 
FMLN agreed to gradually disarm; in a secret annex to the agreement, the 
FMLN agreed to withdraw its demand to participate in the armed forces in 
exchange for participation in the new civilian police force.  In addition, the 451
FMLN was  recognized as  a  legitimate  political  party  and was  allowed to 
stand for election.  Both sides made concessions. The military would contin452 -
ue to exist, but the FMLN would be guaranteed participation in the new Na-
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tional Civilian Police (PNC), which was to replace the military domestically.  453
The FMLN's participation in the PNC was a catalyst for allowing the rest of 
the process to continue.
Chapter I of the final agreement is devoted to the reform of the armed 
forces; chapter II lays out the compromise on internal security.  Chapter II is 454
extensive and detailed, outlining not just the PNC but also the officers’ train-
ing and the rules that would govern their behavior.  “The police was to be 455
placed at the service of the community and integrated with it, lightly armed, 
providing security and defending citizens’ rights—rather than instilling fear 
in them.”456
As part of the compromise, the FMLN would constitute twenty percent 
of the PNC; women would make up at least fifteen percent. Former National 
Police would be twenty percent, and civilians would make up the rest of the 
force.  There were further standards introduced. “A ninth-grade education 457
was required for agents; sergeants needed a high school diploma; executive-
level officers needed at least three years of college or its equivalent; and supe-
rior officers were required to have a university degree.”  458
The inclusion of the FMLN in the PNC was a victory for UN negotia-
tors. The FMLN’s participation in the PNC was framed as a “guarantee” of 
the government’s good will,  rather than as a power-sharing measure.  This 
spin secured the government’s acquiescence.   459
Thus the military reforms sought by FMLN eventually came to be im-
plemented. The armed forces were restricted from domestic activity by consti-
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tutional  reforms and the  worst  human rights  abusers  were  cut  from their 
ranks. The PNC was created for internal security and the FMLN was guaran-
teed participation in this reformed, monitored, and more professional force. 
Overall, El Salvador was returned a sense of the rule of law and was set on 
the path to recover from a history of authoritarianism and impunity.460
The accords did not specifically discuss the role of the PGMs, but ad-
dressed them by proxy in a few ways. First, the shifts in the conflict that led to 
the peace talks also affected the standing of the death squads. The oligarchs 
no longer wished to continue funding the violence, looking instead to join the 
international  economic system.  Second,  many of  those who directed the 461
death squads were named by the Truth Commission’s investigation into the 
military’s  abuses;  they were  subsequently  barred from their  positions  and 
recommended for prosecution. Separately, the Truth Commission also specifi-
cally investigated the actions of the death squads; the embarrassment of this 
sunlight served as a disinfectant in this case, disgracing the worst offenders.462
The creation of the PNC and the delineation between internal and ex-
ternal security was another proxy for addressing the death squads. Though 
former members of the death squads may have tried to infiltrate the PNC, 
they were not able to co-opt it entirely.  Thus, without their financial back463 -
ers, without the ability to work through the political process, and without the 
ability to work through the military to terrorize the domestic population, the 
death squads were effectively neutralized. This may be one of the most curi-
ous things about the success of peace in El Salvador: that it was accomplished 
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without specific mention of the organizations responsible for much of the vio-
lence. 
Land and Agriculture Reform
Inequality of opportunity and access to land—and thus, wealth—was 
the original  root  of  the conflict,  and lasting peace would be possible  only 
when this  inequality  was addressed.  Land reform was one mechanism by 
which the Chapultepec Accords addressed the reintegration of former com-
batants back into society.
Previously, “any hint of land redistribution was anathema to the oli-
garchy” but the accords mandated land redistribution.  “The purpose was 464
partly to address historical inequities and partly to acknowledge de facto oc-
cupation and cultivation in former conflict zones.”  This reform has been 465
thought of as an ‘arms for land’ deal. Though it was “the main venue in the 
agreement through which former combatants and supporters of FMLN would 
be integrated into the productive life of the country,” it was not a means of 
redistributing income.466
The provisions on land transfers were notably vague, especially com-
pared with the chapters on the armed forces and the PNC. This was particu-
larly striking given that economic inequality was the original central incom-
patibility of the conflict.
Implementation of  the land transfers  followed the approach for  im-
plementing for the rest of the accords: when the process became stalled, the 
UN and other international organizations intervened to resolve the standoff. 
And for land reform, intervention particularly necessary because the land re-
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form issue was so underdeveloped in the text of the accords. “The lack of 
specificity regarding land issues and the rigid and unrealistic deadlines in the 
accords stalled the establishment of land tenure.”  But the IMF, Food and 467
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World Bank stepped in, and in October 
1992 proposed and implemented a plan to grant land to “15,000 former gov-
ernment soldiers, 7,500 former guerrilla combatants, and 25,000 civilians in 
conflict  zones.”  The  role  of  the  UN  made  Chapultepec  a  high-profile 468
process, and neither side wanted to be seen as spoiling the process; thus when 
international organizations stepped in to offer solutions, it was difficult for 
either side to refuse the offer.  Ironically, this may have given the UN more 469
authority over the land issues than it would have had if the accords’ provi-
sions had been more specific.
Economic Reform
Of the three major complaints of the FMLN, economic reform was the 
one least addressed by the accords. In part, this is because the FMLN so heav-
ily prioritized reform of the armed forces.  This was a practical  calculation 
made in the months preceding the negotiations. The FMLN came to realize 
that while questions of economic policy could be proposed to the population 
as part of a democratic process, questions of military reform would need to be 
addressed in the negotiated settlement.  It therefore put its capital into mili470 -
tary reform—a gamble that paid off—even though it left economic reform to 
be addressed in the future by the political system.
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This  is  why  the  Chapultepec  Accords  are  not  an  economic 
agreement.  And though the agreements cannot be be faulted for the dearth 471
of reform in this respect, it is important to emphasize the degree to which the 
economic status quo persisted. The accords did not address the root causes of 
exclusion that led to conflict in the first place. The FMLN began as a Marxist-
Leninist organization seeking revolution and overthrow of this exclusionary 
system, but at Chapultepec, “the market economy was not up for debate.”472
Enforcement
The Four Friends along with the UN and the U.S. were all deeply in-
volved in the peace process and in keeping the belligerents invested in the 
negotiation  process.  For  monitoring  and  implementation,  an  enforcement 
body was created. The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
(COPAZ) was instrumental in ensuring that “the voices of those who had had 
no voice were heard.”  COPAZ was made up of representatives from every 473
political party, the government, and the FMLN, and had responsibility for en-
forcing every aspect of the peace agreements.
Pro-reform and anti-reform blocs had equal votes in COPAZ, which 
meant that  the two sides were required to compromise and bargain—new 
skills for some of these politicians “who had been accustomed to getting their 
own way and steamrollering the minority opposition the process.”  In this 474
way, enforcement and democratic transition were mutually reinforcing.
In addition to COPAZ, the UN, other international organizations, and 
the Four Friends continued to be involved in the implementation process. 
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When implementation stalled, these actors were successful at getting the Ac-
cords back on track.
Lessons from El Salvador
From  before  its  independence  from  Spain,  El  Salvador  had  been  a 
deeply  unequal  society.  In  the  early  1900s,  the  predecessors  of  the  death 
squads began to emerge. The landowning elite established private militias to 
defend its wealth. These militias were folded into the national armed forces 
that were eventually established, but were never wholly disbanded. Thus be-
gan the oligarchs’ funding of armed repression to defend the status quo.
During the worst of the civil war, from 1979 to 1992, the death squads 
were responsible for myriad atrocities in the rural communities that were the 
main constituency of the left-wing opposition to the government. The FMLN 
was fighting for the wholesale reorganization of Salvadoran society, and the 
military and the death squads responded with repression and violence.
The ceasefire has held since it entered into force in 1992 and is widely 
considered the most successful internationally mediated resolution to a civil 
war.  Many factors  contributed to  the  success  of  the  Chapultepec  Accords. 
Though the agreement took place in a specific context, it can still offer lessons 
for similar conflicts going forward.
Process, Inclusion, and Spoilers
All parties to the conflict  were included in the negotiations,  though 
some in an unorthodox way. The FMLN by this time had become an umbrella 
group for all the leftist opposition to the government; in this capacity, it was 
representative of  one set  of  grievances.  The Cristiani  administration was a 
conglomeration of both the far-right and the more moderate constituencies of 
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the ARENA party. The death squads and D’Aubisson’s followers were both 
nominally represented at the negotiations by Cristiani, but so were the busi-
ness elites who had pushed hard for peace. Had Cristiani tried to withdraw 
from negotiations, he would have been supported by D’Aubuisson’s wing, 
but roundly criticized by the oligarchs—who, importantly, were the financial 
support of ARENA. Thus, substantively, all the parties were represented in 
the peace process.
El Salvador’s peace came in bits and pieces as several agreements were 
concluded in succession. At times, failure to proceed to the next stage of the 
process jeopardized the whole process. At various stages in the process, the 
two sides  were  asked to  agree  without  amendment  to  an annex that  was 
drawn up. In this way, El Salvador’s peace process adhered to a micro version 
of Ahtisaari’s maxim.
Further,  each concession from both sides  was  framed appropriately. 
The FMLN traded the military for participation in the PNC; the government 
was told that  this  was a  concession rather  than about  power-sharing.  The 
FMLN prioritized among its demands and did not receive everything it had 
been fighting for. In this way, both sides felt the other had lost on a significant 
demand.
In Indonesia,  the agreement called on the belligerents to control the 
‘third parties’ who might be partisans in the conflict. By contrast, the Chapul-
tepec Accords do not specifically address the death squads. Instead, the shifts 
that led to peace also caused them to disband. The oligarchs were now more 
interested in peace than in funding clandestine violence.  The military was 
purged of the worst commanders of death squads.  The Truth Commission 
brought some awareness of the atrocities committed during the war. And the 
military was barred from domestic security, supplanted by the PNC. These 
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reforms combined to  remove  both  the  opportunity  and the  motive  of  the 
death squads. While this is likely a less certain way of addressing the deadly 
excesses of state power, it is hard to criticize in this instance, as the Chapulte-
pec Accords have never been breached.
The differing approaches to the militias may be partially a result of the 
different aspects of the groups in each case. In Indonesia, the militias were 
much more loosely controlled by the government; many were autonomous 
groups simply given machetes by TNI.  Thus the negotiators had to specifi475 -
cally address their role in the conflict. By contrast, the death squads in El Sal-
vador were much more closely tied with the government,  and many were 
funded directly by the government’s supporters.  The reduced support and 
effectiveness of the militias was almost a side effect of oligarchy’s shift toward 
peace.
 
Political Reforms
Though not the main incompatibility of the conflict, nor the main focus 
of the accords, the political exclusion of the FMLN was still addressed in part. 
The FMLN was allowed to reconstitute itself as a legitimate political party 
and to advance its leftist platform in an open political process. In this way, the 
peace process allowed the FMLN access to a sector from which it had previ-
ously been excluded. 
The conflict in El Salvador thus migrated from outside the political sys-
tem to inside the political system. The differences between right and left re-
main as acute,  but now, these disagreements are addressed in the political 
sphere. “The war has ended in El Salvador, but the schism and hostility be-
tween the left and the right…seems not to have been bridged by…the peace 
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process. What has changed…is that groups now compete to implement their 
agendas  via  electoral  competitions  and  political  institutions,  rather  than 
weapons.”  It remains a significant development that El Salvador has man476 -
aged to institutionalize, in political structures, much of what was previously 
rampant violence.
Third Party Enforcement
The Accords provided for enforcement by the UN and the ‘friends of 
the Secretary-General.’  The breakdown of the central authority of the state 
made  this  a  vital  provision:  the  collusion  of  the  intelligence  and  military 
wings of the government to target domestic opposition destroyed trust and 
needed restoring. Further, a sense of the rule of law had deteriorated general-
ly. Even years after the war ended, Salvadorans were out of the habit of stop-
ping at red lights while driving because during the civil war people were kid-
napped or killed while stopped.  The central task of the monitors was to fa477 -
cilitate the reconstruction of lawfulness and to oversee compliance with the 
agreement while trust was rebuilt. 
Third parties had also been accelerants in the conflict. The USSR had 
funded the FMLN but was now defunct. The United States had funded the 
government until the Jesuit murders were finally too much for public opinion. 
Now, the United States and other elements of the international community 
joined the enforcement team to help return peace to El Salvador.
Proximate Goals
As in Indonesia, a major breakthrough in the conflict came when the 
two sides could be persuaded to accept their proximate, rather than central, 
 Mazzei, Death Squads, 131.476
 Ibid., 127.477
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goals.  The  FMLN  abandoned  its  violence,  and  its  particular  identity  as  a 
Marxist-Leninist group, and reconstituted itself as a democratic-social organi-
zation that would take the fight to the regular political system. In this way, the 
FMLN shifted from demanding a complete overhaul of the economic struc-
ture of El Salvador to being content with agriculture and land reforms that 
would gradually shift the wealth from the oligarchy. Because the oligarchy 
and the government were, at times, the same entity, this was a significant con-
cession from the government’s side.
Similarly, the FMLN agreed that the military could continue to exist. In 
exchange, the military would be placed under more intense civilian oversight, 
and would be restricted to external defense only. Finally, the PNC would be 
created, and the FMLN would be allowed to participate. This meant that not 
every FMLN combatant would be disarmed and demobilized, which was a 
concession from the government, considering the FMLN had been calling for 
its overthrow.
Military Stalemate
The November Offensive by the FMLN indicated that it was too strong 
to be beaten by the government’s forces. But the FMLN was also unable to oc-
cupy the cities, which left it too weak to declare an outright military victory.  478
The costs to the elites of continuing the conflict were increasing as the Cold 
War ended and the need for international economic integration became more 
urgent. It was this stalemate that helped send the parties to the negotiations in 
the first place and helped keep them there. 
El Salvador may offer an example of how a military stalemate may be 
simulated—with the caveats,  as above, of the human cost that comes with 
 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 219.478
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such a stalemate. Neither side truly fought to exhaustion before deigning to 
negotiate.  Rather,  support  for  the FMLN disappeared when the USSR col-
lapsed; after the Jesuit murders, the U.S. reduced military aid for the govern-
ment. In this way, both sides faced reduced resources to continue their fight 
and opted for negotiations instead.
Distinctive Factors
The Sandinistas in Nicaragua suffered a resounding loss in an election 
in  1990,  which  affected  both  the  morale  and  the  material  support  of  the 
FMLN. The Jesuit  murders  were finally  enough to  convince the American 
public that supporting the Salvadoran government was an ill-conceived poli-
cy and military aid to the government dried up. But mostly, the Cold War 
ended and allowed the air back in the room. The United States no longer saw 
every leftist conflict in Latin and South America as a proxy battle against the 
evils of global communism; no longer was each conflict a potential foothold 
for the USSR in the Western Hemisphere. For its part, the FMLN was forced to 
negotiate having lost its chief benefactor when the USSR crumbled at the end 
of 1989. 
As with Indonesia’s tsunami, the end of the Cold War and the reopen-
ing of global politics cannot be replicated. But neither can it be ignored. As an 
accelerant, the end of the Cold War was one of the most important factors fa-
cilitating the end of the conflict in El Salvador. But ‘reorganization of the fun-
damental structure of the international system’ is not something that media-
tors and practitioners can easily recreate in order to bring peace. The lessons 
from El Salvador are thus both particular and universal:  while shifting al-
liances, stalemates, and proximate goals may be necessary for peace, the par-
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ticular  way in  which these  elements  are  manifest  in  any individual  peace 
process may vary tremendously.  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VIII. Conclusion
Why do some post-civil war peace agreements succeed where others 
fail to preserve the peace? This thesis has argued that the quantitative litera-
ture addressing this question overlooks an important factor. This literature too 
often assumes the government party to a civil war to be a unitary party. Theo-
retically and empirically, this assumption is incorrect and unhelpful.
This thesis has proposed a new set of independent variables for under-
standing agreement failure: the presence, type, and characteristics of PGMs. 
Agreements concluded while at least one militia was active fail at a rate that, 
statistically, is significantly higher than agreements concluded without active 
militias.  Semi-official  militias—those controlled or organized more fully by 
their government—are particularly detrimental to the chances for peace, as 
are groups that target noncombatants.
In settlement negotiations, the theoretical literature argues, all opposi-
tion groups should be considered and brought in to support a resolution so no 
actor has an incentive to spoil the agreement. This thesis argues, with support 
from the data, that PGMs have spoiler capabilities and therefore should be 
accounted  for  in  the  settlement  process  to  increase  the  likelihood  that  an 
agreement will hold.
PGMs can be understood as bureaucracies within the state, with their 
own constituency, expertise, and incentives. States may delegate to bureau-
cracies to take advantage of externalities and expertise, or bureaucracies may 
act autonomously within the state. States delegate to militias to keep plausible 
deniability  despite  increased domestic  repression,  but  states  may also lose 
some  of  their  monopoly  on  violence  if  militias  become  increasingly  au-
tonomous. These models explain well how a PGM, left out of the negotiation 
process, retains an incentive to spoil an agreement.
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This thesis considered three cases. Peace has held in Indonesia since 
2005, despite an agreement that collapsed in 2003. And El Salvador has been 
at peace since 1992. These agreements illustrate the utility of a variety of poli-
cies recommended by the literature, including political reform, third-party en-
forcement, DDR programs, and acquiescence to proximate goals. These peace 
processes also demonstrate two tactics for addressing the role of PGMs in the 
conflict and its settlement.  In Indonesia,  the military was placed under in-
creased civilian control, which reduced its ability to sponsor militias. This left 
the  militias  with less  power to  spoil  the  agreement.  These proactive steps 
were necessary because the militias were more loosely affiliated with the gov-
ernment. In El Salvador, the militias’ capability to spoil was reduced when 
their benefactors—the oligarchs—bought into the peace process and ceased 
funding the violence. The PGMs were effectively controlled by addressing the 
incentives of their patrons. This worked because the militias were so closely 
held by the government.
In order to have an accurate understanding of the conflict dynamics in 
advance of a peace process, it is therefore important to account for these mili-
tias,  their  role in the conflict,  and their  potential  role in helping to ensure 
peace. These issues will continue to be important. Militias are multiplying in 
Iraq as the government fights ISIS.  Nigeria has reportedly begun to employ 479
PGMs in their fight against Boko Haram.  The violence in May 2015 in Bu480 -
rundi threatened the 2000 Arusha Accords, and reports emerged that PGMs 
 Nour Malas, “Iraqi Forces, Militias Launch Attacks to Drive Islamic State From Rama479 -
di,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 May 2015 <http://on.wsj.com/1LmZwcG> (Accessed 27 
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had helped prop up the embattled president.  And these are just the militias 481
in the headlines.
The war in Syria, and the fledgling peace process to end it,  adheres 
tragically to the theories outlined above. Pro-regime militias proliferate: jour-
nalists traveling through the conflict zones “hardly saw anything of the regu-
lar army” but reported on the “militiaficiation” of the conflict.  Other PGMs 482
active in the central corridor of Syria are Iranian-funded, and these groups 
have helped to alleviate the regime’s manpower shortage in that area.  As 483
the United Nations tries to negotiate a settlement, predictable sticking points 
have emerged: which of these militias to invite to the talks, how to account for 
meddling external parties, and whether the combatants will negotiate before 
they fight to a military stalemate.484
Of course many other very important issues about civil  wars,  peace 
processes, and PGMs remain. While the civil war in El Salvador, for example, 
is rightly considered to have been resolved by the Chapultepec Accords, there 
remains significant instability and violence in that country; in June 2015, there 
were 677 homicides.  More broadly, as I noted earlier, a question remains 485
about when, to use Mac Ginty’s term, peace is a ‘normative good.’ One can 
legitimately ask about “the quality of peace that follows international peace-
support interventions.”  And one can ask similar questions about the forces 486
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that give rise to PGMs. Because it remains difficult for third-parties to hold 
militias accountable for their actions,  the pressures for regimes to subcon487 -
tract violence may increase as participation in the international community 
becomes more essential  to a state’s flourishing. Perhaps this even suggests 
that the ‘liberal peace’ by which states become more fully-fledged members of 
the international community is part of the problem if that community is, in 
fact, an “essentially conservative international political system in which the 
same political and economic interests perpetuate their own domination.”488
I have not purported to engage these questions. I do believe, though, 
that PGMs have a significant effect upon the chances that a peace agreement 
will succeed; that the characteristics of the militias will, in some respects,  in-
fluence the effect  they have;  and that  both large-N quantitative  studies  of 
peace agreements and case studies should take these findings into account 
and examine them further. Undoubtedly more progress can be made when 
the roots of the problems that give rise to PGMs and civil wars are more thor-
oughly addressed. But sometimes at least it is important simply to end the vi-
olence, and we must try to learn what we can about how to do that.
 Neil Mitchell & Sabine Carey, “Informal counterinsurgency from Iraq to Nigeria: Who 487
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Appendix 1: Variables
Variable Name Measures Source
Ended Agreement Success/Failure UCDP
PGM Presence of PGM PGMD
Informal Presence of Informal PGM PGMD
Semi-Official Presence of Semi-Official Group PGMD
Membership.Identity Identity-based membership: Ethnic or 
Religious
PGMD
Membership.Ideology Ideology-based membership: Party 
Activists or Ideology
PGMD
Target.Identity Identity-based targets: Ethnic Group or 
Religious Group
PGMD
Target.PKO Targets third-parties: International 
Peacekeeping Force or Aid Workers
PGMD
Target.Noncombat Targets noncombatants: Civilians or 
Journalists or ’Unarmed Political 
Opposition, Government Critics’
PGMD
Support.Foreign Support from Foreign Governments PGMD
Support.Illegal Support from Crime or Drugs PGMD
Support.Domestic Support from Domestic Government or 
Military
PGMD
Military Contains at least one military provision UCDP
Political Contains at least one political provision UCDP
Inclusive All conflict dyads were included in the 
negotiation
UCDP
PKO The agreement provides for the 
deployment of peacekeepers
UCDP
GDP GDP per capita (USD; log10) World Bank
CINC Composite Index of National Capacity COW
Democracy Average of Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights scores
FreedomHouse
Deaths Final-year deaths in a conflict (log10) PRIO Battle 
Deaths database
Polity Alternate measure of Democracy Polity IV
Spending Alternate measure of CINC (USD; log10) SIPRI Military 
Expenditures
Table 1: Success of Peace Agreements (Logistic Regression)
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM -1.2341**    
(0.4327) 
Relationship: 
Informal
-0.5869         
(0.4040)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
-1.5203**      
(0.5465)
Support: 
Foreign
-2.3710    
(1.3656) 
Support: 
Illegal
-0.5374   
(0.8995)
Support: 
Domestic
0.4065   
(0.6999)
Membership: 
Identity
0.6737    
(0.6153)
Membership: 
Ideology
 -0.2453    
(0.6976)
Target: 
Noncombat
-1.5185*   
(0.7149)
Target: 
Identity
0.1840    
(0.8206)
Target: PKO 1.5675   
(0.9443)
Military -0.0692     
(0.5258)
-0.6311         
(0.5263)
0.0120    
(0.5449)
Political -0.6450     
(0.5021)
-0.9225         
(0.5332)
-0.7328    
(0.5462)
PKO 1.0542*     
(0.5142)
0.9759          
(0.5050)
 0.9981    
(0.5369)
Inclusive -0.2540     
(0.4219)
-0.5290         
(0.4330)
-1.0936* 
(0.5115)
GDP -1.0375     
(0.5735)
-1.0051         
(0.5597)
-0.6617    
(0.6159)
Democracy 0.1417      
(0.1766)
0.1689          
(0.1813)
0.1704   
(0.2078)
CINC 10.3126  
(22.4558)
11.1794      
(22.7587)
18.4993  
(24.6543)
Intercept 2.2272      
(2.1623)
2.332             
(2.1450)
1.2935    
(2.3238) 
Number of 
Observations
158 158 158
Significance 
Codes
** = 0.01 * = 0.05 • = 0.1
Significance codes: ****=0    *** = 0.001   ** = 0.01   * = 0.05  • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
Appendix 2: Tables and Figures
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM  -0.7905   
(0.5892) 
Relationship: 
Informal
-0.4940    
(0.5710)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
 -1.784*    
(0.7676)
Support: 
Foreign
-19.7862 
(1543.2170)
Support: Illegal -2.9081*   
(1.3847)
Support: 
Domestic
4.2586*    
(2.0161)
Membership: 
Identity
5.5669***   
(1.6232)
Membership: 
Ideology
 -0.1828   
(1.2342)
Target: 
Noncombat
-5.2991**    
(2.0398)
Target: Identity -3.9225   
(1.7419)
Target: PKO 1.4974    
(1.4603)
Military 0.2321       
(0.6471)
-0.0368    
(0.6784)
 -1.5697    
(1.0361)
Political -0.6472    
(0.6509)
-1.1289    
(0.7543)
-2.0515  
(1.2161)
PKO 0.8289      
(0.6819)
0.6389      
(0.6895) 
 0.6578    
(0.8903)
Inclusive 0.4007      
(0.5358)
0.0650      
(0.5696)
-0.0488    
(0.8565)
GDP  0.0435     
(0.8072)
0.3089      
(0.7860)
 0.7154    
(1.0940)
Democracy 0.0534      
(0.2347)
0.1539      
(0.2474)
0.0891    
(0.3324)
CINC 13.5214   
(24.4113)
22.4992   
(25.4932)
-82.7830*   
(39.1971)
Deaths  0.7339     
(0.4201)
0.8335*      
(0.4243)
0.9909    
(0.5248)
Intercept -3.1348    
(3.2719)
-3.6231    
(3.2442)
 -2.8066    
(4.1724)
Number of 
Observations
92 92 92
Table 2: Success of Peace Agreements (Logistic Regression)
Significance codes: ****=0     *** = 0.001    ** = 0.01    * = 0.05   • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
Figure 1: Probability of Peace Agreement Success
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Table 3: Alternative Measures of Success of Peace Agreements  
(Logistic Regression)
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM  -1.3612**     
(0.4433)
Relationship: 
Informal
-0.6346   
(0.4096)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
-1.6957**    
(0.5690)
Support: 
Foreign
-2.8828*    
(1.3973)
Support: 
Illegal
-0.2430    
(0.8928)
Support: 
Domestic
0.3381    
(0.7170)
Membership: 
Identity
0.5517    
(0.6198)
Membership: 
Ideology
-0.5135    
(0.6861)
Target: 
Noncombat
-1.2274    
(0.7453)
Target: 
Identity
0.4382    
(0.8409) 
Target: PKO  0.9445    
(1.0332)
Military -0.0596     
(0.5302)
-0.0232    
(0.5326)
0.2194    
(0.5554)
Political -0.8809     
(0.5219)
-1.2376*    
(0.5695)
-0.8972    
(0.5659)
PKO 1.2887*     
(0.5321)
0.9944    
(0.5167)
1.0957*    
(0.5439)
Inclusive -0.3056     
(0.4267)
-0.6263    
(0.4428)
-1.1194*   
(0.5132)
GDP  -0.5980     
0.5819
-0.5991    
(0.5666)
-0.4337    
(0.6210)
Polity -0.1186*     
(0.0465)
-0.1291**    
(0.0478)
-0.1022    
(0.0556)
CINC 23.9131    
(23.1689)
24.5751   
(23.4881)
-7.4490   
(25.6055)
Intercept  1.8109     
(1.8120)
2.1814   
(1.8016)
1.3152   
(1.9394)
Number of 
Observations
158 158 158
Significance codes: ****=0     *** = 0.001    ** = 0.01    * = 0.05   • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM -0.9614   
(0.5223)
Relationship: 
Informal
 -0.0732    
(0.5108)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
-1.6745**    
(0.6441)
Support: 
Foreign
-2.5456    
(1.6271)
Support: Illegal 0.2576      
(1.1314)
Support: 
Domestic
0.4539    
(0.8545)
Membership: 
Identity
0.8497   
(0.8216)
Membership: 
Ideology
0.0781    
(0.9521)
Target: 
Noncombat
-2.2020*    
(0.9448)
Target: Identity 1.2137    
(1.0951)
Target: PKO 3.7536**    
(1.4124)
Military  -0.4462    
(0.5877)
-0.5379    
(0.6060)
-0.2268    
(0.7269)
Political -0.2590    
(0.5847)
-0.74123   
(0.6438)
-0.5051    
(0.7183)
PKO 1.1866   
(0.6175)
0.8879      
(0.6313)
1.5098    
(0.8021)
Inclusive -0.4026    
(0.5191)
-0.7512    
(0.5253)
-2.0650**   
(0.7507)
GDP -0.3380    
(0.9067)
-0.5271    
(0.9073)
1.2874    
(1.2009)
Democracy  0.0981     
(0.2167)
0.0448      
(0.2314)
0.2725    
(0.3132)
Spending -0.1229    
(0.6436)
 -0.0958    
(0.6405)
-1.3213    
(0.8288)
Intercept 0.4740      
(2.7543)
1.7813      
(2.8852) 
-3.3530    
(3.7116)
Number of 
Observations
118 118 118
Table 4: Alternative Measures of Success of Peace Agreements  
(Logistic Regression)
Significance codes: ****=0     *** = 0.001    ** = 0.01    * = 0.05   • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM -0.7225    
(0.5987)
Relationship: 
Informal
-0.3940   
(0.5832)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
-1.8369*    
(0.7893)
Support: 
Foreign
-20.0767 
(1532.5942)
Support: Illegal -2.6078    
(1.4490) 
Support: 
Domestic
 4.0182*    
(2.0398)
Membership: 
Identity
5.3809***    
(1.6336)
Membership: 
Ideology
-0.2987    
(1.2338)
Target: 
Noncombat
-4.9690*    
(2.1085)
Target: Identity -3.5793*    
(1.7937)
Target: PKO 1.1247    
(1.6382)
Military 0.1455      
(0.6482)
-0.0219    
(0.6738)
-1.3792    
(1.0817)
Political -0.7498    
(0.6744)
 -1.3624    
(0.8060)
 -2.0911   
(1.1898)
PKO 1.2585    
(0.7411)
 1.0247    
(0.7466)
0.7155    
(0.9029)
Inclusive  0.3806    
(0.5420)
-0.0108    
(0.5878)
-0.0763    
(0.8532)
GDP 0.6987    
(0.8420)
0.8097    
(0.8353)
0.8777    
(1.1219)
Polity -0.1214   
(0.0646)
 -0.1338*    
(0.0658)
-0.0608    
(0.1052)
CINC 29.4802   
(25.5006)
36.5291   
(26.3385)
-73.2991   
(42.8641)
Deaths 0.5335    
(0.4310)
0.6854    
(0.4400)
0.9323    
(0.5423)
Intercept -4.1686    
2.9702
-3.8361    
(2.9875)
-2.8381    
(3.8502)
Number of 
Observations
92 92 92
Table 5: Alternative Measures of Success of Peace Agreements  
(Logistic Regression)
Significance codes: ****=0     *** = 0.001    ** = 0.01    * = 0.05   • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
Presence Relationship Characteristics
PGM -0.5799   
(0.7006)
Relationship: 
Informal
  0.2496    
(0.9048)
Relationship: 
Semi-Official
-2.7961*    
(1.1047)
Support: 
Foreign
-20.1305  
(2565.6059)
Support: Illegal -1.4628     
(1.4500)
Support: 
Domestic
1.5533     
(1.4564)
Membership: 
Identity
3.8482*     
(1.8509)
Membership: 
Ideology
0.7189     
(1.3795)
Target: 
Noncombat
 -2.1205     
(1.6058)
Target: Identity -2.0704     
(1.6993)
Target: PKO 19.3820  
(2607.1093)
Military -0.0759   
(0.6774)
-0.7362    
(0.7772)
-0.6287     
(1.2268)
Political -0.4278   
(0.6952)
 -1.7216    
(0.9513)
-1.4246     
(1.3200)
PKO 0.8033   
(0.7836)
 0.2856    
(0.8157)
0.8428     
(1.1895)
Inclusive  0.6294   
(0.6164)
 0.1914    
(0.6980)
 -0.5171     
(0.9587)
GDP -0.7811   
(1.2465)
 -0.7260    
(1.2959)
1.6258     
(2.1872)
Democracy  0.00387   
(0.2680)
0.0583    
(0.3049)
 0.5973     
(0.4194)
Spending 1.1317   
(0.9571)
1.1776    
(1.0488)
 -0.4838     
(1.6764)
Deaths 0.3290   
(0.6301)
0.4356    
(0.7758)
-0.4541     
(0.8992)
Intercept -0.7639   
(4.0009)
0.4125    
(4.4633)
 -5.5341     
(5.6331)
Number of 
Observations
73 73 73
Table 6: Alternative Measures of Success of Peace Agreements  
(Logistic Regression)
Significance codes: ****=0     *** = 0.001    ** = 0.01    * = 0.05   • = 0.1!
Dependent variable: Success of peace agreement
